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July 1, 1854.] THE LEADER. 613
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SATURDAY, JULY 1, 1854.
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There is nothing so revolutionary, becau...
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AUSTRIA IN THE PRINCIPALITIES. The diffi...
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WHY ENGLAND WA1SITS POLICE BILLS. Oppose...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
July 1, 1854.] The Leader. 613
July 1 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 613
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Saturday, July 1, 1854.
SATURDAY , JULY 1 , 1854 .
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public Maitn .
There Is Nothing So Revolutionary, Becau...
There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world is by the verylaw of its creation in eternal progress . —Db . Arnold .
Austria In The Principalities. The Diffi...
AUSTRIA IN THE PRINCIPALITIES . The difficulties of the European situation are likely to commence with the Russian retreat from the Danube , and the Austrian occupation of the Principalities . We are sure that we have given vouchers for * the liberality with which we are prepared to regard the conduct of Government , because we have too much reason to Jmow , that some of our most esteemed readers have taken great exception to the allowance which we have already made . We believe that all Englishmen who now sit in the Cabinet Council , partake in a greater or less degree the general feeling of the English people in favour of constitutional freedom , and in favour of straightforward conduct . We say , in a greater or less degree , because we have our suspicions that some few do not « hare the English love of victorious action , but view the affairs of the world in a bookish
aspect 5 that some have systematically sacrificed national feelings to the diplomatic art , and the family interests which that art subserves . But we say also in a greater degree , because we are convinced that some are as thoroughly liberal , political , and national , as any Englishman that can take his stand upon a platform < That there was ground for suspicion in the very equivocal language employed , is confessed in Lord Aberdeen ' s
explanation ; but there were other grounds . It has been remarked , and not untruly , that thex'e never was a contest undertaken by a great power in modern times with so little of the ordinary formalities in the shape of distinct declarations . The announcement of war against Russia was protracted by our Ministers , with an unaccountable delay . When the declaration came out , although its general tenpr was intelligible enough , its language was less precise than usual . We have heard
it said , that it did not contain a declaration of war . Austria is permitted to occupy the Principalities under a convention with ^ the Porte , but without a declaration of war against Russia . Wo do not yet mistrust our Ministers , but wo say that , regarding the Eolit ical antecedents of Austria , and regarding er very equivocal position , a great responsibility is incurred by permitting her to assume
a post of such great power while she yet remains to so considerable a degree uncommitted towards our enemy , and in special alliance with a power , Prussia , whoso conduct has been worse- than equivocal . Having regard to these circumstances , our Ministers can bo neither surprised nor offended if their conduct ia still viewed with some suspicion , and they will be closely watched .
l ^ roiu what Lord Aberdeen said on Monday—and hero all from him muafc bo taken « fortiori—Ministers < lo not intend to accept proposals of peace from Russia on the basia of the status quo . But they intend in some way to take a security that Russia , shall not only ho pledged against making similar oucroochmonts upon tbo boundary of" Turkey or the peace of Europe , but really incapacitated ugaineb doing so . Ministers not only declare their duty to withhold any overt statement aa to the method of arming at that object , but
they also confess that they themselves have not made up their minds about it , and they take pains to remind us that much must depend upon the fortune of war and the views of allies . They are , therefore , entering upon that which is the most important stage of the whole conflict , without having really
defined their object , but having only shadowed it forth in general terms , without having in any way decided aa to the process for getting at it , without knowing the real sentiments of their allies , and , in shorty with nothing but the vague notion that they must not make peace until they have put some kind of restraint upon Russia .
JNow , the fear of this country is , that the present Ministers are not the men to make for their own object with sufficient energy to attain it . It is feared that Lord Aberdeen is so bigoted in favour of peace , that he will be impelled to make undue concessions to obtain it . It is supposed that Sir William Molesworth is , on economical grounds , so prejudiced against war , that he would incline to view with favour any terms for bringing it to a conclusion . It is supposed that Lord Palmerston , however lie might have felt stimulated to achieve success as a " War Minister
when responsible for the war and able to get credit out of it , will feel his old habits of diplomacy return upon him , and will be inclined to fall in with the red tape department of Europe in arranging all these little matters . It is remembered that Lord John Russell , although , sometimes very obstinate and inclined to bolt , " can at other times be soothed and coaxed into any amount of compliance , and that he may yield to the majority of the Cabinet . Sir James Graham has never shewn
himself to be so much of a politician as he is of an administrator and manager of party connexion . And in short , the public has no proof whatever that any member of the Cabinet really desires to put an effectual restraint upon Russia , by seriously abating her power . On the other hand , it is the obvious policy of Austria to hush up the war at all events . Russia has threatened that if the war be
carried on , she will raise against her opponents not only royal enemies , but revolutionary enemies ; and no opponent of Russia can dread such enemies so much as Austria . Austria , therefore , would be inclined to stop short in the war , unless England stood pledged to sally forth against the Italian people as well as against the Russian Czar . And standing on the middle ground of the Principalities , Austria ia not unlikely to counsel the acceptance of terms with the threat that her forces
can be as well employed against one side as the other ; and here would bo a complication of those " difliculties" which can always bring an English Cabinet to a stop . In a military point of view there ia no doubt that the occupation of the Principalities by Austria , forming a reserve for the allies and cutting off the communication between Russia and her accomplices in Turkey , is a valuable assistance , and there "is a mode , we believe , by which Austria can be rendered faithful to the alliance without implicating England in any disgraceful conspiracy against
the people of the continent . Wo agree with Lord Aberdeen that Prance is stronger than Austria and Russia put together , if England bo with Franco . The very first element , therefore , in the successful and easy progress of the war , is the continued alliance between Prance and England . The second point would bo to render the war against Russia effectual , with distinct objects , and an avowod resolution not to stop short of those objocts . Russia ought to come out of the contest much weaker , she should be dcspoilod of territory , and rendered incapable-of harassing Austria . To establish the powor of Englaud and Prance upon tho
continent it is necessary that their arms should be victorious—and signally victorious . To continue France in the alliance it is necessary that the conquest should be worth the honour and dignity of both " countries . The French must feel that their gratification of self-love is identical with the English alliance . And if Ministers would keep the English people in that state of harmonious nationality , which they now find , they must give employment and nourishing food for the spirit . While England and France are victorious they will be permitted to dictate the disposal
of all that is reaped from victory , and other restless influences on the continent will stand by to wait the issue . The final result , as Lord Aberdeen says , no man could now measure , or define . But it is clear , that the way is open for England to attain , in conjunction with France , a position of victorious supremacy . Having attained that , it would be hard indeed if the influence of England could not be exercised beneficially for the people of the continent , for her allies during the conflict , and for the continued , greatness of this country .
Why England Wa1sits Police Bills. Oppose...
WHY ENGLAND WA 1 SITS POLICE BILLS . Opposed by the mayors , Lord P / almerston has consented to throw up his Police Bill at all events for a time . The measure appeared to be dictated by an obvious necessity . It is a principle of our constitutionthat much-abused shadow , which so seldom appears in reality—that the military shall not be employed against the people , except by direction of the civil authority ; and
this principle ought to be so far respected , that the military should only be called out to quell banded conspiracies against order . It has happened , however , in recent cases of some standing , that important towns , large districts of the country , have been , disturbed by riots lasting for days , weeks , or even months ; and that the only means of suppressing these riots has consisted in calling out the military .
Preston , is the last instance . In that town the employing and the employed classes had a dispute on the subject of wages and the management of factories ; they resorted to extreme measures , striving , on either side , to reduce opposing forces by the dread of ruin or of starvation . The masters , we believe , were as disorderly as the men ; but being few in number , they were obliged to make up for the waut of physical strength hy strategy and by provocation ; and it was mado to
appear , as usual , that the more numerous class were actually the instruments of riot . Thus the employing class—who furnish the magistracy of the place—were enabled to appeal to the law . Now , tho local authorities ought not only to possess a judicial jurisdiction , ' but also the means of enforcing execution , and by the theory of our constitution they do so . It turned out , however , that they were unable to put down tho disturbance . Their inability must have arisen
from one or other of two causes : either tho true sentiment of the people was against them , and in that case they were invoicing extraneous aid to put down the gouuino wish of the community ; or they were , through want of resolution , incapablo of executing their duty . The latter is almost presumed aa tho basis of tho " Bill lav Improving tho Police Regulations of Counties and Boroughs . " It was proposed to give an . overruling jurisdiction to counties , and so to secure the command oi' a stronger force In tho actual case of Preston , the magistrates called in tho military .
Such aa incident ; is no novelty in our country , and wo have on record a still more striking example of social disturbance and of military suppression . It ia npw twenty- > thrw
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), July 1, 1854, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_01071854/page/13/
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