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32 The Leader andSaturday Analyst. [Jan....
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MB. BRIGHT AT BIRMINGHAM, T / I7"E canno...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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The President's Message. Nphe Patience O...
muster an annoyance incident to his high station ; but as the House can * if it so p leases , go on baUotmg without results for an indefinite period , and father likes the dead-lock , inasmuch it allows long speeches de omnibus rebus— - and the pay runs on all the whilej- ^ Mr . Buchanan has done well to wait no longer , and force the ' House—as the delivery of his message will have the effect ofdoing—to elect its Speaker and go to work . The message has lost much of its interest in this country , by the delay which has already taken place in its publication . Whatever interest we may feel in the internal politics of the United States , and their relations to Spain and Central America ,
we are of course much more concerned about our own dealings with them ; and if there happens , as is usually the case , to be a " difficulty" between the two Governments somewhere , we are eager to learn what the President has to say about it . The paragraphs , therefore , which refer to the San Juan affair , would have possessed considerable interest whilst the results of General Scott ' s mission were unpublished ; but since it has become known that the question was in train for an amicable arrangement , the remarks of the President have lost their attraction . It is satisfactory , however , to have his distinct official announcement that there is no longer any fear of a collision between the forces of the two countries , and
that the question has become the object of special negotiations . It would have been but right that Mi-. Buchanan , whilst commending the forbearance of the British admiral , should have rebuked the temerity and insolence of General Harney ; but it would , perhaps , be too much ito ask an American President who has riot entirely abandoned the hope of re-election to directly censure the hero of a class which , exercises so potent an influence upon the elections . We are not at all surprised to be told that the differences arising out -of the Clayton-Bui / weh treaty are not yet adjusted . The same statement will be probably repeated in two or three future messages , since the difficulties in question
depend partly for their solution upon arrangements with two or three of the petty republics of Central Americai : and have their sole origin in the repudiation by the United States of its own distinct Engagements . They will probably prove again a pretext for stirring up the anti-English feeling amongst the Irish democrats of the north ; butas-something of that kind must be done every year , it is really better that the occasion , should be a matter about which Englishmen certainly will never excite themselves , and , consequently , one which can by no chance lead to war . Upon the whole , the message is as friendly towards us as is consistent with' the traditional style of such documents , and we may
congratulate ourselves accordingly . It is upon Spain that the weight , of Mr . Buchanan ' s denunciations falls . If w e have been spared , it is only that she may be trounced more severely . There is a paltry sum of some 1 . 20 , 006 dollars , called the " Cuban claims , " alleged to be due to certain American citizens , for duties unjustly exacted from American . vessels in Cuba about fifteen . years ago , which always figures prominently in the presidental indictment against Spain ,
by every law , human and divine , we shall be justified m wresting it from Spain if we possess the power and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbour , if there , were . no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home . " Perhaps the most important portion of the message is that which relates to Mexico . The President , after dwelling : upon the outrages inflicted upon American citizens , asks Congress to pass a law authorizing him to employ military force against
Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future . Should the request be granted , that most unhappy country will be exposed to the horrors of invasion , as well as to those of civil war . It is scarcely possible , however , that things can be much worse than they now are ; and it is becoming the conviction , even of those most averse to American filibustering policy , that the only hope for Mexico and . Central America lies in their annexation by the United States . It is evident that such a consummation must come sooner or later ; it is
merely a question of time ; and the sooner , therefore , the American Government introduces order and something like security , the better for the people and the world generally . The United States themselves have most to apprehend from such an acquisition ; but if , in pursuance of what they deem their manifest destiny , they will even seek pretences for hastening it , it is not for us to attempt to stay them . Mr . Buchanan ' s domestic policy seems to be a vigorous support of Slavery , and a strong show of hostility to the . Slave trade . The one event recorded in the message which fills him with joy is the recognition of Slavery by the Supreme Court as a fundamental , we 1 night almost say necessary , institution of the Union . AYe can understand his satisfaction , as a strong
pro-Slavery man , at this decision ; but not his presumption that it will prove a final settlement of the question . As singular is his belief that the events at Harper ' s Ferry Avill be the ; means of allaying existing excitement . The decision ' of . the Supreme Court , and the Harper ' s Ferry outbreak and its results , may prove that the lawis 011 the side of the Slavery -party , ¦ arid' that their opponents are rather ¦ hair-brained ' enthusiasts than practical politicians ; but they no more dispose of the agitation , or cement the Union , tlian the pettiest election triumph gained by a democrat in one of the open States . They rather hasten the " irrepressible conflict , " and increase the danger of a dissolution of the " cherished Union . " The Federal law may . be against the " Republicans , " but . they will render it practically inoperative in the states iii which they predominate ; and the judicial declaration that Slavery is the keystone of the Union will lead many who were before friendly to it to desire its dissolution . The victories of the slaveholders arc
like those of Pyititnus : another great one may prove their rum . A cause like theirs cannot be maintained by aggression arid propagandisin ; their hope lies in their own quietude , and the absurd excesses of their opponents . It is but consistent that the supporter of one kind of spoliation , in the shape of slavery , should be the advocate of that other , which takes the form of protection and prohibition . Nothing more natural ; therefore , than the President ' s recommendation to raise the import duties . Mr . Buchanan ' s message is not one in which'the friends and well-wishers of the great "Republic , which , according ; - to him , enjoys the " special protection of Divine Providence , " can find much satisfaction . It portrays her greedy for fresh territories , unscrupulous about the means of acquiring them , and all the while distracted at home by mi agitation which threatens to find its solution in a disruption of the Union which has made her what she is .
and is , of course , made much of by Mr . Buchanan . Thq claim may be a just one , but if settled at once Spain would obtbin no relief . If Mr . Buchanan has any project which deserves the name of a policy , it is the acquisition of Cuba . He first directly proposed the scheme , has successfully traded upon it as a politician , and , having gained power , adheres to it . He is , therefore , at least , entitled to such merit as ' consistency in a bad cause mriy entitle him to . lie recommended the acquisition of Cuba in the famous or infamous Ostend manifesto ; he'recommended it in
lus last message , and asked Congress to take the question into consideration—a request to which Congress very sensibly paid no attention , He repeats the recommendation and request in the present message . Of course the question is mainly one for Spain and the United States to settle by themselves . It may be as Mr . Buchanan put it in his previous message , that the geographical position of the island makes its acquisition necessary to the United States , while its possession is of'little importance to Spain . It may be quite true that America is rich
and Spain poor , and that the bargain would be a mutually advantageous one ; and if they can agree upon terms , well and good . But it must not be forgotten that Mi " . Buchanan has calculated upon the probability of Spain ' s refusal , and propounded a policy to bo adopted in that event . It will sct \ rcoly bo for the interest of civilization and progress that the doctrines of the Ostend manifesto should prevail ; and it may be useful , as some guide to the principles which influence the ruler of the United States , to repeat lore the sentiments ho expressed in 1854 ;—
" After we , shall have ofifered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present valuc > and this . shall . have been refused , it will then bo time to oonsider the quostion , Poos Gulfti in tho possession of Spain seripusly endanger our internal peace , and the existence of pur cherished Union ? " Should this question be answered in tho afiirmativo , then ,
32 The Leader Andsaturday Analyst. [Jan....
32 The Leader andSaturday Analyst . [ Jan . 14 , I 860 .
Mb. Bright At Birmingham, T / I7"E Canno...
MB . BRIGHT AT BIRMINGHAM , T / I 7 " E cannot wonder that Mr , Biuoht's organ should be ex' " tremcly ungvy with the Times for comparing its hero to the " carcase of a defunct tabby " floating 011 the tide ; but the criticism of an enemy , however unsavoury , is often valuable , and it would bo well for the honourable member for Birmingham and his adherents to consider , not whether such an expression is justifiable , but what there has been in his conduct whioh may have suggested to an unscrupulous opponent so coarse an
invective . Prom Mr . Bright s long prominence before the country , and his acceptance or assumption of tho position of leader of tho Reform party , it might have been reasonably cxpcoted that he would guide , not simply follow opinion—that he would rule the elements ho hod invoked , mid provo master of the circumstances which , to some extent at least , he had produced . If these are jeeqognised asfrhe- duties and attributes- of a political leader , it will be impossible to read Mr , Bkight ' s Birmingham oration without disappointment and regret . Polivorecl just before tho mooting of Parliament , in a city famous for its services to reform , mid-b y " tho man put forth as tho champion of the un-
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 14, 1860, page 4, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_14011860/page/4/
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