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Jtjjhs 9, 1855.] THE LEADER, gg$
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Imperial Parliament. Tote Two Houses Met...
of the late Emperor of Russia than the speeches oJ Messrs . Bright and Cobden could have effected . As to the ideas that had been spread abroad with respect to Russia descending upon the whole of Europe , and sweeping away liberty and civilisation , these were mere hobgoblins . Russia had never eneroached upon the West , except at the direct invitation of the Western Powers . The way in which Lord Palmerston had held outdndirect hopes to the unhappy Poles , when he Icnew that this country would never support him in a war of nationalities , was unjustifiable , and might jeopardise our friendly relations with other European powers . If we attempted the reconstruction of Poland , we should find , to quote the words of an eminent Pole , that such a result is " about as probable as the reform of the Koran , or the reinvigoration of the Turks , " and that " both will be accomplished about the same time . " As regai-ds the question of " taking care of Turkey , " Russia had not refused to bind herself by moral guarantees to-respect the territory and independence of the Sublime Porte . But our insisting that Russia should limit her naval power In the Black Sea was both puerile and unjust , and a thing hitherto quite unheard of . The Russian proposal to open the straits to the ships of all nations was , in his opinion better than our plans , and offered to Turkey the best security . The policy of a mare clausum would furnish no basis of a lasting peace . The threatened aggression upon Turkey had been arrested , and the war should therefore be brought to a close ; for otherwise we might enter into a contest which would only terminate with exhaustion . Sir William Moleswokth assumed the gist of the question contained in the several amendments to lie in the consideration whether or not we ought to have made peace upon the Russian suggestions with regard to the Third Point . Now , in connexion with this point , Russia had resorted to every kind of diplomatic artifice ; and to accept her proposals would be to abandon the main object of the war , and to sanction that very menace to Turkey which we have engaged to destroy . The first Russian proposal would compel the Allies to run a never-ending race of war establishments and war expenditure with Russia in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean . Russia would increase her fleet , and then we should be obliged to increase outs ; and a collision would be certain to ensue . As to the second Russian proposal , France and England , to afford any protection to Turkey , would be morally bound to maintain in the Mediterranean fleets always ready to obey the summons of Turkey , and to cope with the fleet of Russia in the Black Sea . Either proposition , therefore , would entail upon us the burdens of continual war . Russia has already made concessions which have only been extorted from her by fear ; and our late successes in the Sea of Azof , together with our command of the Baltic and the Euxine , ought to induce us to persevere in our demands until they are fully complied with by Russia . " Let the history of the campaign of 1829 , and its conclusion , as recorded by Moltke , be a warning to us not to allow Europe to be again tricked by Russian artifices into a fatal compromise like that by which Russia was saved at that period from a complete and ignominious defeat , and the Sultan of Turkey was compelled to sign a disastrous peace . Let . not a future historian record that the statesmen of England , on the eve of a great success , consented to an ignominious and dangerous peace . The acceptance of these Russian terms would , in his opinion , be dangerous even to ourselves , for it would bo a confession of defeat on the part of England and France , by which Russia would be elevated into a prominence menacing to all Europe and Asia . It would embolden her to fresh aggressions , and teach her to despise the remonstrances and threats of the Western Powers . Such a peace would make Austria less disposed to be our adherent , Prussia more detached from us , and all the petty principalities of Germany more servile to our foe . It would lesson the military reputation both of France nnd England , would put to shame the efforts of their brave armies , and excite the rourmura and recriminations of commanders and officers both in the army and navy . Such a ponco would weaken the alliance between France and England , and perhaps make it necessary for thorn to seek ere long some new battlefields on which to regain the honour they would have lost . Such a recreant peace would he dangerous to oursolvos , ho repeated . It would shake the foundations of our Indian empire , which were laid on the opinion of our irresistible might amongst a tickle and various people , cattily moved from tho extreme ( if . suliinissioii to the extreme of audacity ; and that Indian umpire of ours is over watched by our bitter and irreconcilable foes , who nro looking on at this contest , and roady , if the Knglish power should prove loss formidablo than it . bus formerly nppoanid , to attack us on tho lndiun frontier . Such a peace would , all over tho world , jilllict every man of British descent with a huiiko of diMgiaw , and niaku ( he oolonim of Groat Ilritniu ashamed of tho niotln-rcountry ' H humiliation ; it would coiivurl . those feelings of affection which they manifested at . tlio coninience . inent of this struggle into noutiine , nln of dissatisfaction throughout our colonial dominions . " Mr . Joiur M'Giuaaou commented upon tho ag *
H gressive policy of Russia , regarded the limitation of i the Russian ships in the Black 'Sea as totally insuf-; ficient to the end proposed , and held that the Euxine should be declared open to the ships of all nations , and that Russia should be forced in the end to pay the whole expenses of the war . —Mr . G . H . Vbemon thought the proposals of Russia offered a basis for satisfactory adjustment , aiad that our proposition was not justifiable ; while- Lord Dixngarvon contended that we ought not to recede from our high position , but that hostilities should be carried on vigorously . — Mr . Henr y Baillie condemned the mismanagement of the Government with regard to military matters . We had only been able to furnish an army of 40 , 000 men fit for taking the field : any secondary German power could have done as much in less time . And in doing this , England has been denuded of troops to such an extent that there are not as many as four regiments of the line remaining in the United Kingdom . We have also been left without reserves ; and , unless the bounty and pay of soldiers be increased ( at present , the wages are just half those of a common labourer ) , we shall find the greatest difficulty in recruiting . Mr . Baillie wa 8 also of opinion that the Government ought to have availed itself of the resources of our Indian army , and to have roused Circassia . — Mr . Monckton Milnes hoped that , as the Conferences have terminated , Austria -would cease to occupy the position of mediator , and England and France would be left to decide the quarrel upon principles that may secure the goodwill of Europe . He thought that we should have pursued a wiser course had we confined our operations to the ocean ; and he believed that the exclusion of all ships of war from the Black Sea , except for purposes of police , would afford the best solution of the difficulty . That sea should be thrown open to commercial vessels , but shut against the armaments of every flag . —Sir Edward Dering condemned the proposal made to Russia for limiting her naval force in the Euxine ; but , at the same time , thought that the tvo suggesstions of Russia were open to great objections . He desired more effectual guarantees than those already demanded . The preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea does not depend altogether upon her navy , but upon an undue share of the shores of that sea , especially Anapa , and that part of the Eastern coast of the Euxine which has been acquired by Russia in violation of the treaty of Bucharest . If the river Kuban could be made the boundary of Russia in that direction , we should obtain all that we can expect . — Lord Elcho , conceiving that the object of the war has not been attained , would not be satisfied with anything less than the limitation of the Russian power in the Black Sea . Lord Claud Hamilton made a vehement pro-Russian speech ; contending that in 1832 the late Emperor might havo seized Constantinople if he had so desired , but that instead he sent his fleet and army to protect the Sultan from the victorious troops of Ibrahim Pacha . In the negotiations which preceded the present war , it was Turkey which refused to accept the Vienna note ; and this was before the Russian interpretation of that note , which was said to have changed its character . That refusal on the part of Turkey led to the present war . The heaviest blows which the Forte has received of lute years have not come from Russia , but from France and England . Tho destruction of her fleet at Navarino was more the act of France and England than of Russia ; bo was the separation of Greece , which deprived Turkey of iill her able seamen , and reduced her fleet to its present state . When her power in Syria was threatened with destruction , it' was Russia that came to her aid . The recent negotiations had been entered into by tho Government without any sincere desire to arrive at a successful issue . It was impossible to suppose that Russia would consent to an arrangement under which she would be restricted to four ships , while the Allies might sail round her coasts with ten . Tho blamo of breaking off tho negotiations rests elsewhere than with Russia ; nnd , us lie never could reconcile his conscience to taking part in tho war , he could not rest satisfied with giving n silent vote . Sir BuLWKK Lytton , in reply to Mr . Gibson , said that the continuance of the war was necessary to tho honour of England , nnd that , if tho honour of such a country as this wore lowered or ( Unregarded , our material interests themselves would in the end be vitally injured . Commenting upon tho course taken by Mr . Gladstone , he observed that that gentleman had been * i party to tho expedition to the Crimea , and ivns therefore responsible for all ith logical consequences . Mr . Gladstone had complained that tlio terms of peace had been unwisely extended ; but to whom was that owing ? Why , to Lord Aberdeen , who said that tho condi- < lions of peace must vary , with the fortunes of war . Tho right honourable gentleman , moreover , seemed i to have forgotten ournlly in thus proposing to creep i out of the quarrel , though ho w « s very mindful of ' that , nlly when opposing inquiry into the niisinanngeinent of the war . Kussiii , said Mr . Gladstone , had i moderated her own twins ; but how was this change t
| ' effected ? It was effected ~ by the sword—* y the fldlSs of Alma and Inkerman . Sir Bulwer Lytton then exhibited , by menus of arguments similar tt > those of Sir William Molesworth , the futility of the terms proposed by Russia ; and , passing to a consideration of the several motions and amendments before the House , gave his undivided approval to the original resolution . This had not changed the Government , ' bub it had changed their tone . With respect to Austria , he thought they should maintain friendly relations with her as long as she remains neutral . It is easy to say that she might be reduced to a fonrth-rate power ; but her answer would be that she is as neeessary as a counterpoise to France as Turkey is necessary as a counterpoise to Russia . Still , our attitude towards Austria had been much , too supplicating ; but , on the other hand , we ought not to raise fallacious hopes among the nationalities and democracies of Europe . " The noble lord the member for Lynn had said that there was nothing so impolitic as humiliating a foe when you could not crush him , quoting JVTachiavelli in support of his proposition . He warned his noble friend against the attempt to reduce the grand science of statesmanship to scholastic maxims . We could not , it was true , crush Russia as Russia ; but we could crush her attempt to be anything more than Russia . If might be said that William of Orange could not have crashed LouiB the Fourteenth , or that the burgesses of the Netherlands could not crush the house of Austria ; but William of Grange did crush Louis in aggressive action upon Holland , and the burghers resisted successfully the house of Austria . In the same way , his noble friend might depend upon it , we could crush Russia in her attempts to injure our ancient ally . The right hon . gentleman the member for Manchester had asked when , if the policy indicated was followed out , would the war end ? He ( Sir Bulwer Lytton ) believed that if we were only in earnest in carrying it on , and limited it to its legitimate objects , it could not last long . In these days war was money , and it was impossible for any power to sustain a long war with a short purse . The pecuniary resources of Kussia were already becoming exhausted ; her trade was almost annihilated , while her recruiting system was being carried on in a way which , besides draining the country of its adult male population , inflicted a heavy loss upon the lords of the soil and incalculable misery and discontent upon the people . " The Lord-Advocate agreed with the sentiments uttered by Sir Bulwer Lytton , and said that , looking to the tone of the debate , he did not think any doubt could exist as to what is the opinion of the country on the subject of the war . On the motion of Mr . Cobden , the debate was adjourned ; and , after a little routine business , the House rose . The discussion was reopened the following night by Mr . Cobden , who commenced by vindicating himself and those who think with him from the imputations cast upon them by the majority . In the same way that they were now charged with being the tools of Russia , Burke in former times had been denounced as an American , Chatham lay under similar opprobrium , and Fox was held up as a mere hireling in the pay of France . Honourable gentlemen , therefore , who have no facts or imagination of their own on which to base their arguments , should be ashamed to reproduce absurd and calumnious partisan accusations of that kind in such a debate . " I will deal with this question ( said Mr . Cobden ) as a politician , strictly on the principles of policy and expediency ; and I am prepared to assume that wars may be inevitable and necessary , although I do not admit that all wars arc so . We , therefore , who took exception to the commencement of this war on grounds of policy , are not to be classed by individual members of this House with tho 3 c who arc necessarily opposed to all ware whatovor . That ia but a device to represent a section of this House as advocates of notions so Utopian that they must be entirely shut out of tlio arena of modern politics , and their arguments be systematically denied that fair hearing to which all nluulos of opinion arc entitled , no matter from what quarter they may emanate . I say , that wo have all one common object in viow—w 0 all hboIc tho interest of our country ; and tho only basis on which this debate . should bo conducted 18 that of tho honest and just iiitere . stH of England . " The interests of England are the only questions in which tho Mouse of Commons can concern ltsclt ; and members ought therefore to cast from them all tho declamatory huMonlusli they have lately heard from tho Treasury bench as to our lighting for tho liberty of tho entire world . " You don ' t seriously mean " observed Mr . Cobdon , " to light for anything of the kind . " The opinions of Sir William Molesworth , as exprossed on the previous evening , were at direct variances with all the previous declarations of that gentleman , who , when wo were in danger of ifoini ? to wnr with Franco on tlio Syrian b ^ ST ^ e'SWr , made a speech in the streets of Leeds * ffi \ u >»* 79 S * ' \ involving ourselves in hostilities for tjtt ? pryfottttyn ' . tfjftf . ' ); Turks , Syrians , Kgyptiims , Greeks , ^'''' X ^ ' ^ ' ^ . ^ - ^ t ' The question before the House was , ^ yJietfljaij tlw > ,. gw j . \ bronco between our plan and the Ifcwsitm'plaw wuaV :. ; , } raoh ' RS to justify us in contiuuim ^ hoC'ywV ; - 'typ ^ A !» . ! ¦ ' i ¦ r . , ¦ ¦ > .-1
Jtjjhs 9, 1855.] The Leader, Gg$
Jtjjhs 9 , 1855 . ] THE LEADER , gg $
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), June 9, 1855, page 3, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_09061855/page/3/
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