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    V GEtiEKAZ , KLAPKA ON THE WAR . TM War in the East . From theTear 1863 to July 1855 . -4 » Historico-CrlUcal Sketch of the Campaigns on the Danube . By General George Klapka . Translated from MS . by Lieutenant-Colonel A . Mednydnsky . Chapman and HalL This is a political , ' as well as military criticism on the conduct of the "War . General Klapka has claims to be heard beyond those of a mere soldier . He is intimately acquainted with the arena of the war , in Eastern Europe and I Western Asia . He has studied the genius and the tendencies of the varied I populations spread along the borders of the Russian and Ottoman Empires . I He is familiar with the spirit of the Russian policy , and , without being enf slaved by the infatuation of a favourite idea , has distinct views , which he I develops with as much candour as enthusiasm . It results that the summary j § here presented , though personal and peculiar , is honest , clear , and careful . 1 As an outline-history of the Russian War , no more lucid * narrative could be

    I desired . As a review of statesmanship and of strategic ? , we have seen none I less passionate , or more convincing , except , perhaps , an episodical criticism 1 in the pamphlet of General Mierolawski . We will constitute ourselves , for the occasion , the exponents of General Klapka ' s ideas , and present the essence of his summary , which may serve a double purpose : ^ that of recalling the original necessity of the contest in which England is engaged , and proving the futility of any attempt to keep in view , at once , high European interests , and the established maxims of European diplomacy . In the spring of 1853 , says the General , the Emperor Nicholas thought the time had arrived when he might consummate the traditional policy of the Russian Czars—already pursued during two centuries—and take a large

    portion of Turkey under his own control . The other great Powers seemed disunited ; the Porte had confessed its weakness by yielding to Austrian claims ; its arms had been barely successful in Montenegro . The time , therefore , appeared ripe for an assault on this declining authoritj' . Demands were accordingly made , which would have placed the Russian Government at the head of eleven millions of Ottoman subjects , and these were rejected . The occupation of the Principalities ensued ; but the Turks , instead of surrendering to threats , declared war , and set their military forces in motion . The first campaign was favourable to their arms ; Omar Pacha , having gained the day at Kalafat and Oltenitza , advanced on Bucharest , and the I world expected that he would now retort the attack upon Russia .

    But here diplomacy interfered . Austria , which guards the Russian frontier as Prussia nurses , the Russian trade , solicited a political concession from Great Britain and France . The further successes of Omar Pacha , her internuncio declared , would imperil the peace of Europe ; and , to save the peace of Europe , no less than to conciliate Austria , Great Britain and France adopted a course trhieh spared the Czar , and left him a long opportunity to repair his losses blithe Danube . The Turks , therefore , half-way to victory , went into winter quarters ; the Western Powers delayed ; the Sclavonian populations of the border were disappointed ; the invaders of AVallachia were reinforced ; and while the Ottoman army was forbidden tomove , the Russian fleets without let or hindrance , enacted the massacre at Sinope .

    This event roused public opinion in the East and in the West . The Turks muttered " Treason ; " the English burned to see vengeance taken ; the French Cabinet made a move in advance . The indulgent " Four Pouits , " rejected by Russia , completed the term of grace , and the combined fleets were wafted , by the popular breath , into the Euxine sea . Nominal war commenced ; but during the spring of 1854 , Omar Pacha alone combated the enemy . Austria ^ by her friendly offices , had enabled the Czar to prepare at leisure an army of 120 , 000 men , which menaced the line of the Danube , forced a passage , and hovered upon the road to Constantinople . The Greek insurrection beckoned them onward ; the Turks were alarmed , but diplomacy maintained its composure . A plan of the Wallachians to revolt m the Russian rear was discountenanced as in opposition to existing interests . The conservative policy of Austria ruled even the Allied camps ,

    • 1 and the Wallachian patriots , disarmed and expelled , were driven within the I jurisdiction of Prince Gortsohakoff ' a courts-martial . Russia , meanwhile , employed the revolutionary artifice which the Allies rejected , and organised I a Greco-Slavonian legion . Then followed the weakening of the Turkish line by Russian attacks , until j the enemy's progress was checked under the walls of Silistria . A few per-; sons , who seem to argue upon the principle that every plan of operations j not adopted would infallibly have succeeded if tried , believe that the Otto-1 mans should have been left to their own resources , which would have enabled j them to beat the Russians from Silistria , and establish the integrity of their i own frontier . Clearly , however , the Arab-Tabia did not repel Prince Pas-;< kievitch . Silistria was nobly defended , yet it is impossible to doubt that it 4 ! must have submitted to the final processes of the siege . But the Allies wore

    I preparing to march in the direction of the Danube ; a concentration of Turks 1 was taking place at Shumla ; and secret notes , in all probability , were passing : !\ between Vienna and St . Petersburg . The Russians , therefore , retreated from an insecure position , the Turks were in readiness to follow them , when ;| again diplomacy interfered in behalf of the political constitution of Europe . Perhaps the most , flagrant error in the whole unfortunate series was then J committed . Austria , pretending to threaten the Russian flank , covered , in ] fact , the Russian frontier . She was permitted , by the inconceivable docility of the Allies , to establish a separate treaty with Turkey , excluding every other nation from the Principalities , acquiring the monopoly of military

    occupation on the Danube , the right of setting bounds to the success of Omar Pachn , and the power of compelling Great Britain and France to seek a distant field , far from the avenues of Europe , fur from the centres of political disaffection , where every Curtius might plunge into the gulf , and where Russian nres tiqe mi g ht bo lost without Austrian interests being endangorcd . The result undeniably has boon , in spite of success , that the military reputation of Russia Una been enhanced , while the prestige , of Great Britain has been &acrifioed , ' whbther by false policy or by incapacity it is hard to say . In ^ hothor direcition tho Turks continued to lose ground . Their Asiatic fronjtjer wais watches *! by Russian armies , and in the autumn of 1854 they ^ te'netL at ^ important positions , a twofold defeat- It is the opinion of General Klapka that a small European nucleus should have been planted

    here ; the tribes of Georgia and the Caucasus should have been encouraged to revolt ; from the 60 , 000 Georgians and 80 , 000 mountaineers capable of bearing arms , 50 , 000 or 60 , 000 martial auxiliaries might have been levied : We prefer General Klapka ' s estimate on this subject to that of Mr . Duncan , who deals carelessly with the history and character of the Circassian nations After a succession of corroborative details , the General writes : — All that has hitherto been said tends to show how little care the Allies , from the very beginning , bestowed upon the warlike events in Asia , and particularly in the Caucasus ; otherwise they could but have seen that the whole mountain range forms part of the southern theatre of war , and is to Russia in the south what Poland is to . ' her in the west , viz ., her most vulnerable part . The Allies ought to have been aware that an energetic offensive in the Caucasus , and the defeat of their enemy there , would have immensely promoted the success of their arms on the other scenes , of action . It was possibly apprehended that the possession of those districts would bring : but little direct advantage , and that * even that little could not easily be turned to account ; but , on the other hand , it was entirely forgotten what enormous Russian forces would thereby be destroyed , and that , by means of that acquisition , in the following year a Turco-Persian and Circassian army , numbering hundreds of thousands of combatants , might have been called into existence to deluge Russia as far as the Don and the Wolga . Neither was it taken into consideration that so tremendous an invasion would have shaken that empire to its very foundation , and have produced consequences of the highest and most beneficial importance to humanity . In a word , everything was disregarded and forgotten , and the conquest of Russia confined to preparations for a descent upon the Crimea . ¦ ; . General Klapka examines rigorously the policy of the Crimean campaign . He first states the general objects announced : — The pressure of Russia upon Europe had already lasted far too long a period ; she had been too long allowed to form a barrier to civilisation , and a check to the freedom , of thought and of action . It was high time to put a limit to her encroachments , arid to reduce the balance of power to an equitable and natural basis . ^ From the outset the shadow 3 of disappointment gathered over these generous anticipations . The Gallipoli camp , the Varna parade , the indecision of the Western governments , their desperate search after a compromise—all Were auguries of a war begun with infirmity of purpose , and pursued amidst a confusion of plans . Lord Raglan is described by the General as a man of acknowledged merit , and popular with the army ; but too old , too cautious , too slow , governed too much by tradition , and too little acquainted with the theatre of war , to succeed in the face of so many difficulties . He selected an incompetent staff , and suffered the odium . created by their errors and negligence . The best generals of France declining to associate with the men of the coup d ' etat , St . Arnaud , a Kabylie conqueror , headed the . French troops , who neither trusted nor respected him . With such leaders , with small forces , with no means of land-transport , no pontoons , no siege trains , the Allied armiesi were thrown upon the Crimean territory , hurried forward by the diseased impatience of the French Marshal , and against the judgment of Lord Raglan hurledf upon and through the Russian lines at the Alma , and thence diverted fronttheir original object to attack the south side of Sebastopol : — , The flank march of the Allies succeeded marvellously . Had they but taken advan * tage of the surprise of the enemy and attempted an immediate assault upon the city , which at that moment was weakly garrisoned , they might possibly have succeeded in carrying both the town and the arsenal ere the Russians had time to erect regulari works of defence . But , instead of this , they took to protracted reconnoitrings , in this case overdoing what had been utterly disregarded oh the Alma , where a more accurate reconnoissance would have assisted them in a better arrangement of the plan of battle . Here , on the contrary , protracted reconnoitrings led to perpetual indecision and preparation , and finally to a formal siege , which had never entered the calculation of the Allies in the original plan of the expedition . One daring and rapid blow ,, evea at a heavy sacrifice , might still in the present state of affairs have led to a favourable issue and if the Allies had not had determination enough at once to have recourse to such ' an extreme expedient , they ought immediately to have returned to their vessela . Pelissier , the present French commander-in-chief , would in all probability have been the very man for such a contingency ; both Canrobert and Lord Raglan were wanting in energy They thought such an act of daring did not tally with their conscience and the responsibility devolving upon them . How incomparably more victims has the winter campaign cost the Allies , than a bold assault under the protection of some easily constructed batteries at tho end of September . While the Allies prepared to attack , the enemy recovered from his surprise and from his fear , and the artillery duel before Sebastopol commenced The first bombardment failed ; the action at Balaklava was a , misfortune : and after the battle of Inkerman , according to Klapka , the Allies should hav £ raised the siege . After the " horrible and heartrending winter , a second cannonade took place , which also faded . Ihe . subsequent operations of General Pelissier and General Simpson are criticised in un equally sceptical spirit , and the result is presented thus : —¦ Tho worst is yet to come . Everything betokens a most determined defence on the part of tho Russians . According to their prisoners , the larger works of Sebastopol have as vet scarcely suffered , and the Allies themselves may see from their campe thousands of Russians actively employed in strengthening their defence ^ and constructing new one * behind them . Moreover , the command of tho attacked fronts ib entrusted to the most expert and resolute officers , who will doubtless strain every nerve to dispute the advance inch by inch . Yet wo do not deny that the Allies may not obtain a partial auccess , for example , against the baations and numerous batteries crowning tho Uul » in front of Karabelnaia . If they can secure a firm footing upon one of those cora .-manding points , the fate of that part of Sebaatopol would sooa bo decvlcd j for the arsenal and the barracks could not offer any serious reaiatanco , and tho besieged , would bo compelled to retire into Fort Paul , ut tho entrance of tho military harbour . Hut then tho aole advantage guinod would bo an insight into one part of tho port , tho Allies would Btill have to clear a way into the city proper , »«<» . ^" ' { JJ Russian veaaela could always And sufficient Bholtor agairiHt thwrOTOchtajJ * oma corner of the groat bay . Suppoaing , ho wovor , that the Allies ahould In « h > o « d , j »« at tho cost of half their army , obtain possoaaion of tho south side of Sobaatopol , '" The reply , though read by the . light of victory , is " ^ ZZ ^*^ to The Allies , when once mastora of tho town , ^ *^ ^ barkation of thoif ' . content thopselvos with what thoy have dono , unrt oiuor n . r ^ ^ mwoeMr . trpopo , or to decide upon a continuation of opcnitionBi in i ^ aockyardBi ! of tho enterprise would only be partial , for if the veaaola J" ™ flid tho nortaent arsenals , forte , tho whole city , everything destroyed on tho

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    SisetembeS 3 ^ 3 . 855 : 3 TTO ^ EiiDEiB ; 393

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 15, 1855, page 893, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2106/page/17/