On this page
-
Text (1)
-
DECEMBEg^g^lSS^.] TJH -E _Jj EiDER. l'!3...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
-
-
Transcript
-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
Poundikuthewar. Au O€ Us Here- Present, ...
Alma , -defective as it was in disposition , and therefore barren in resalts , has been glorious in execution , and covered ¦ with a lustre of immortality the renown of the British and Fiwnch soldiery ; but the battle of Inkerman , from the hrst m rank to the last , was a prodigy of valour ¦ scarcel y inferior to the miracle of Agincourt . The history of 2854 , whatever be its records about the state wisdom of those who rule , will hand down with imperishable renown to the admiration of posterity tlie impetuous military ardour of the ^ French , and the stern , immovable courage of the Britons who fought in the Crimea . However , they tight on a battleiield richer in glory than in possible results , and richest in death . One more such victory as that of Inkerman and the army is lost . It is a sad consolation to know that the tombs of those glorious dead around Sebastopol can say , like those of Thermopylae " Wanderer , tell England thou hast seen us lain obedient to our country's laws . " The English public have been told of late that there never was a position > of more pressing necessity , demanding so imperiously a mind
that can forestal instead of waiting on events , and can avert evils which it may be impossible to repair . That is perfectly just , though somewhat of an . after-fact wisdom come out too late . But if it be just , then there is no good service to England in lulling public opinion to sleep by advising it to let bygones be bygones- A forestalling mind , must look to the -past for instruction . And the great lesson of accomplished facts is , that England ' s policy , in reference to the present ¦ war , has been wrong in its direction , and inefficient , unsuccessful , and disastrous in details . Let us analyse the situation . Your gigantic armada in the Baltic is nearly without a laurel to rest its head upon . To do something effective there , the co-operation of Sweden was a matter of prime necessity . England did not get it , because England ' s policy ¦ was wrong . I told England six months ago that the cooperation of Sweden is to be got only by calling Poland to arms . And lhat was the answer which , three months later , King Oscar gave to General Baraguay d'Hilliers . You have taken Bomarsuiid—a small matter
forsooth—yet when the time comes that necessity will force you to remember Poland , and you shall have to thank her for the advantage of getting Sweden over to your side then Bomarsund would have proved an acceptable offer to Sweden ; but you blew it up ! as if afraid of your own victory , as if bent on the purpose not to have anything to offer to Sweden , "What a gigantic blunder ! England pretended to strike a blow at the commerce of Russia by blockading her coast , and England just succeeded- in turning Russian commerce to Prussia . England has bent her mind on bringing Austria over to herself ; she has sacrificed to this one aim everything —numerous millions spent in vain , the life-blood of the flower of England spilt in vain—principles , political reputation , the liberal character of the war , and the Very issue of the war—everything . And has vour Government cained
Austria ? ( No , no ) . Has it gained that Austria to whom at has sacrificed everything—that Austria of whom even the Times is bound at last to acknowledge that " You are fighting her battle more than your own ? " ( No , no ) . What a proud sneering there was in official quarters when I , months ago , told the good people of England that they believe they pay and bleed for freedom , when in reality they are made to light for Austria . Now it comes out at last . Truth will come out , like murder wiD . Well , has your Government gained Austria ? ( A © . ) Go and rend the well-founded lamentations in the organs- —even the Ministerial organs—of publicity- about the treacherous attitude and the overbearing insolence of that Austria which your Government persisted in courting with so much submission , and which in return facilitates the enterprises of Russia , insults
your allies , and counteracts your combinations . It is not only tltat you have not gained over Austria , but you hare the Turks arrested in the midst of their victorious course ; and the fruit of that heroic struggle , ppor Walluchiu , played over into the treacherous hands of despotic Austria . There is the Turkish army paralysed on tho one hand , and there is on tho other hand the Csar made and loft free to throw overpowering numbers upon tho flunk and the rear of your gallant ranks in tho Crimea . There you have the spirits of tho Turkish army , high-flowing as they wore by the victories at Silistria and Giurgevo , now depressed ; there you have tho spirits of the Russian army , depressed as they were , now restored . And oh , 1 could tell you what it is to neglect tho moment of spirited excitement in a victorious army , and whnt it is to give time to a demoralised enemy to
resume its spirits and to tsiko breath . One such moment ' s neglect iu u war , and it is not buttles , gentlemen , not battles , but empires that may bo lost by it . And ut last , ulna ! not least , there is Sobastopol . Every British heart has watched the great bloody drama there with intense anxiety . 1 am not wanted to tell you the talo of your heart . I wn not wanted to describes how your braves Iiuvo found thuro an entrenchqd cump , with an army , instead of a fortross "with n garrison ( us your Government appears to have anticipated ) -r—how now armies are pouring upon your shattered ranks , as your Government does not appear to havo anticipated , or -olso it would bo more than an error to act us the Government did . All I iun wuutcd to do in to quote from public reports those words : — " Tho question is no longw whethor wo shall take Sob . iBtopol or not . Tlio siugo of ? Subuatopol , though not ruined , may bo rog ; iirilod as a't a NlitnJ-tttill . YVo uro reduced to thu dofonsivo . " Such id tho aituiition . " Tho loaves arc
turned ; Russia is tho besieger , you uro tho besieged . And at what price has thi . i mtuuliou boon purohuuud ? kossuth ' s puoi'iikcv . Gonlhunon , on tho 5 th of July , ton wuoko buforo England embanked ou that oxpuitition , iil-udviaou as woll u « ill-proj > arod , I , in a apuaoh , tho contonUuf whioh would havo boon well for Grout Britain to mind , Bpoko thoao words ut Glasgow : — " Not oiio out of fivu of your bruvow will moo Albion uguin . " Of oourso I umul tho number ligurulivdy , tin indicative ) of u groat Ions . Now , it U a wad lain ; numlmi your doad , your wounded , and your ditiubloil— -mom tlun 20 , MO man out <> f HO . QOOiiro already lo . it . My m »< l unti < . 'iputi <> n « nr « literally fuUillort ! And liuro at , homo ? Wliy , huro thu nuinhuv of wiilowa and orphans applying for nupport to
patriotic charity amounts to 11 , 000 ! Such is the position , gentlemen ! Now , with , that position thus analysed , I , call on contemporary age and on history to say whether I was exaggerating or too harsh in saying that England ' s policy has been wrong , that it has been successful nowhere , but inefficient , unsuccessful , and disastrous everywhere . But you are told for all consolation that " no human foresight could have fully anticipated the extraordinary position which you find yourselves in . " Now , as to this , I must say it is not true . Many a man must have anticipated that position . I , for one , have foretold it fact by fact , and word by word . And I certainly claim not the slightest credit for perspicacity on that account . I wonder how any thinking men could do otherwise than know all this . Yet , if such there were , they could have used the modest light of my poor oil-lamp . It is true the people of Great Britain gave rne tremendous cheers in return , and went home to toil on , and then to
sleep . It is as if I would have been inendieating favours for myself , whereas it was England ' s honour , dignity , interest , and success that I held up before their eyes . They went to toil and to sleep , and the flower of jour nation went to die ; and now , after my disregarded words have proved true , some of them ( the Scottish press ) say— " The words he spoke read like the inspiration of a seer " , or a picture drawn from history . " Others , the Times , say : "No human foresight could have anticipated the extraordinary position in which England finds herself . " Extraordinary ! Why , what is there extraordinary in the inexorable logic of concatenation between cause and effect ? Is it extraordinary that Sebastopol is found to bean entrenched camp witli a numerous aimy in it ? Is it extraordinary that the Czar is pouring whole fresh armies to its defence ? The Czar has been left perfectly free , and with ample time afforded to do it ; my , in fact , he has been invited to do it by the lurco-Austrian treaty , negotiated under England ' s auspices .
POliND ySEEOL TO THE ALLIES . The most extraordinary thing in the matter is not that he has sent reinforcements to Sebastopol , but that he has not sent double the number , and a month earlier . I take this to bs so extraordinary that I find only two explanations to account for it . The first is , that to begin a war with Eussia with landing an expedition iri the Crimea , is an idea so extremely absurd , that the Gzar , giving more credit for foresight to his enemies than they deserved , did . not believe it until you actually landed off Eupatoria . Secondly , and chiefly , you are indebted to Poland for not having to meet 100 , 000 " Russians more at Sebastopol . If England did disregard the fact that Poland is the vulnerable part of Russia , the Czar was prudent enough to mind it . In the Crimea proud England and France attack him ; he is content with opposing 100 , 000 men to them . On the Danube the flower of the Turkish army , elated by victory , defies and menaces he is ntent to
mm , co oppose them with 8 C , 000 men . But to Poland , where there is not one man in arms , but where the unquenchable fire of a heroic nation ' s hatred is smouldering , he sent an army of 300 , 000 men , to be prepared for emergencies . Some may tell you that it is due chiefly to a precaution against Austria . But it is clear to demonstration that the Caar feels perfectly easy about the submissive obedience of his proconsul in Vienna , or else he certainly would , not have left . the very existence of ] iis 80 , 000 men , on the other side of the Pmtli , at the inercy of his good friend the Hapsburg . Yes , it is the name of Poland you liaye to thank for the fact that your whole army in the Crimea , all heroes as they are , has not yet fallen a victim to overpowering numbers . But the situation is sad enough , such as it is . To be sure there may have teen some strategical and tactical mistakes in the operations themselves , such as they are .
CONDUCT OP THE WAR . Sir , I havo not the pretension to say that my pnst could impart authority to my remarks about military matters . I liave not been brought up a soldier , neither can I claim tho lionour of having had to net tho purt of a soldier in our glorious war . My duties worn high and great , hut somewhat of a different nature . Thoy wro just what the duties of your Government are now , only that mine were a great deal more dith ' cult . We hail to fight two great powora alone ; you are three great powers united to light only onoof them . Anil I hud no ready army , no rich treasury , no abundantly-stored arsenals , and no freu communication with
tho world . I had to create everything with , nothing out of nothing ; monoy and armies , and arms , and all military imp lements , secluded as wo were from all tho world , and in tho interior , with tho deludoil third part of our population , armed with tho iirobnmd and with murder , in a condition ¦ worse than tho Vonddo ever Vfaa in Franco , w Ireland sometimes to you . These wore my duties , ami , besides , my duty lias beoii to iksigtiuto the objeots of military oponiiioiis , and to direct tho war in gonoral , ju . st as tho duties of your Government aro . Yet , us Hoklior I . was not ut that time , I oould not draw the plan for tho buttle , nor dirocst it mymilf . But tho fact in , had I boon ublo to add the skill of a soldiur
to my patriotic devotion , no treason would havo crept into our mnlci , and Hungary woro now f ' ruo—not all tho Cssurs of tho world could have ilofoutod uh . And who can yot tell whothor I nniy not yut bo culled upon to nerve my country ? Therefore , I thought tho time of ' iny exile may bo best employed in preparing lor poshihlo ujnorgciu .-iai , hy learning what , unfortunately , I havo not known buloro . And nioduut iia bo my huniblu ul > iliticn , I certainly dure nay , if iisaiduouB application and dinurutiim , guulml by ttxpuriuuuo , may master tho mywlorlon of ' un arl , I am a uuldior now , ami fed competent lojiulgu of military malturt ) . With thin omi-HoiousnonM , 1 nay tlxmi havo oortauily been some very soriou . mmtukctf coiuiuutcU with thu oporatintm in the ( Jmnou . 1 consider It uu unucuouutahle mmtiiko to havo ongugod in tho Bitigo of Sobiistopol without ; titking previously hold of tho Ntrait of Porokop in thu north , anil taking command by huh o < thu buy of Kertoh iu tho cant , ho us to pruvont , or ut hiuHt retard , thu niliilorooinontti which it wum « uh y to forutol that liuHnia would Bond . And that neglect oiioo omittud . 1 certainly cannot undor » tuiul tho logic of Hhiliing tho Limn of opuration down to tho uoulhurninbat coriiur of tho poniiiaula ,
thus leaving the whole of the land free to draw hence supplies to Sevastopol , and leaving the liussians not only entirely at liberty to send reinforcements to the Crimea , but leaving to them , besides , the very road , perfectly open and unimpeded , even to enter Sebastopol in small or large numbers , just as they please , without liaving to fight for it . My opinion is that , yours being what is called a moveable basis ( the fleet ) , you could choose that point all along the coast which was the best to rest upon . Now , the bulk of your allied squadron is actually , not south of Sebastopol , at Balaklava , but north oi' Sebastopol , off the Katcha river . Why not remain there with the army likewise ? Why not draw . up your lines , leaning on the Belbek river , affording more or less protection against cavalry ? There , with a well-provided redoubt at the point where the only road from the interior splits in t- \ vo towards Sebastopol an > l Balaklavayou .
, by your position , already had restricted the communications of Sebastopol to that narrow convex where it is now your bad fortune to be jent up . You would have cut off all their supplies from the interior , and no reinforcements could have entered Sebastopol without having first to fight separately an open field battle , wherein , certainly , the Russians are no match for your heroes there . Instead-of that , your army has been established so as to leave Sebastopol perfectly , free to communicate with the whole empire of Russia . This is a strategical error , in my humble opinion , not even justified b y technical considerations . By besieging the north instead of the south of Sebastopol you would have encountered more of permanent fortifications , which is no difficulty for engineers , but would , have encountered less of an entrenched camp , with less numerous a . garrison , which makesyour real difficulty ; aud at last , on . ee the north side fortifications
taken , you would have become masters of the town alike ; whereas , ' .-on the . contrary , the taking of the town will not make you masters of the northern forts . You would have to return for besieging them to where , you had better have begun , were it not more likely that ,, in taking the town , you would either have to do what yon diil at lloiiiarsuiid , and sail off , and swiftly too , or would " have , in your turn , to stand a siege , with the difference th . it , while you were the besiegers Kussia had to stand the siege in a fortified place ; you , on , the contrary , would have to stand it amid ruins , yawning , shattered , and smouldering . Even as to the battle of Alma , glorious as it has been in personal gallantry , from the Commander-in-chief down to the lowest in rank and file , I cannot help thiuking that it has been a wantoa sacrifice of valuable life , and very defective in plan . A strong position should never be attacked when it can be carried by turning it .
And this was evidently the case . A march of two English , miles up the Almui must have forced the Russians either to retreat or to change then-front , with the loss of all the advantages of the position . Not the wings of the line of battle , but tho position had to be turned . And as to the battle itself , why , the plan of turning both the wings of a line of battle is certainly the ; worst plan which could be imagined . It is condemned by theory as well as by all the history of modern warfare . It did not succeed on the right wing of the enemy where it would have been of importance ; the success ou the Other wing was just so much as if the French had been bent ou the generosity of preserving the Russians from being driven into tho sea , in cast" the English flanking movement succeeded . And then the battle was reduced to a parallel attack in front , "which will say so much as a perfect absence of any plan at all . It waa a bull-fight , breasts against
breasts , and horn against horn . Thu impetuous bearing of tho French soldier , and the stern courage of the English soldier , have carried the day . The French liavo gloriously maintained their military renown , and tho English soldier deserved the more praise , us your shilling and poundfasliioniid military regulations give him a very scanty share in those impulses of noble ambition which the French soldier draws from the conscience thut he curries the materials to a Marshal's staff in his knapsack—a neglect on your part , bythe-by , which is u dim spot on tho shining robo of EnglUh . civilisation . Tlioy have gained the day—till honour to them—but the 4000 wounded and doad laid low on that day could havo been spared forsooth . However , all tlicao mid liko mistakes enter only for secondary considerations in Gstiinatinp ; tho situation sui ' . h an it is . Tho chief error ( if not more ) on
tho part of tho Western Powers is in tho very idwi of beginning a war against UuMsiu by a systematic campaign in tho Crimea . Not thut I am of opinion that this war nhould have beiin brought , or should lie brought , to ai > end without wresting the Oriiuua from tho U / . itr , mid destroying his Black Sea fleet ; but I am decidedly of ihu opinion thut , if an attack on Subustopol hu . s not . or could not liuvu been tried by a nuvul coup da main , tho very next day after the outrageous slaughter at Siixopo , a Hy . sti'inulio expedition to tho Crimea ought to havo boon «» o of th » last strokes , and by no ujouns the first ; in no ciuso one which I would havo undertaken to dual hoioro 1 hud , by hucoi'mmI ' uI vie Lories in lkittmirubiu . and urouml Odo . iHii , < lrivon tin : Ku .-wiiuis hank from thu Blii-. 'k Situ , aud pcMiutstly imitated Uio Crimea from tho retst of thu lluusiun ( jinpij'Q . Thmi taking my stand witli thu main body of my force in u convenient , locality , Honuiwliero ubovn Oileum ( which , ronioinbi . T , might huvobwn ucuumplinhiuJ
uttuircumutiuicos woro up to tlio half of Soptmiibor ) , I ourtumly would havo Hunt Huiiio lit ) , 000 men to tuko Helmutopoj , who , herittitt art thoy are , with a gullunt , Iutulligmil , unii experienced cliUif at thuir heud , u « Lunl Uuglnu ih , would Uuvo duun thoii' work up to thio day hihIoi miioIi oirouinhtuiices , nud wuuM havo found MuUfiohilcou" cut oil' f ' coin ovury liopo of mliof , lighting , ul . tlm I / umI ., but ibr military reputation , an ( Si-ncrul ( Jmi . v . tJ ilid at Antwiirp . Hut , in tho mo ; iu whilo , 1 would Jiuvo been perluutly ( ionUuit with kiniwing tlio Jtan . tiun fleet , was utturly purnh / iiixl by tho very jiiiinoiu . ' e of your vu . itly huj > orioi" hijuitdrou iu tho lJludc . Si'ii ( an easy tank with thut uuval f ' uruo . and with n littlo vigilance ) . 1 would liuvo bodii mlhor gUil to know that thu nui'Ottnity of kociiiug H « l ) i » nlop . » l wull gurrlnoned would hocvo uiu liko a ilivoi-rtion , by Uuuping ho much Hinallor tho main KiiMHiun Hi-juy , vliiuh 1 wum onga ^ oil iu dofoating . Uut , huforo dofoiiting tho Uim . iian . i doomivoly in tho Hold , iu no cuau would 1 luivo uovorud my ditipouublo l ' oroou , ua you did
Decembeg^G^Lss^.] Tjh -E _Jj Eider. L'!3...
DECEMBEg ^ g ^ lSS ^ . ] TJH -E _ Jj EiDER . l' ! 35
-
-
Citation
-
Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 2, 1854, page 7, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_02121854/page/7/
-