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tfo. 408, January 16,1858.] THE LEADER, ...
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SPECIAL LETTERS FROM INDIA. (From a Mili...
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STATE OF TRADE. Business at Manchester d...
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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The Indian Revolt..—•—*—• We Are Now Bet...
a rate to be fixed according to the functions and position which may have been assigned to him . " 4 . Every native commissioned and non-commissioned officer and soldier who has formed part of the garrison shall receive the order of merit , with the increase of pay attached thereto , and shall be permitted to count three years' additional service . " 5 . The soldiers of the 13 th , 48 th , and 71 st regiments , N . I ., who have been part of the garrison , shall be formed into a regiment of the line , to be called the Regiment of Lucknow , the further constitution of which , as regards officers and men , will be notified hereafter . " A melancholy occurrence which took place at Lucknow during the siege is related by the corresnondent of a Calcutta newspaper , who writes . —
* . _ _ _ i . !_• L il " The enemy have two enormous guns , to which they have given the names of Jasim and Alum . These huge pieces of artillery caused considerable annoyance to Sir James Outram at the Paly Guard , in consequence of which he detached a part of his men to charge the guns and take them . They did so in gallant style ; but , when they had advanced far enough , a mine was sprung , and a terrible havoc ensued among our poor fellows . A rumour reached camp to the effect that six hundred of our gallant fellows , who left for Lucknow with a large supply of ammunition , were surrounded on the way by a large body of the enemy . "
Tfo. 408, January 16,1858.] The Leader, ...
tfo . 408 , January 16 , 1858 . ] THE LEADER , _____ 53 _ ~ —— - | . " - " . " * - ^ . , : ¦ . —; ^
Special Letters From India. (From A Mili...
SPECIAL LETTERS FROM INDIA . ( From a Military Correspondent . } Nagpore , November 28 , 1857 . Sib , —In my last letter I spoke of the defects which in my opinion had rendered the native armies of the three Presidencies unworthy of trust , and had made the dissolution of the Bengal army in particular bo rapidly contagious and so complete ; and I made some suggestions for the reorganization of the Indian army , as the subject of more immediate and pressing interest and necessity .
I now propose to point out what are the causes which have led to the general distrust and disaffection throughout India , of which the mutiny of the sepoys , and the rebellion over a vast area to the north of the Nerbudda , may be considered as merely premonitory and diagnostic symptoms . But let us first endeavour to estimate the true nature of the crisis through which our Indian Empire has passed , and of the internal and intrinsic forces by which it was saved from utter ruin and destruction . For be it remembered , six months of danger were endured , Delhi was taken and Lucknow relieved , before a single
soldier arrived from England . Dreadful as were the events of last May , June , Jnly , and August , great as have been our humiliation and loss , we have for this time escaped from possibilities a thousand times more appalling . Nothing less than a war of extermination , the natural plan of a weak and ignorant people struggling against a dominant alien race , was aimed at by the Nana Sahib and the other spontaneous leaders of the insurrection ; nothing less was hoped by all , and fully expected by the great majority of the mutineers and rebels than that their signal would be taken and their example followed by all the Nawabs and Rajahs of India , and by the armies of the three Presidencies , and in short that a simultaneous rising should take place all over the peninsula . None but the wilfully
blind can fail to see how nearly their expectations were fulfilled . The Bombay army , though far from the scene of action and but partially associated in race and customs with the actors , has in a sufficiently alarming manner responded to the cry for war and vengeance on the European masters of India . The Madras army has come through the crisis without any outward agitation ; but those who know them best know well , as I explained in my last , where the sympathies of the sepoys were during the uncertain and anxious period of this terrible outbreak . Scindiab , Hplkur , and the Rajah of Rewah , the three most powerful and influential princes within reach of the first vibrations of revolt , have all found a largo party of their relations , nobles , officers , soldiers , and subjects in general , intent upon making common cause with the rebels—so intent that they have in all three States not hesitated to throw off their allegiance to their own sovereigns . At Hyderabad , the firmness and vigilance of Solar Jung , the Minister of the Nizam , with difficulty
prevented a general Mahorncdan rising . At Jhansi , one of Lord Dalhousie ' a annexations , the most terrible massacre of all , with the exception of that at Cawnpore , took place , and the district still forma a rallying place for rebels . At Sattara , another of his annexations , there wns a deeply laid plot , which was fortunately discovered in time , baffled by Lord Elphinstone ' a prompt despatch of European , troops to the spot , and punished by seventeen executions . At Nagpore , another and porhapa tho most unjustifiable and reckless of all Lord Dalhouaio'a annexfttionflfthere-were-pl 0 Uing 8-enougl » ,. but , _ owing .. t ; o the wiadom and prudence of a venerable lady , II . II . the Banka Baeo , tho widow of Rughojoo tho Second , who fought against us at Assayo and Argaum , no important conspiracy waa brought to maturity . Tho Maliratta chieftains at Nagporo without her countenance would not attempt a rising j and tho only people who endeavoured to imitate at Nagporo tho clcoda of Mccrut and Delhi wore an obscure party of Mussulman fanatics , whoso plans were frustrated by the local authorities ,
without a shot being fired or any resistance offered . Nine executions terminated the troubles at Nagpore , which never actually agitated the surface of the native population . In the annexation of Oude , the largest and richest of Lord Dalhousie ' s annexations , the birth-place of nearly one half of the late Bengal army , may he found the climax of the disgust , distrust , and spite which , increasing throughout India for the last twenty-five years , at last exploded in the rebellion of 1857 . In Oude we have hitherto met with stout resistance , and now that so many of the large Zemindars in that province are * up , ' it will not be settled again without considerable expenditure of blood and treasure .
We must be very careful not to underrate the magnitude and peril of the crisis through which we have just passed . A partially successful rising at Nagpore . the murder of the Commissioner and the lew English officers residing near that city , the plunder of the treasury and arsenal by the Mussulman fanatics , would have forced the more influential and powerful Mahratta and Brahmin chieftains to take possession of the movement , and the Ranees could not , in all probability , have resisted any longer . A little more boldness and determination , an hour or two more to perfect their preparations , would have easily given the Mahomedan conspirators at
Nagpore this partial success . There was nothing to oppose them at Seetabuldee , the residence of the Commissioner and his staff . And after this auspicious beginning a Mahratta cavalcade , a few flags , a Rajah or a Ranee in the saddle , distributing money and gold ornaments , would , in the month of June , have terribly tried and shaken the Madras sepoys ; and the effect of the news on the immense and turbulent population of Hyderabad would probably have been decisive . The name of the Banka Baee of Nagpore is well known ; and the news of any one of the Ranees , a tcoman , being in the field would have roused the whole Decean . The Nizam and his
Minister , Salar Jung , if they had endeavoured to stem the tide , would have been swept away , and some other member of the family raised to the throne . During June and July , the subordination of the Madras and Bombay armies , and the peace of the Deccan and of the Carnatic , were almost entirely dependent on the tranquillity of Nagpore , Hyderabad , and Poonah . The two former cities were more to be suspected and feared than the latter , but any one of the three would in all probability have carried away the other two in resistance and war to the knife against the British power . It would not have mattered in which city the outbreak first took place , they would have mutually reacted on one another ; and the defection of any of the troops at one of these places would have been the signal for the dissolution of
the Madras and Bombay armies . Poonah and Sattara , the petty Rajahs and Sirdars of the Deccan , Khandeish and Guzerat , would have risen at a signal from either Nagpore or Hyderabad . Kurmool and Cuddapah , two Madras districts containing numbers of warlike Pathan Mahomedans , would have followed the example of Hyderabad ; Mysore , Tanjore , Trichinopoly , the Moplahs of Malabar , the Mahomedans of Madras itself , almost entirely denuded of European troops , would have joined in the war of extermination ; and with a mutinous and murderous Madras army , what resistance could have been offered by the English ? No European fugitive
would have had a resting-place for the sole of his foot in any part of India , except perhaps in the three great Presidency towns . There would have been a series of Cabul and Cawnpore massacres throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula . It would have been the beginning of the end , so far aa our existing power in India is concerned : we should have had to begin again entirely . Our enemies would have had time and space to organize and eatablish themselves , and no native State could much longer have pretended to uphold our cauae . We should no longer have been able to speak of rebels or mutineers , but should have had to enter India ouraclves as foreign invaders .
These possibilities we have escaped for this time ; wo have never lost the prestige , the awe , tho credit , which belonged to an established and recognized Government . Except at Delhi and at Lucknow the rebels have never succeeded in getting even tho form and semblance of a national and sovereign leader . Nana Sahib at Cawnpore was almost a foreigner ; at Poonah he would have been fonnkluble . In Oude , the most recently annexed , and notoriously an unquiet province , the great zemindars and noblea appear to bo about equally divided into a hostile and a neutral party . Several of them have protected fugitive officers , and at least one or two are giving us active assistance . In short , wo have never lost our hold on tho conservative interests of the country .
And before quitting this part of our subject we must glance at tho Punjab , and give some notion of the causes which have not only kept that province , formerly a groat eouroo of danger and anxiety , quiet , but have also enabled us to maka it tliobaais of our operations atT Delhi , and to draw from it all our supplies of men , money , and stores of every description . This seems to form an exception and answer to our suggested and implied reference to annexation , us one cause of our unpopularity and qf our weakneaa . Wo shall come to that question shortly , but in tho meantime wo must not overrate tho inferences in favour of annexation to bo drawn from tho peculiar case of tho Punjab . In the first place
it must be remembered that if we had not annexed it , we should not have had to occupy it ; and that we have now seven or eight thousand Europeans locked up in the Punjab , who would otherwise have been placed in the stations of our old frontier , and available for service at Delhi , or in Oude . In the next place may we not assume that , if after the war of 1849 we had retained the innocent Dhuleep Sing on the throne , merely exacting from the Punjab Government payment of the expenses of the war , and of such further occupation as might have been necessary , we should in our time of need have found him as faithful and earnest an ally as his neighbour Goolab Sing of Cashmere ? And lastly , I am quite willing to allow , and this is a most important point in the inquiry , that this was the most just and reasonable of our recent annexations , and it has excited bnt little objection or reprobation among the reflecting and influential class of natives .
And while the Sikhs are traditionally hostile to the natives of Hindostan , and to the Mussulman King of Delhi , whose ancestors were the unrelenting persecutors of their earliest and most revered Gooroos , or prophets , thev have learned , ever since the last war , to hate still more the Bengal sepoys , who assumed the airs of conquerors , and whose countrymen monopolized the majority of the best military , civil , and police appointments available to natives . The Sikhs were , therefore , not prepared to sympathize or make common cause with the Hindostanees , or to fight for the Great Mogul ; and in the defection of the Bengal sepoys , which was most promptly and wisely met by Sir John Lawrence ' s invitation to the Sikh 3 to enlist , they naturally saw their own opportunity to gain the confidence and favour of
the ruling power , and to supplant the haughty Hindostanee interlopers . But the Sikhs only form a very small portion of the population of the Punjab ; they number , perhaps , 500 , 000 , or about a twentieth of the whole . In India , south of the Sutlej , the Mahomedans , as compared with the Hindoos , are supposed to be about one in ten at the most ; in the Punjab , on the contrary , they form the majority of the population , certainly more than the-half , perhaps two-thirds . Now , under the Sikh domination , as perfected by Runjeet Sing , the Mussulman religion was subjected to severe restrictions and frequent persecution . The Mahomedans were not allowed to make proselytes , while every encouragement was offered to the young and ambitious among them to submit to Sikh initiation . The cry to prayers of the
Muezzin was not permitted to be heard in any city , town , or village ; and the celebrated Jumna Musjid , the most ancient and splendid mosque in Lahore , was converted by Runjeet Sing into an arsenal . This mosque , immediately after the inauguration of British rule , was , after being put in thorough repair and order , handed over to the charge of the principal Mussulman MoolJahs of Lahore , to be restored to its original purpose of religious worship . The Punjabee Mahomedans had , therefore , good reason to prefer our rule to that of Runjeet Sing and his successors . And great numbers of them serve in the socalled Sikh regiments . Ever since the annexation , also , the Punjab was Lord Dalhousie ' s particular hobby and pet province ; the best men were selected for its administration , money for local improvements waa freely granted , and it has been liberally and considerately governed . Large remissions of land revenue have been
made , transit duties entirely abolished , and even the wild and predatory tribes on the north and northwestern frontier have learned to appreciate the advantages of free commerce and honest payments . I think that I have shown sufficiently that the Punjab cannot be cited as a case which tells either for or against annexation ; and that I have also explained how it is that the population in general in that province is better disposed towards our rule than that of perhaps any other part of India , except Bengal Proper . Do not let us run into the other extreme , and imagine that wo may trust them in any numbers , and under any temptation , with the use of our most formidable engines of war ; and above all , now that wo have got twenty or thirty thousand of them in our aorvico , do not lot ua dolugo them and disguat them with a constant succession of boys from Eugland , aa wo have our old-faabioned aopoy regiments , with a result that ought now to bo evident enough . But I muet hero couclude my letter , and continue thia subject in my next . Youra faithfully , E . V . "
State Of Trade. Business At Manchester D...
STATE OF TRADE . Business at Manchester during tho week ending last Saturday waa even In a more depressed state than in the provioua wook ; but thoro is a rather better feeling in tho laco trade of Nottingham . Tho hoaiory trade in that town , however , in exceedingly dull . Still , manufacturers gonomlly arc hopeful , as they expect that tho 8 Wfirrg trado'wilhmake ,-amend 8-for-tho-provioua-8 tAgi »«^_ tion . Tho South Staffordshire iron trade remains very qulot . More failures wcro announced during tho wook ; but only a very fow aro for largo amounts . Tho colhora aro aufforlng aovorely from want of work , but they conduct thomaolvofl with exemplary pationco . I ho operatives of Birmingham pretty generally rosamad . work on Monday week ; but a good many of tho oatabliahmonta aro on ahort time , and trade is languid . A atrlke has
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 16, 1858, page 5, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_16011858/page/5/
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