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April 19, 1856.J T H»E LEADER. ^ 377
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OMAR PACHA'S CAMPAIGN. The jTrans-Oaucas...
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Typical Forms. Typical Forms And Special...
able circumstances , capable of itself becoming a separate individual , as is found by cuttings , buddings , graftings , and other horticultural processes . This being the case , it follows that -what ia proved of one branch is true of all the others . " We have seen a pear-tree laid prostrate on the ground by storms , but , with its roots still fixed in the soil , sending out a branch from its side , which mounted upward , and took a form precisely like that of the parent tree . The other typical or model form is the leaf . We Jiave shown that all the appendages of the plant are constructed on this type . " Linnaeus had a presentiment of something of this kind , and , in his Prolepsis Plantarum , carried it out in such a way that , starting from the consideration of a perennial plant with regular periodicity of vegetation , as in our forest trees , he explained the collective floral parts , from the bracts onward , as the collective foliar product of a five-year old shoot , which , by anticipation and modification , was developed in one year . This view is , in the first instancetaken from the most limited point possible , from the
examina-, tion of a plant of our climate ; and , secondly , imagined and carried out with great want of clearness . " The true doctrine was first propounded by C . F . Wolff ( Theoria Generationis , 1764 ) , but his treatise lay buried in neglect till the doctrine became established by the influence of others . It was first presented to the world by the great German poet , Goethe , who , though not learned in the artificial botany at that time taught in the schools , had a fine eye for the objective world . We are not willing , indeed , to admit that the form in which Goethe expounded the doctrine is in every respect correct . It is wrong to represent floral organs as metamorphosed leaves , for they never have been leaves in fact ; the accurate statement is , that these organs and leaves are formed after the same general plan . Nor are we to represent nature as striving after a model form ,
which she fails to reach , in the various modifications of organs ; for the modifications are as much an end and intended as the parts which may be pointed to as patterns . Still , Goethe may be regarded as having seized the great law of vegetable morphology . His Ver 3 uch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erkliiren was published in 1790 , and has furnished the foundation to scientific botany . But as Goethe had no name among the initiated , little attention was paid by botanists generally to his speculations till long after , when they were mentioned by Jussieu , and brought into general notice by De Candolle , in his " Organographie , " published in 1827 . The doctrine somewhat modified , is now acknowledged by the great doctors , and has been sanctioned by the great councils of science .
According to this idea , a plant is composed of two essentially distinct parts , the stem and leaf . The leaf is attached to the ascending stem , and besides its common form , it takes , while obeying the same fundamental laws , certain other forms , as scales , bracts , sepals , petals , stamens , and pistils . Schleiden , who has developed this view , gives , in his '' Plant , a Biography , '' a picture of a typical plant constructed on this principle . This makes a plant a dual . But it appears to us possible to reduce a plant by a more enlarged conception of its nature to a unity , that is , to show that there is a unity of plan running throughout the whole . *• "We have no space to give I ) r , M'Cosh ' s views on this subject , because , without his illustrations , they would not be intelligible .
April 19, 1856.J T H»E Leader. ^ 377
April 19 , 1856 . J T H » E LEADER . ^ 377
Omar Pacha's Campaign. The Jtrans-Oaucas...
OMAR PACHA'S CAMPAIGN . The jTrans-Oaucasiart Campaign of ilie Turkish jinny under Omar Pacha . A Personal Narrative , by Laurence Oliphant . Blackwood and Sons . Mr . Oliphant ' s volume on the Russian Shores of the Black Sea , his Minnesota , and his pamphlet on . the project of a campaign in Trans-Caucasia , have given him a reputation which it will be found is hardly sustained by the present unpretending work . We certainly looked for something more" substantial , something less of the superficial correspondent , in . the account which Mr . Oliphant , an eye-witness , would give of Omar Pacha ' s campaign . The
expectations which the brilliant pamphlet of May , 1855 > led us to form are not , however , gratified ; and we confess to considerable disappointment . But having said this much , we are hound to admit that the reader will find here what he will not , that we are aware of , find elsewhere : a good account of Omar Pacha ' s campaign , and of a part of Mr . Olipliant ' s travels ia Abasia and Mingrelia . Mr . Oliphant was on the plateau before Sebastopol when it was determined that , Pelissier permitting , Omar Pacha should make an effort for the relief of Kars . He left the Crimea a week before the fall of Sebastopol , and proceeded by Kertchaqd Anapa to Abasia . After much steamine and counter-steamino-up and
down the coast m a man-of-war , he finally settled down at Souchum Kaleli a few days before the first movement of the Turkish army was made towards Kutais . Not satisfied with the bIow operations of the army , our author diverged right and left in search of amusement or forage , and did not join the army again until it was far on its way to the Ingour . Our readers may remember that the passage of that river was effected by the Turkish troops on the oth November . Opposite the main ford two batteries were constructed , and while they occupied to some extent the attention of the enemy , Ballartl , bmimona , and Osrnan Pacha successfully forced the fords lower down . One of those two batteries was begun under the superintendence of Mr . Olinhn-nt .
= and it was brought about in this way : — As engineer officers are scarce in the Turkish array , or , at all events , as none were forth coming upon that ; occasion , Colonel Simmons gave me a lesson in bntterymakmg , and sent me to Skender Paohn to got the men and gabions necessary for one battery , -while he superintended the construction of the other . About ten o clock p . m . I found Skender with his reserves , bivouacked near the wood ; and he , supposing me in tho dark to be an officor , gave mo , not only a working party of two hundred men , but a regiment of infantry and two field ^ piecos , a command with whioh I was considerably astonished and overwhelmed . However , I thought it would scarcely be discreet to undeooivo him , so we marched off , and half au nour attorwards wore silently and vigorously at work on tho bank of the river , witiuu about a hundrod yards of tho Russian sontrioa . Wo had almost filled our iront ot
row gabioua when tho Turkish Major whispered that ho saw the Russians coming down to tho river in foroo . This was a most startling announcement . I certainly saw , through the darkneagi , throo black liuoa drawn up upon tho opposite Bnore . As my oxperience in military matters was exactly that of most ofchor Lincoln s-inn barristers , and my knowledge of Turkish did uotinolude a single word ot command , the thought of tho two field-pieces and tho regiment of uuantry began rathor to trouble me—more , particularly ostho artillery officer auirgested something that I did not in tlie least understand . However , I peremptorily ordered him not , and discovered , to my intense relief , on looking through my opera-glass , that tho Russians were , iuf « ot , throe rows of logs , whioh bucoobsivo Uooda had stranded upon tho bank .
After the Ingour the army did not move for six days , a delay which gave the enemy time to destroy , his barracks and provision depots . Neither did the army move directly upon Kutais . Whether Omar Pacha was afraid of losing his communication with the sea , ' or whether there were difficulties in the direct path from Sugdidi to Kutais that could not be overcome , are questions which Mr . Oliphant does not answer . Omar Pacha did move offi to the right when he arrived at Sugdidi , instead of pushing straight on , apparently to shorten the distance between his army and its supplies . By this movement he gained the road which runs between Redout Kaleh and Tin * is , and moved forward to Ziewte , where he encamped . Here the expedition began to show signs of failure . The end of November was now approaching ; fine weather had lasted for two months , and could not be expected to con ? tinue : the weakness of the army was its land transport ; and the troop 3 were
chained to the camp at Ziewie , because they had to send their animals for supplies . ' * Here , " says Mr . Oliphant , " wefound Skender as usual chafing ' af delay , and in an agony lest the Russians should retire without fighting . " Two or three rivers , only fordable in dry weather , lay between the Turkish army and Kutais . So long as they delayed , the season fought on the side of the enemy . Yet on the Ziewie they remained until winter and December had come together . The rain began to fall incessantly ; the river Ziewie became a torrent , and swept away a bridge that had been with some difficulty built over it ; and it was not until another was constructed that the army could move . Wepannot but regard this advance as one of a most daring character . Having left the swollen Ziewie in their rear , they advanced to the equally swollen Techoua . Mr . Oliphant ' s description alone can do
justice to the scene : — The whole army was assembled upon the plain , which was at an elevation of about seventy feet above the river , and knee-deep in mud . Aides-de-camp were galloping , soldiers were wading , guns were sticking , and baggage-horses rolling in the mire . Below us swept the turbid stream , about fifty yards in breadth , and at this point unfordable . Across it a narrow and very fragile-looking foot-bridge had been placed , while below it a ferry , constructed of two pontoons , -was making an experimental trip across . The soldiers now began in single file to pas 3 the trembling bridge , and . form on the other side . The guns were carefully let down the bank , and , with nauch difficulty , placed upo-n , the ferry : but from the time
occupied in this operation , and in the txaject of the men , it was clear that many hours much elapse before the whole army would be collected upon the other side . It was most fortunate , then , that a ford was discovered lower dow ^ n , and long lines of cavalry , infantry , and artillery , were soon after seen following one another into the rapid current . The water reached up to the waist 3 of the men . After I had forded , I turned to sketch the scene ; it was one worth remembering . At three different points the army . was crossing the river , at each in a different method , whilst on the bank above , a group of horsemen were assembled , whose more brilliant uniforms denoted the presence of the Commander-in-chief superintending operations .- The picturesque old castle I have before named crowned one of the hills in the background , whilst the lofty range closed the prospect .
In spite of the difficulties the army got over by mid-day , and continued its advance towards the Skemiscal , crossing several smaller streams , and marching knee-deep in mud . The next evening the army was within two miles of the Skeniscal . Omar Pacha knew that the enemy lay on the opposite bank of the river ; and he promised his soldiers that the next day they should fight the Russians . It was not destined to be . Rain began to fall that very afternoon ; all night it came down in torrents ; and the next day the Skeniscal was almost as effectually a protection , for the Russians as the Atlantic would have been . The whole country was flooded , and every gulley became au unfordable stream . Forest trees rolled by , borne onward by the turbid flood of the Skeniscal , now two hundred yards broad . It was a provoking situation- The enemy was posted about two miles from the left bank of the river ; Kutais itself was only a two hours ride from the
enemy s position . Had the Turkish army made a continuous march from the Ingour to the Skeniscal they would have not only arrived in time to cross the latter before it became a torrent , but we believe before the reinforcements sent by General Mouravieff joined the army defeated on the Ingour . The want of land transport ruined the expedition . The retreat was very painful , as it rained all the way ; but the rear was gallantly covered by the crack Turkish corps , Ballard ' s Rifles , very excellent troops , and the enemy did not dare to molest them . The Turks ultimately formed that camp at Choloni , which they have only just quitted for Trehizond . On the whole , considering the great difficulties of the country , the lateness of the season , and the smallness of the means at his disposal , the Trans-Caucasian
campaign is very creditable to Omar Pacha and his army . Mr . Oliphant ' s volume contains , besides a pretty good analysis of the Kars Blue Book , so far as it relates to Ornar Pacha ' s expedition , several speculations on the campaign . He evidently does not understand why some measures were not taken "to injure Russia where she is most vulnerable and to protect Turkey where she is most exposed . " "Had the campaign , " he continues , " been undertaken at a sufficiently early p eriod of the year , and with such troops as would have insured success , military and political results would have been attained , among which the salvation of Kars would have been the most certain , but at the same time the least important . " Mr . Oliphant evidently considers that the French Marshal indirectly caused the loss of Kars : —
Whatever may have been the neglect of tho Turkish Government in tho first instance , with regard to the ooramissariat of the garrison—how distressing soover tho apathy and corruption of tho Ottoman officials may then have been—there can be no doubt that , iu spita of all theso evil and disastrous influences , had the Fronoh Govornmont entertained tho proposition of Omar Pacha when it was first pressod upon thorn , by Lord Clarendon , instead of leaving it to the generals in tho Crimea , Kara would never have been takon . THiero is indeed n , very fair probability that , even at the oloyenth hour , when Sebastopol had fallen , and General Simpson stated that ho had no further need for tho presence of the Turkish army , if General Polissior had thou authorised its departure , instead of threo weeks later , that unfortunate garrison would have been saved . But whether this was bo or not , it i » certain that , in that case , tho Turkiah army would havo been at this moment iu possession of tho Pass of Suramm , from whence the fertile valley of the Kur , and tho cities of Qori and Tiflis , lying at its foot , would offer an inviting field of oporatlouB for a apring campaign ; while those four populous provincca ol Imortia , MiugrelU , Gouriel , and Abkhazia , wrested from tho dominion of Russia
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), April 19, 1856, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_19041856/page/17/
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