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jq"<yv^3CTER 1,1856.] T g E LEADEB. 1043
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NOTICES 1O CORRESPONDENTS. The Moon's Jt...
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We do not undertake to return rejected c...
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SATURDAY, NOTEMBER 1, 1856.
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^ There is nothing so revolutionary, bec...
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OPINION IN ENGLAND AND GOVERNMENT IN FRA...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
Jq"<Yv^3cter 1,1856.] T G E Leadeb. 1043
jq "< yv ^ 3 CTER 1 , 1856 . ] T g E LEADEB . 1043
Notices 1o Correspondents. The Moon's Jt...
NOTICES 1 O CORRESPONDENTS . The Moon ' s JtoTiTiMT . —W . Xenward ' s communication in The SirBsCBrPTioK von Italt . —The lists arrived too late for publication this week . They shall appear in our next ¦ with all others sent in before Thursday , aud a general statement of progress . ^ " A Lombard . "—Nest week .
We Do Not Undertake To Return Rejected C...
We do not undertake to return rejected communications . No notice can Vio . taken of anonymous correspondence . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily forpublication . bat as a guarantee of his good faith .
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Saturday, Notember 1, 1856.
SATURDAY , NOTEMBER 1 , 1856 .
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^ There Is Nothing So Revolutionary, Bec...
^ There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so "unnatural and convulsive , as the strain - to keep" things fixed ¦ when all the -world is by the very law of its creation , in eternal progress . —Dr . Aea'old .
Opinion In England And Government In Fra...
OPINION IN ENGLAND AND GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE . The Moniteur lias pnee more reiterated the complaints of tlie Preach Government against the British press . On ^ f . more , therefore , some explanations oil this" subject are due from us to our readers . Our ojjinions with respect to the French Emperor are well known . " We have never , for a moment , retreated from them . 33 ut while we have been consistent , we have sought to be just , and if we have sacrificed opportunities of popularity by refusing to flatter the Empire , we have
incurred the risk of offence and misconception "by declining to represent the passions of defeated parties . "When the growth ' of civilization in Trance was interrupted by the coup d ' etat , wlien every eminent Frenchman found himself , in his own country , a nullity , and , of necessity , a malcontent , there ¦¦ were strong temptations to the liberal journalist to _ identifyhimself with exasperated politicians and refugees , eager to breathe their "bitterness against the Usurping power . "Bat
"we claim not to be reckoned among those ¦ wh o yielded to this temptation . It appeared to us—and we have not ouce or twice only laid down the principle—that an English journalist ^ writing of foreign politics , should oe a critic , not a partizan ; and we have always held it to be as irrational to adopt the animosities of parties abroad , as it is unmanly to extol every form of success , by "whatever means obtained . "We have sought , indeed , to represent that great constitutional
party which is deprived of representation in France , and - wo say , with not a little pride , that among our readers are the most distinguished of tliose men who stand aloof from the disgraceful honours of the Empire . But the sympathy to which they appeal is not that of the libeller , ILotjis Napoleon became Emperor of the Fhench ; his government was , dc facto , accepted by the nation ; Trance submitted to bo controlled , for a time , "b y his will , and it was not for any Englishman to constitute himself the
champion of the Emperor ' s personal enemies . We have not consented , therefore , to authenticate inuendoes or lampoons on the personal habits of Napoleon III . But ho * s a public man , and , beyond most public men , liable to criticism . Ho is not inclined , ye supposo , to disavow the responsibilities of his position . He is the State ; ho has undertaken to regulate every public transaction in inrance ; by his own choice , by his own pretensions , he is answerablo for all and everything that res \ ilts from an official act within the limits of the Empire , or of its diplomatic influence abroad . Consequently , if , as his
friend 3 and those -who have access to him affect to believe , his will does not actuate all the proceedings of his Ministers , if . he . be wiser than Walewskt , and more conscious of his dignity tlian the Moniteur , that is n plea not admissible while the French constitution remains what it' is . For the workings of Imperialism in France the Emperor is distinctly and directly responsible . And by the workings of that Imperialism to what condition has France been brought ? "We have from time to time pointed out what we conceived to be the inevitable
consequences of Xotris Napoleon ' s policy . "We have said— -our pages are our witness— -tliat the prosperity attributed to the Empire was showy , superficial , and deceptive ; that France was being converted into a universal gambling-table ; that the public works of Paris were constructed at the cost of the provinces and at the risk of a disastrous collapse ; tliat trouble , discontent , and fear would ensue as soon as these false appearances began to vanish : that the industrious classes would
want employment when the State could not give it to them ; and that the financial system established by the confederates of the cotip d ' etat vra . s a . delusion and a danger . Ifwerecal these declarations , made long before- the occurrence of the events which have justified theiri , it is not to claim the gift of prophecy , but to prove—may we not say for the honor of journalism . ?—that such statements are not made at random , or without a sense of recalm and
sponsibility ^ . A impartial study of passing incidents , and of the sure action of political principles , a determination to write independently , an honest use of sound information 011 contemporary affairs— -this , indeed , was necessary before we could perceive whither France was drifting ; but this is within the reach of every responsible and conscientious journalist . "Within whatever sphere of publicity originated political criticism of such a character has a
recognizable effect " upon the public mind . This is our work , and this is our reward . Have we , then , said anything of France , under the coup d ' etat , which has not teen amply justified ? Of the names that make the glory of the living generation of Frenchmen is one to be found among the converts of the Empire ? Does not the irrefragable logic of his jjosition teach Napoleon III . that he must govern by repression , by artifice , in silence ? "What has become of the
commercial and industrial prosperity which was heralded last year by officious adulation ? Does any serious man believe that the Empire rests upon a surer foundation than uncertainty and the dread of change ? The English press is awakening to a perception of these truths , and publishes criticism instead of flattery . Whereupon tho French ( Government takes alarm , and indites an ignoble paragraph endeavouring to criminate our Liberal contemporaries and ourselves as enemies of the alliance . If the
accusation wero not false , if we wci * e not better friends of tho alliance than the flatterers who conceal its real necessities , not another lino should appear in our columns directed against the system of the Emperor . lYc havo asked for an alliance with France Avhen our Ministers have not been so ready to ratify it as they wero when IJouis Napoleon became Emperor by an act ^ hich
proved his oaths and professions worthless . When . Franco changed her form of government in 1848 , tho Republic sacrificed its foreign policy for the sako of a British alliance . What was tho responso of tho British Cabinet ? Sir Robert Peel plainly implied what it was in his last memorable speech on the 28 th of June , 1850 : — " Sir , the moat important point in the foreign policy of Her
MAJiisrr ' s Government I concurred in . . agreed with them in the recognition of tlie French republic , and as to the policy of recognizing the Grovernment wliich appeared to be most conformable to the will of the French X > eople . I go farther , and say that ! think such a recognition ought not to be a cotcZ
reluctant acquiescence in an unavoidable necessity . I believe that , without reference to the constitution of the Grovernmenfcj the true policy is to maintain friendly relations with that great people on the other side of tlie Channel , to cultivate a good understanding with them , to show a disposition to place confidence in them . And ifc is because 5 "
concur in that policy , because I " am favourable to the cultivation of a good understanding with France , that I now ask you , the Government , to give an account of your French relations , and to tell me how it ia that such a correspondence lias taken place as that which is laid upon the table of the House , and wh y it is that you have had these altercations with the people of Franee , who have shown a disposition , to place in you a cordial and unlimited confidence ?'
Well , the British Government haa displayed " a cordial and unlimited confidence , " but not in France . Iiord Palmerston's confidence dates from December , 1851 . We have trusted Ijottis Napoieon , have been led by him , have conferred upon him position and prestige . We have lent him our power , and he has used ifc . ¦ •¦ to . work out his own adventures . For , be it remembered , they Avho are most warmly attached to the idea of a French alliance are now forced
to question the advantages and to count the costs of Imperial friendship . What haa' ifc gained for England ? It has dragged her into a costly , ill-conducted , unsatisfactory war . It has forced her to sign au abortive and discreditable peace . It has made her subserviency to the Empire of December the common -sneer of Europe ; On the other hand , what has it . done for Louis Napoleon ? His situation , which was a I : least ambiguous , has been made respectable . He has been launched into the company of ' legitimate * rulers . He has been allowed to show
himself at the head of the British Government , and the worst suspicion arising from , the cavillings of the Moniteur is , that having played out the hand of the English alliance , he desires to secure new sympathies by following another course of policy . But , if Louis Napoleon really meditated a withdrawal from Great Britain—which , is scarcely credible—it would be difficult to indicate any positive evil that could ensue to the British nation . We do not yet feel ourselves weak
enough to solicit Imperial protection . Even the free trade which wo have invited is postponed to a time when the Empire itself may have ceased . Supposing , however , that the Empire exists until the law of nature destroys it—that is , until the death of IiOtriS Napoleon—for beyond that the most rabid Bonapartist does not look— -are we sure thafc
wo have reared the foundations of a durable alliance ? Have we cultivated the sympathy of tho French people ? Have we respected their aspirations , or given them credit for probity and intelligence ? Have we not stung them by congratulations to their political conqueror ? Let us bo sure of this : —loyal as Napoleon III . may be , were he to vacate tho throne to-morrow we should find that
our Government had not made a friend in France . Our policy towards the French people has been one of alienation ; our policy towards tho Emperor , so far from conciliating the Bonapartists , has disappointed thorn ; fot they cannot comprehend the necessity of 0 sentimental intimacy with England in preference to more congenial oilers . They
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Nov. 1, 1856, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_01111856/page/11/
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