On this page
- Departments (2)
-
Text (10)
-
740 T HE LEAD EB. [No- 28<> > Sattjrpat,
-
TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION TO « &$t 31 eater....
-
EBSA.Ttm.-In mentioning, last week, the ...
-
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS. Kb notice cau...
-
%t * FrosaPBNCK is now the price for an ...
-
, , " _ . /^Y y ' C3HTF*) 1 Cp-M^/"* /^awl*/ <J. \l rlW \ fy fc t^L mm & < %^ '_ ~j *" * !a>^% ' ' r¥ ^^r "* r *w \ * ? V->^ vJL/ ... ,; ,' .^ ; i....
-
SATTTKPAY, AUGUST 4, 1855.
-
, . ; ' . . , , - ' "ffitthlif tfiffttiVPi jpUUIW ^Ul-UUfl. "' ' ' —— ''
-
Thdre is nothing" so revolutionary,^ bec...
-
SUKVEY OF THE WAR. If it he true—-and tl...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
-
-
Transcript
-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
740 T He Lead Eb. [No- 28<> > Sattjrpat,
740 T HE LEAD EB . [ No- 28 <> > Sattjrpat ,
Terms Of Subscription To « &$T 31 Eater....
TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION TO « & $ t 31 eater . " ForaHfrtf-Year .................. * 0 13 0 To be remitted in advance * «• Money Orders should be drawn upon the Stkand Branch Office , and be made payable to Mr . Alfbbo E . QAU . QWAX . a * Ifp- * P *> Strand . . -
Ebsa.Ttm.-In Mentioning, Last Week, The ...
EBSA . Ttm .-In mentioning , last week , the return of Colonel Ogilvie from Yeni-Kaleh . we omitted to mention that he has since died of cholera .
Notices To Correspondents. Kb Notice Cau...
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . Kb notice cau be taken of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended fof insertion must be authenticated by the name and adiiress » f the writer ; . not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his good faith . During thetSeasion of Parliament it is often impossible to find room for correspondence , eyea the briefest . Communications should always be legibly written , and on one side of thepaper only . If long . it increasesthe dimculty of finding space for them . ..- ¦¦ ¦ We cannot undertake to return rejected communications .
%T * Frosapbnck Is Now The Price For An ...
% t * FrosaPBNCK is now the price for an Unstamped copy of the Leader , and Sixpence if S » ampkd . A Stamped copy of this Jonrnal can be 'transmitted through the Post-office to any part of Great Britain as frequently as may be required , during fifteen day 3 from its date , free of charge ; but it is necessary that the paper should be folded in such a manner that the stamp be clearly ¦ visible on the outside . , . . . The Leader has been " registered" at the General Postoffice , according to ' the provisions of the New Act relating to Newspapers , and a Stamped copy has , therefore / the privilege ori transmission through the post beyond the United Kingdom on payment of the proper rate of postage . , . ,
, , " _ . /^Y Y ' C3htf*) 1 Cp-M^/"* /^Awl*/ ≪J. \L Rlw \ Fy Fc T^L Mm & ≪ %^ '_ ~J *" * !A≫^% ' ' R¥ ^^R "* R *W \ * ? V-≫^ Vjl/ ... ,; ,' .^ ; I....
¦ < 3 p ^ $ * C '
Satttkpay, August 4, 1855.
SATTTKPAY , AUGUST 4 , 1855 .
, . ; ' . . , , - ' "Ffitthlif Tfiffttivpi Jpuuiw ^Ul-Uufl. "' ' ' —— ''
Thdre Is Nothing" So Revolutionary,^ Bec...
Thdre is nothing" so revolutionary , ^ becatiae there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to Keep things fixed whenall the world is by the very la . w o < its csreataonizLeterrtal progress ^—Db . Abwoxj >
Sukvey Of The War. If It He True—-And Tl...
SUKVEY OF THE WAR . If it he true— -and tlfere is some reason to believe the report " - —the Allres will shprfcl y test the strength of th ? it \ RuSsian position so succinctly described by General Simpson in his despatch of the 21 st of July . According' to this despatch , the Russians are posted as in previous remarks tre ventured to anticipate they might he , ' namely , so as to cover the roads ancl practicable path & leading' tipon BakstcM-Serai . There may be sWd to-be three outlets from the valley of the Tchernaya : one leading through the valley of Baidar , along " the Wororizoff road , " to the xindercliff of the Crimea ; a se < : dtid by Aitbdor to the Upper Belbelt ;' a third " up the / steep road that leads ' directly ' iipon Mackenzie ' s Farm , having this Irikerman heights on the left ; and the Mackenzie ridge on the right . The Woxontoff » oa 4 leads , « mly . to tU . eiooastito-wms ; but it is reported thafc-Alujpka is occupied in a way that wouldi bar . the , road , afc Jeqsfc to cavalry , and it abownde , in defensive position ^ which ,. how , ev « , P ,, wight all be tur , ned t were anything to he / gainq ^ t ^ yitliQioperfttioii , by landing » force » i Aiushtft . . The pout i » t Alupka . is compaopativeily j & platedf bui it , no doubt comjpaumcatea ,, witli ifche-iKuesian Jeffc
stationed at Aifcodarf , and-4 JJba , fc , ihyi . theipass , from TTalfca to the valley off Qaembaeh ^ iiTue ) Bussiaa nvmy th e * extends from AlbaMo the , , north side of i-Jebafctopol , Jia ' ving i the . strong ! post of . AitodorJn front qffcJU < fcJeit yvirigyM » ifcii outposts pushed down the valley of ( JUpJiu ^ l wifch ; the t » oops behind t ^ o Mflckenz , ^ r ; dga . complptely / CQvering the cpntjro , stationed in the viUftges lying < between , Al ] hat , ** nd > Mackenzie a , Fana ; and wifchjt » right hojding the Inkers
man heights , and resting on the entrenchments and forts to the north of Sebastopol . If an attack is to be made , as we hear it is , upon this position , the choice would lie between a movement on the right upon Albat , similar to that begun by the Turks and Sardinians on the 17 th of June , and a direct advance up the defile down which the army marched in September , 1854 . In the former case the army would act in a difficult countrysteep mountains intersected by deep defilesbut not more difficult than the Pyrenees or
the Affghan passes ; in the latter there is too much reason to fear that formidable earthen batteries , as at the Alma , would have to be carried , unless , as at the Alma , some weak unguarded point can be discerned , and forced . But it may be that the operations which we are warned to expect relate more directly to the siege ; at the same time , it is impossible not to perceive that some important preparations are afoot for action external to the
trenches . If the Mackenzie heights cannot be carried , the Allies can land an army either at the Katcha , or Alushta , or Kaffa 3 and break upon the Kusssian line from some unexpected quarter . The Siege . —With respect to the actual operations performed in front during the six weeks that have elapsed since the 18 th June , we are necessarily but poorly informed . But enough light has been thrown from various quarters to show that the troops have been extremely active with the pick and spade , the gabion and sand-bag , aud have advanced so far as to be below the level of the
guns of the Malakhoff . There is also some reason to believe that the batteries on Mount Sapoune will be able to annoy the ships , if not to destroy them . It is a mistake to suppose that because we have heard little news , little work has been done . The silent activity in the front has been
appreciated by the enemy , whose frequent sorties ought to prove to us that the Allies were becoming unpleasantly close neighbours to the garrison . At the same time we have no doubt the enemy has accumulated defence on defence in the rear of the IVIalakhoff , and that the Allies will , bave quite enough to do to hold that work when it falls into their hands .
The fortification of Kamiesch with earthworks greatly strengthens the position of the Allies , forms a place of arms where large numbers may assemble for any secret expedition , and secures a point of debarkation in case of unlooked-for disaster . The position occupied by the four armies is now one of great extent . The French cavalry fill the valley of Baidar ; the Turks
cover Balaklava ; the Sardinians and French hold the line of the Tcliernaya ; and the plateau before Sebastopol is covered with an encampment , stretching from the great harbour io the Monastery of St . George , and from the , Col df Balaklava to Kamiesch . Eupatoria is still in their possession , and may still become formidable to the enemy , and Yeni-Kialen is secured against nil attack .
ISepc of Afyof .- —We are without any definite information from the Sea of Azof , except the narrative of the gallant exploit against Genitchi . Tlie enemy had connected the Ton ^ iie of Arabat with tho mainland by a floating bridged fjieutennntHewett with the Beriglp determined to destroy this bridge — -a task brilliantly accomplished by two boats ' it uufcu jji 01 f
luioym uuuer ry juu » KCM'y . » uw this It * not the ohly | lino of coniimuiication : wttji the ' Gtimch iVmn Southern ' Russia . > At ) o | it tWeniy inilps ' west of , Gei ^ tclii there iis a seco ' iVd route across the Putrid Sea , . called Me bridge of , Tchcrgar ; ' and Prince . Gdrcrkolff ifo'to , apprehensive of a visit from the Allied flotilla , has brdered typ fpfrt ^ cations
to be strengthened—a convincing proof of its importance to the enemy . It is to be regretted that the operations in that direction Jhave- not been followed up ; but from Russian reports it appears that more has been done on the shores of the Sea of Azof than has yet been made public by our Admiralty . Asia . —The fate of Kars is still uncertain . According to the latest reports from Trebizond , General Moukavieff has abandoned the investment of the place , and Kars and Erzeroum are once more in communication . This alleged step on the part of the Russian General has been brought about , we are told , by an advance of Schamtl upon Tiflis . "We cannot say that we entirely believe the rumour . But no doubt an advance of the Circassians would sufficiently account for the retirement of the enemy j ^ and the position of Motjbavieff , as described by himself , up to the 8 th of July , leads to the belief that he has not found the conquest of Turkish Armenia so easy as some among us would have the public believe . It appears that in addition to the main body which advanced directly upon * Kars , a detachment proceeded from Erivan , along tlie southern slopes of Mount Ararat , and that it has advanced beyond Toprak-Kaleh , on that road to Erzeroum . The plans of the enemy seem , therefore , to have included the seizure of Kars , and the march of the main body and the Erivan detachment iu a combined move * ment upon Erzeroura . General Mouhavibpf , as we know , found Kars too well prepared for a coup dc main , and ho passed it by a flank inarch , establishing his camp at Mougaradjik . Here the rain put a stop to his movements for several days ; but oa the 25 th the weather cleared , and on the following day he made a careful rcconnoissance of the town . Moving his camp from Mougaradjik to Kany-Kieni , he left there a part of his troops to watch Kars , and proceeded with the rest on a promenade infco the Soghaulu Mountains , The object of this movement seems to have been to obtain information , destroy all tliB provisions he could find , and completely cut off the garrison of Kars from Erzeroum . In three days he reached tho western incline of the Soghanlu Dagh , occupyiug the pass ol Bardous , and seizing hard by a large convoy destined for Kars . It is remarkable that
although he pressed into his service all the vehicles he could find to carry off all the provisions , yet that he had not enougii , and ho was compelled to destroy a considerable quantity . Lingering three da } f s on the Soghanlu , ho withdrew his troops on the 4 th July , and returned to his camp at Kaity-Kieni on the 6 th July . During the time no remained on the mountains , he sent patrols to Kara Ourghan and Zeviue , two stations on the road to Erzeroum , and found that
they were not occupied by the Turks . It has been remarked that ho did uot penetrate as far as Hassan-Kaleh , tho Key of the valley df Erzeroum , and from this it has been inferred either that"General Moub ^ vieff had no intention of inarching on Erzeroum , or that difficulties arose in his path of which ho lias not informed us . It is probablo , indeed , that notwithstanding the * progress of the Erivan detaebmont , the Russian general did not feel that he should leave either flank of
liis communications secure from attack ; t hat ^ he learned too much of tho stn , te ofdefonco iu . which General Williams left Erzcroum to , hazard a coup do main ' x nn'd that on reflection , if he ever had the intention of leaving Kara behind him , ho considered such a step would be too full df danger . Further than this we , havo no authentic news . Wo have not been able , to look upon this offensive ' lnoVeilnonfc of tho enemy , in any
-
-
Citation
-
Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 4, 1855, page 8, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_04081855/page/8/
-