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is difficult to draw the lines of demarcation between p lants and animals , so , also , is it to ascertain precisely what actions are voluntary , and what involuntary . To take a striking example : when you hurt a frog ' s foot , and the frog leaps away , and leaps as often as you irritate it , —does not this seem clearly a case of voluntary action ? It is not , however—at least not always , if ever ; it is no more voluntary than your winking when a hand is passed rapidly before your eyes . I must ask you to accept this paradoxical assertion ; for to prove it would require an examination of the
nervous system quite beyond the limits of these articles . Not only are the voluntary actions difficult to be demarcated from the involuntary , but there arises a further complication , inasmuch as actions which , in early life , are perfectly beyond control of the will , become afterwards so completely controllable , within certain limits , as to deserve the name of voluntary . The excretory actions , for example , are , in infancy and certain diseases , wholly involuntary ; yet , by the influence of habitual resolution , they become voluntary actions . On the other hand , Dr . Carpenter luminously explains what , after Hartley , he calls " secondary automatic actions , " viz ., those actions which were at first performed voluntarily , requiring a distinct effort of the will for each , and become , by repetition , so far independent of the will , that they are performed when the whole attention of
the mind is bestowed elsewhere . * Besides those actions that are automatic or involuntary , there is a class of actions I should be disposed to further distinguish as Organic , under which would range the Instinctive . Who , that has watched mothers with their children , has not been struck with the remarkable sameness of their deportment , even to their very tricks and caresses ? Who has not noticed how all children play alike ? They use the same muscular varieties , throw themselves into the same complicated postures , following the same routine . These , of course , depend on the identity of Organization ; and they form a proper introduction to the study of the more special actions , named instincts . These instincts are also dependent on organization : they are the
functions of the organism . But metaphysicians , as usual , insist upon adding to the mystery of instinct a mysterious entity , to explain it . They range all these organic actions under a general term—Instinct , and then convert that general term into an abstract entity , which fulfils , in the zoological world , a function analogous to that of Mind , in the human world . This implanted mystery—this shadowy semi-spiritual entity—named Instinct , has long been discussed by puzzled Metaphysicians , who , denying to Animals the possession of Mind , solve all difficulties by a jugglery of words . The positive biologist sees , in it a mystery indeed , and a mystery inexplicable , but not more so than any other organic phenomenon ; and , true to his principle of only occupying himself with laws , irrespective of essential causes , he treats it as a branch of human physiology—a
rudimentary reason . Much has to be done in this direction . It has occurred to me that some correspondence will be discovered between the unstriped , involuntary muscles and instinct , on the one side , and striped , voluntary muscles and intelligence , on the other . That is to say , the greater complexity of structure gives rise to a corresponding variety of power . De Blainville gives this definition , IJ instinct est la raison fixee ; la raison est Vinstinct mobile or , as the author of The Vestiges expresses it , " the same faculty in the one case definite , in the other indefinite in its range of action : " which accords with what I just said . Moreover , if you consider that Instinct and intelligence are both functions of the brain , you will be prepared to find the differences to arise from greater complexity of structure .
After the Instinctive Actions , we pass onwards to the study of the special Senses , as a preliminary to that of Intelligence ; and here let me introduce Comte ' s criticism on one point of this investigation . " The only point in Method which can be regarded as scientifically established , is the order according to which the various kinds of sensation ought to be studied , and those notions have been furnished by comparative anatomy rather than by physiology . It consists in classing the senses according to their increasing speciality , beginning with the universal sense , that of contact , ami successively considering the four special senses , taste , smell , sight , hearing . This order is determined by the analysis of the animal hierarchy , since those ; senses must be held to be most special , and more elevated , in proportion as they disappear in the descending seale . It is remarkable that
this gradation corresponds exactly with the importance of each sense , if not in respect of intelligence , nt any rate in respect of sociability . One must note , moreover , the luminous distinction of Gull , between the passive and active states of each special sense . And an analogous consideration leads me to distinguish the senses themselves into active and passive , according as their action is essentially voluntary or involuntary . This distinction seems to me very marked between the senses of sight and hearing ; the latter operating without our participation , and even in spite of it ; the former requiring , to a certain degree , our participation . It seems to me that the more prof ound though more vague influence exercised over us by music , compared with painting , arises , in a great measure , from this diversity . "
From the Senses we pass to Intelligence , or the " positive study of the cerebral functions intellectual and moral . " And here I feel that Positive Philosophy demands a modification of Comte ' s Classification , und instead
of these nervous states ; we know not , nor can hope to know , m what respect one of them differs from another ; and our only mode of studying their successions or coexistences must be by observing the successions and coexistences of the mental states of which they are supposed to be the generators or causes . The successions , therefore , which obtain among mental phenomena , do not admit of being deduced from the physiological laws of our nervous organization ; and all real knowledge of them must continue , for a long time at least if not for ever , to be sought in the direct study , by observation and experiment , of the mental successions themselves . , mental henomena t be studied in those
of considering Psychology as a mere branch of Physiology , we ought to insert between Biology and Sociology another fundamental science , Psychology . I am glad to be able to cite John Mill on this point , as a balance against the authoritative weight of Auguste Comte . After alluding to Comte ' s objections to Mind as the object of observation , he says : — " But , after all has been said which can be said , it remains incontestable by M . Comte and by all others , that there do exist uniformities of succession among states of mind , and that these can be ascertained by observation and ' experiment . Moreover , even if it were rendered far more certain than I believe it as yet to be , that every mental state has a nervous state for its immediate antecedent and proximate causeyet every one must admit that we are wholly ignorant of the characteristics
Since , therefore , the order of our p mus phenomena , and not inferred from the laws of any phenomena more general , there is a distinct and separate Science of Mind . The relations , indeed , of that science to the Science of Physiology must never be overlooked or undervalued . It must by no means be forgotten that the laws of mind may be derivative laws resulting from laws of animal life , and that their truth therefore may ultimately depend upon physical conditions ; and the influence of physiological states or physiological changes in altering or counteracting the mental successions , is one of the most impor tant departments of psychological study . "
I think , however , that Comte is better met on his own ground ; and if any one will turn to the article on Organic Chemistry , ( part XIII ., ) and consider the arguments which force a repudiation of the encroachment of Chemistry into the proper domain of Biology , he will see how irresistibly they apply to this encroachment of Biology into Psychology . The analogy seems to me complete . Biology is separated from Chemistry , not because there is any essential distinction between organic and inorganic matter , but because there is so wide a distinction between the phenomena ; in like manner , I would separate Mind from Life , not because there is any essential ( noumenal ) separation —( the former is but the out-growth of the latter ) -but because the phenomena of Thought are special j they are not
the same as the phenomena of Life . Organic matter is simply a higher degree of complexity of inorganic matter—which special degree causes a speciality in the phenomena . So Thought is but a higher degree of Life , its speciality creating special phenomena . Comte proposes this test whereby the chemist may distinguish whether a problem truly belongs to his domain : —Can tEe problem be solved by the application of chemical principles alone , without the aid of any consideration of physiological action whatever ? I put the same test to the Biologist , who certainly will not pretend to solve many psychial problems upon physiological principles . If the Organic world is to be separated from the Inorganic , then on the same grounds we must separate the Psychial from the Physiological .
I propose , therefore , to keep the Physical Sciences as Comte arranges them ; and to introduce a new fundamental science—Psychology—as the basis of Sociology ; that is to say , I begin the Science of Humanity with a preliminary Science of Human Nature . And here ends the first division of my difficult task . The exposition having reached this point , I will pause for a week or two , and recommence the new series with the hope that , having passed through the abstruser and more abstract considerations of sciences with which the " general reader" is less familiar , when I come to the great moral , intellectual , and social questions , I shall gain a more interested audience . have toiled
In reviewing the great field of scientific speculation we through , no one can fail to be struck with the greatness of conception and philosophic insight there . displayed . Had Comte written nothing but these three volumes , his name would rank among the very greatest philosophers ; but in truth these volumes are but the Prolegomena to a Philosophy which forms the basis of a Religion ; and here I will borrow the language of an admirable review of Comte in the Christian Examiner , ( March , 1851 , ) which the reader is urged to get possession of : — " The three volumes thus cursorily noticed are , as we hnvo said , simply introductory . They contain many admirable views ( if they may not 1 ms called treatiMw ) , critical and historicalof the special sciences and furnish probably the most aWo
, , and complete exposition to X * s found of their several processes and results . Sti " , his province hitherto is mainly critical and expository , rather than constructive . He is labouring , so to sjHiak , in other men '» fields . Henceforth , the ground ho is to occupy id his own . He enters upon it in a masterly manner , and works in it , to do him justice , with a steady step , a thorough oversight , and a strong and nkilful hand . Once allow for the speciality of his position , and the whole becomes eminently instructive and valuable . Hardly a pugo or a line is without its fertile HUggCHtion , and its traces of close and profound thought . He propones in his way to answer thu whole great problem that weighs upon tlw > mind and destiny o arncHtiictw
Europe " : and he addresses himself to the tusk with all the gravity , e , ana concentrated strength , which become a inun feeling himself as it were alone , him speaking on ho tiunHcendontry great a matter . And , still to do him justice , tlioro nn apparent good faith , a strong sense of morality , a humanity amounting at tiiu to tenderness , a force of conviction that , though bo may not be heard now , «> yet saying what men must somo time listen to , and what they will be inovitou y compiled to iicccpt and apply , —which put him in most favourable comparison wi ^ uny purely ethical writer whom we know . For breadth and minuteness ol vu- » no statement , is superior to his of the condition of things under which ho wni - For largeness of intellectual grasp , and Btoadiness of conception and dovelopm i
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* I cannot too Hl . rongly recommend the reader to Him whokj of Chapter XX , of Carpoutor ' u I ' r ' moiplos of Comparative 1 'hysioloyy , Urd edition .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 14, 1852, page 786, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1947/page/22/
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