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^g2 THE LEAD E R. [Sattop aj^
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THE WA ~ Et! The most striking intellige...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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' The Sebastopol Committee. Monday. Sir ...
enough . -He ( the witness ) appointed Admiral Boxer , on the strength of a recommendation by Sir Thomas ' Hardly , who in 1830 represented him as an admirable seaman . Besides , having acted as harbour-master at Quebec , he was well acquainted with the embarkation and disembarkation of troops and stores . The responsibility of affairs in the harbour at Balaklava was entirely under Admiral Dun das , as well as everything relating to the transport on the Black Sea . Captain Christie was appointed by the witness' on the recommendation of Captain Milnes ; and , sb there was a naval harbour-master at Balaklava , Captain Christie was in no way responsible for the confused state of the harbour . The witness added that Captain Christie had
made" two mistakes , for which he has been ordered to be tried by court-martial—an order which has almost broken his heart . The first of these was in allowing the Prince ( the vessel which was lost ) to remain outside the harbour ; the second consisted in ordering a transport with Turkish troops to come to Balaklava , instead of going to Eupatoria . Immediately afterwards , however , Sir James Graham stated that the admission , or refusal of admission , of the Prince into harbour rested entirely with the officer in command of the harbour , and not with Captain Christie , who was in no respect responsible for her loss . In justice to Admiral Boxer , he might mention that on one occasion he represented to the Admiralty the necessity for having a receiving-ship
at Constantinople , and the answer at first sent out was that it was not thought necessary , though he ( Sir James Graham ) reconsidered the question ; and , finding the emergency of the service increasing , he ordered a depot ship to be sent in October . It had not been officially notified to the Admiralty that there was any defect in the transport service in the Black Sea , nor was he ( Sir James ) aware of it . The amount of naval transport was limited at first , having been constituted with a view only to operations in Bulgaria and Lithuania . The supply was limited out " there ; " but if he were asked as to its supply " here , " he would say that you might get it as you would get a cab off the stand . ( A laugh . ~ ) They exerted themselves to the
utmost , and exhausted all available means of transport . He was hi favour of fixed hospitals , rather than floating hospitals ; but , upon the urgent request of Admiral Boxer , he sent out directions ,- in a private letter to Admiral Dundas , that two or three large steam transports should be fitted up as hospitals without delay . Notwithstanding that this communication was private , he could make Admiral Dundas responsible for nonobeyance of the instructions so conveyed . Almost in the same breath , however , Sir James declared that Admiral Dundas might shield himself under cover of the privacy of the communication , but that he thought a man of so honourable a character would not . — Lord Baglan possessed supreme power over the
movements of the transports , and had a veto on the directions of Admiral Dundas . Sir James had received no official complaint whatever of the conduct of Admiral Boxer . With respect to the sufferings of the sick and wounded , Sir James begged the committee to consider the immense numbers which were thrown on the hands of the authorities from the commencement of September till nearly the end of February . In answer to a question about the blockade , the witness stated that the Government , in the most emphatic manner , called the attention of the naval commanders-in-chief to the necessity of keeping
up a strict blockade . On the 5 th of April ( war being declared on the 29 th of March ) , the Admiral was ordered to nae -the largest discretionary powers in regard to the ports in . the Black Sea . On the 29 th of 31 ay , Admiral Dundas , in conjunction with the French admiral , waa ordered to establish the blockade without delay . The aeheme of blockade which was prepared by Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin contemplated the stoppage of , the entrance to the Bosphorus to trading vessels , and it was sent to England and France by the respective ainbaBsadors . A letter written on the 25 th of October
expressed regret that that blockade had not then been generally and vigorously established . During the months of September and October Admiral Dundas gave us no information in regard to the blockade . ¦ B y the Chairman . —Tho plan of blockade , as arranged by Admirals Dundas and Hamelin , was quito effectual ; but . Lord Stratford and tho French Ambassador did not think it admissible , and time was lost by ita being referred home . Admiral Dundas had not established a Lilookade before quitting the station . It in not clearly
[> roved ; that a steamer came out of Sobastopol and effected i digression on the Turkish coast . Such an occurrence night have taken place , but tho witness was not satisfied hat it did . -He then detailed further und still more imwatiw ) orders that the blockade ( should be effectively iarrfod out , irrespective of expense . He was not , howwer , disposed to blame Admiral Dundaa for not having larried out the blockade ; for tho calls upon the naval lorvice , in tho w * y of bringing up reinforcements , were io great , that he doubted if tho Admiral had disposable neana for effecting the object .
Respecting a statement that , oh sending out tho expedition to the Crimea , tho Government had no information as to the amount of tho troops and tho nature of tho lofoncea at Sobastopol , Sir James said :- — " Instead of an xpinitn , I will give you a fact . In tho month of July ,
I saw a Crimean authority ( who , of course , must be nameless ) who had left the Crimea in the month of June . I examined Mm myself at the Admiralty , and his evidence was taken down by an officer belonging to the department . It was , on the whole , most circumstantial —giving an account of the Crimea , its harbours , roads , and productions , and the supply of water it afforded ; but what was most important was his statement' of-the force of the enemy , which he estimated at 78 , 000 men—8000 cavalry , 40 , 000 constituting the garrison of Sebastopol , and the remaining 30 , 000 dispersed throughout the Crimea . I sent that information to Admiral Dundas on the 29 th July , and directed him to give a copy of it to Lord Raglan . It must have been received by
Admiral Dundas before the expedition sailed for Varna . This person was-a most intelligent Englishman . I had the utmost reliance upon his statement , and subsequent events have proved that his estimate of the Russian force at that period in the Crimea was accurate , with the exception of a few hundred men ; and , more than that , this individual was afterwards in personal communication with Lord Raglan . Also , immediately after the declaration of war , I sent out an engineer who had been employed in a packet-boat plying between Sebastopol and another port in the Black Sea , and who knew the harbour of Sebastopol just as well as the commander of a Ryde steam-packet knows Spithead . I also sent to Admiral Dundas an eng ineer , an Englishman , who had
been employed by the Russian Government , and knew every shoal and every battery on the Crimean coast . "In answer to a question by the Chairman , Sir James said that when the head of the Ordnance Department is three thousand miles away , it is impossible that , that department can work well . The witness , so far from thinking that the expedition ought to have sailed earlier , considered that August , September , and October are the best months for an operation of that kind in the Black Sea . There was a difference of opinion between Admiral Dundas and Lord Stratford ; but Sir James did not believe that it interfered in any way with the public
service . He could not think of a single instance . ( In immediate juxta-position with this denial , Sir James added that at such a crisis the misunderstanding could not have failed to produce some bad effects upon the public service . ) In December , 1854 , the Government received information of the roads constructed by the Russians between the Putrid Sea and Perekop ; but until that time those roads were unknown at Constantinople andJthrough the English and French fleets . 2 STo attempt was made to blockade the Sea of Azoff , because it would have been impossible without a supply of vessels of light draught .
TUESDAY ( LAST SITTING ) . The Earl of Aberdeen gave evidence , and stated that preparations for war were made about three months before the declaration of war . Previous to January , there were differences of opinion as to the probability of hostilities ; and " perhaps , " said the Earl , " I was more sanguine than any other member of the administration . " No Cabinet Councils were held from the prorogation of Parliament in the middle of August until the middle of October , and the members of the Cabinet were " dispersed in various directions , " with the exception of the Duke of Newcastle and Mr . Sidney Herbert ; but they could have assembled in London within eight-and-forty hours if there had been an occasion for them , and he did not
see that there was any necessity at that time for Cabinet Councils . The general belief was that Sebastopol would fall by a coup de main ; but his lordship did not think that the complexion of the expedition was altered by tho fact of the army having to lay regular siege to the fortress . He did not know whether it was too late in tho year to undertake the expedition . In conjunction with Lord John Russell , he came to the opinion early last year that it was not a fit time for the consolidation of the "War Departments . The witness then , in answer to questions , gave a narrative of tho facts which led to tho split in tho Coalition Government ; but this docs not in any way differ from tho explanations made in Parliament at tho period . Ho holieved a good deal of the distress in tho Crimea existed for some time without tho
Government having any official notice of it . Ihey were in ignoraneo longer than they ought to have been . Tho authorities on tho spot wore the responsible parties for this omission . It was understood that tho Lioutenant-Gcnoral of tho Ordnance received tho same powers as tho Master-General ; but that was a question tho witness was unable to decide . Being asked by tho chairman if ho thought it wine to scud tho head of tho Board of Ordnance 3000 miles away at such u time , ho answered that it might not have boon , but that Lord Raglan ' s services wore urgently required in the Crimea . To u further question , no to whether any beneficial object was attained by keeping Lord Iiuglun at tho head of tho Ordnance , ho said , " None at all . " Tho only roauon why tho connniasuriut- department was not transferred to tho War Minister until tho 22 nd of December was tho want
of housoroom . After a fow more remarks on matters of arrangement , Lord Abcrdoon retired , the room was cleared , and . in about half an hour tho Committee sopuratod . With tho examination of the Into Premier , their luboma , us fur as tho reception of evidence is concerned , concluded .
^G2 The Lead E R. [Sattop Aj^
^ g 2 THE LEAD E R . [ Sattop aj ^
The Wa ~ Et! The Most Striking Intellige...
THE WA ~ Et ! The most striking intelligence from Sebast opol is that which , closes the week—the resignation , from ill health , of General Canrobert . St . Arnau ' d lias already perished without grasping the fruit of victory : is the same fate to attend his successor ? The latest intelligence from Lord Raglan which -re possess , dates as far back as last Saturday , the lath of May . The telegraphic message of that day announces that , on the night before , " the enemy made a sortie on the advanced works of the left attack
They moved forward in two columns , but both yere immediately repulsed with considerable loss . The conduct of the troops was admirable . Our loss consisted of 1 officer and 5 men killed , and 30 men wounded . " A telegraphic despatch of the day before intimates that , on the preceding night ( Thursday May 10 th ) , the Russians " opened a heavy fire on our trenches , and maintained it for nearly two hours . Their troops , however , did not attack our advanced parallels . "
Despatches from General Canrobert down to May 16 th , have been received in Paris . During the night of the 13 th ( last Sunday ) , two sorties were made upon the French lines by the Russians , who were vigorously repulsed . We also hear of two sorties on the night of the 14 th ; but , from a similarity in the statements , we are inclined to think that both refer to the same events . General Canrobert says that " the works of the siege are c « intinually advancing , " and that " several camoujlets have been employed , with complete success , to annoy the Russian garrison . " These " camovfiets" it may be as well to
inform the reader , are , in plain though unsavoury Saxon , known as " stink-pots ; " and , Avhatever may be said as to the unromantic nature of such warfare , it is known to be very effective . Lord Dundonald ' s invention is said to be a camouflet upon a large scale . We are now within fifty yards of the Russian sentries , and are still constructing new butteries . " The second parallels , both on the left and right attack , " says the Daily JYcws Correspondent , " have been greatly strengthened . Several new batteries have been constructed , and guns of heavier metal brought into position . On the Greenhill attack several batteries have been made and armed in the
third parallel , and , still further in advance , a work known as the Redoubt has been thrown up . From this work our riflemen are enabled to do much execution against the enemy ' s artillerymen in the Flagstaff and Barrack Batteries and the adjoining earthworks . " The French , also , are pushing forward , and , on the right , are nearly ' approaching the foremost Russian redoubt on Mount Sapoune , and the works on the Mamelon and Malakofi" hills . On their left , there is but a small space between their third parallel and the Flagstaff Bastion . The Russians have strengthened their new works constructed in the quarry below the Redan , and have opened six or seven new rifle-pits , not far off from the ambuscades which our troops took from them on the 19 th of April . These pits renew the annoyance which we experienced from the former . We presume that sooner or later they will be taken .
A despatch from General Gortschakoff , dated the 6 th inst ., states that " On the evening of the 1 st of Muy , the greater portion of the enemy ' s ( French and English ) fleet stood out to sea , it is said with W , 00 l ) to 15 , 000 troops on board . On the 2 nd , it was seen sailing past Yalta , it is believed in the direction of the coast of Anapn . " Another despatch from tho same source , dated two days later , says that tlio allied fleet got underway on the 3 rd , and that it only went as far as Kertch , and then returned , it is added—* ' A portion of the troops that were on board the ships appeared to have been landed in Kamiescn received by tuc
Bay . " A telegraphic despatch , IJaili / News from its correspondent before bounstopol , sncnlca of this expedition as having lelt « nmklava on tho 4 th , with Kertch for its dest . n . U . on . and says that the troops wero composed ot buuii French and . 0000 English , under tho command ol bir Gcorgo Brown . These contradictory accounts me sufliciently confusing ; but not so strange as tiw Lord Jlnglan , in his telegraphic despatches o J 11 th and 12 th of May , should not make the c . > im , mention of the expedition . But did ho really m £ . no mention of it ? and has tho aoverninei its > pressed the allusion ? If so , why ? The ^ « additional particulars of this very mysterious niovL menfc arc from tho Morning Herald correspondent ,
writing on the : » d of Muy : — " Tho domination of tho expedition in , *> f courw , « impenetrable secret . Some arc tmuiuiuully P « '' ' , " to believe in Valla , other * uphold tho Knldi » i « ' h J finds inuuy Bupiwrtaru , but , on the whole , Ode . » Kertch are the favourites . Yalta i » out ol all 1 '' bility , as the only road from thuueo would only ¦>' "*• buck to Uulukluvu . K * t « lm mid J W «> p » ' « ' ^ poHaiblo Umu probable , and Olimaa . would ruuuno u «•
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), May 19, 1855, page 6, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_19051855/page/6/
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