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August 6, 1853.] THE LEADER. 7#9
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RUSSIAN ADVANCES—USURPATION OF THE SOVER...
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"A STRANGER" IN PARLIAMENT. "The best pr...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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The Chuech In" The Colonies. Little Did ...
restrictions on imperial laws , therefore this bill gives law-making powers , and is identical in design with those charters ! And he infers that the lawyers would so interpret the bill . Heaven help the lawyers , then ; and the clients who entrust'such persons with their business ! . The bill was intended for a specific purpose ; the words are clear to that effect ; the operative powers of the bill only bound members of the Church of England , as such ; and the whole tenour of the bill kept it clear from the colonial Legislatures .
Another weapon he used was the argument that as we have set up the principle of local self-Sovernmen t , we ought to confer on the colonial legislatures the power to enable the Church to reguiate her own affairs . This is nearly as untenable as his other position . We presume that Sir James Stephen is a member of the church of England ; and in that capacity knows that the churches in the colonies are regarded as offshoots of the church at home . Therefore there is an imperial
obligation to relieve them from imperial disabilities ; while there is no colonial obligation to do so . Confer the power on the Colonial Legislatures , and they may not exercise it . . But that is no reason why the spiritual subjects of the head of the church should suffer wrong . Then , he says , there would be a disturbance in the colonies ; but that could only arise from such misrepresentations of the power and scope of the Bill , as those of Sir James Stephen . His letter had its eflect , however , and was
aided materially by the " lateness of the session . Its introduction to the Commons had some good effects . It led to the admission of Lord John Hussell and Mr . Sidney Herbert that some such measure was needed . It led to the momentary triumph of Mr . Arthur Elinnaird , a respectable low churchman | but we are mistaken if this victory , like some others-equally facile , is not the prelude , to defeat . The real reason o £ the rejection of the Bill cannot be concealed . It embodied church principles which might succeed ; that was the grievance . If these principles succeeded in the colonies , who could resist the argument for
their application at home P The low church shuddered ; wondered how its j > et archbishops could have been deluded by Mr . Gladstone and the Duke of Newcastle , brought its Stephen to bear , and nervously threw out the Bill . We have always said that the Convocation movement was democratic . We have now presented our readers with proof . When the bishops had to decide on a constituency they naturally went to first principles—they found universal suffrage . No churchman could say , " I am holier than thou . " There was no help for it—universal suffrage and no property qualification must be the basis .
If these be essential in matters spiritual , of so much more moment we are told than matters temporal , are they not equally essential in the latterP—for the greater comprehends the less . How , after this , can churchmen decently oppose universal suffrage P
August 6, 1853.] The Leader. 7#9
August 6 , 1853 . ] THE LEADER . 7 # 9
Russian Advances—Usurpation Of The Sover...
RUSSIAN ADVANCES—USURPATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF MOLDAVIA . Letter IX . ( To tlio JSditor of tho Leader . ) Siu , — The audience attends tho dSnoument of the political plot which now has Europe for its stage . Tho rogue of the piece is in tho ascendant , and tho poor unfortunate of the drama suffering from his perfidy and his success . Where the protector of tho oppressed , and tho righter of tho wronged has got to just at present , does not seem quite clear . Ono moment this Nemesis is at Vienna , another rotating round Constantinople , and anon , in all tho European capitals at onco . All efforts havo failed as } r ot , of course ; but unless tho hypothetical justice of tho drama bo greater than tho real justice of fact , too bizarre a supposition to bo . entertainod , tho end has yet to como which is ,, to '' point the moral and adorn tho tale . "
But events havo inarched with ominous precipitation to a final crisis . " By a despatch dated tho 17 th of last month , " tho Earl ot Clarendon " learned from Lord Stratford do liedoliffo that a communication had been made by tho Consul General of Jlussia to tho Hospodar of Moldavia , informing him that his relations with tho Ottoman Government woro to coaso , and that tho tribute usually transmitted to Constantinople was to bo placod at tho disposal of tho luissian Government . " The oxouso for this preposterous
act follows the declaration of its accomplishment , and is , of course , conclusive— " that during the military occupation of the provinces , the action of the sovereign power must necessarily be suspended . " The occupation itself being illegal , we may be permitted to suppose nothing resulting from that occupation can derive legality from an illegal source . The British ministers have therefore plucked up a show of courage to protest against this logical seizure
of the Government of the principality ; and should the Hospodar of Moldavia refuse to proceed to Constantinople on the arrival of the Sultan ' s expected requisition , the British Consul will lower his flag , and diplomatic relations will cease . An ultimatum has also been agreed upon by the four Powers , and forwarded to St . Petersburg . In case of the rejection of this ultimatum , are the ambassadors at St . Petersburg instructed to demand their psssports ?
Every declaratory paper issued by the Czar and his agents , events have falsified . If we dared apply to monarchs the vulgar vituperation we employ to more humble individuals , the coarsest , and the briefest monosyllable in our vocabulary would be the most applicable . Following the misstatements of Menschikoff , the invasion of Moldavia was accompanied by a proclamation in which Prince Gortschakoff promised that he would not interfere with the Government and internal administration of the provinces . Thereupon he seizes the post , and
appropriates the civil administration , orders away the Moldavian army as pickets on the Danube , and as guards at different points , and finally directs the Moldavian tribute to be paid into the strong box of St . Petersburg , instead of the coffers of Constantinople . It is then asserted that the Porte must , as a matter of reasonable concession , defray the expenses of the invasion ! Similar news of complete incorporation is expected from the principality of Wallachia . Thus , sir , JJussia has grasped the granary of Moldavia , and thus she threatens to grasp the sister
province . No principle of right , no dogma of justice , has stayed her hand . Events , rapid , forcible , and striking , have demonstrated an iron will and an inflexibility of purpose , which cast Louis Napoleon ' s Second of December into shade . So far from the hesitations indicated in despatches having really taken place , we learn from ministerial explanations that the purpose has not once faltered—that it has even sharpened the impression- of its sincerity by its brusqueness , and has resorted to insulting indifference where acts of unparalleled aggression would provoke in reply
nothing but requests to negotiate , and nothing but empty and valueless protests . We are assured , " that diplomacy has done its utmost , and that if it fails at last , the want of success will only prove that it was useless ; not that it was injudicious . " This diplomacy was , in plain English , disgraceful timidity , and a singularly base subserviency , which read no lesson in tho past , and which shrank blear-eyed from the premonitions of tho future . This diplomacy , by deceiving tho Emperor as to the real resistance he
was to meet with , has encouraged him to proceed to the last extromities of insolence . Tho deception is not alone on his sido , and should the allied powers of Europe determine to support Abdul Medjid , Machiavelli himself could scarcely have devised so righteous a cause , to have encouraged an enemy to commit acts of more unjustifiable aggression , or have induced an enemy to outrago more complotoly tho rights and laws of nations , and to place himself without tho pale of civilizod mankind . This is tho result of accident ,
and flows from tho imbecility , not from tho determination , of the Western Powers . But should tho present moment bo lost , and tho stormy season compel tho retirement of tho fleets , tho strategic position of Jlussia will bo perfect . Supported and supplied by hor navy , there will bo nothing but tho Turkish levies to prevent her advance to the capital . If tho European pojvevs temporize longer , they are lost , and it is doubtful , oven now , whether tho fanaticism ot tho Moslem will not seek tho readiest and most docisivo solution of tho crisis .
But tho importance of tho South has caused us to overlook tho clouds gathering in tho North . It is not alono in Persia and Turkoy that tho Czar is ondeavouring to obtain a rich province to hound his empire . Troops havo been long concentrating in Finland ; and intrigues in Denmark , and tho extraordinary strength of tho
Baltic squadron , point to the Sound , and Copenhagen , or Bornholme , as plainly as the movements on the Danube point to Constantinople . The imminence of the danger has even caused the immediate recal of the Swedish squadron , which is now on its way home . The overweening confidence of Nicholas ( justified too well by dynastic sympathies of Courts , by the connivance of statesmen , the complacency of diplomatists , the sordid apprehensions of countinghouse Utopians , and stock-broking philanthropists , ) comprehends all Europe , from its most northern to its most southern limits . At this
instant he has not one single avowed ally , however many crouching and double-faced adherents . But very soon the autumnal gales will drive our fleet from Besika Bay , and leave him undisputed master of both sea and land . If we seize the moment ere it be past for ever , this Russian Colossus must succumb to united Europe : and if we do succeed in placing shackles upon the monster that threatens to desolate the world ,
they must be strong and enduring ones . Russia must be made to pay so dearly and so terribly for this movement , as to make her utterly unable to stretch her bruised and wounded members for years to come . The giant , whose feet lie extended within the limits of eternal snow , and whose head rests pillowed upon the holy altar at Jerusalem , may even yet become a dwarf . Alpha .
"A Stranger" In Parliament. "The Best Pr...
"A STRANGER" IN PARLIAMENT . " The best preparation for war / ' said Lord John Russell , the other day , in answer to Mr . Layard , thinking lie was making a phrase , and imagining that he was a dignified British statesman , ^ is to exhaust all the means of preserving peace ; " and as every conciliatory , and respectful , and too considerate effort would nowr appear to have been used to divert Nicholas from his purpose , and used with no result beyond rendering England little and ludicrous , it is not extraordinary that the talk last night about the Houses of Parliament should have been assentive to the argument that war must now soon be declared . When the Archduke
Constantine , who , with a Louis-Napoleonic faith in a name , believes that he is to be the founder of a new world-empire at Constantinople , takes command of the Russian army of Turkey , matters begin to look serious , and even Lord Aberdeen must begin to lose faith hi the politeness of the Czar . Nevertheless , our Government seems resolved to be mild to the last . You could see , from Lord Clarendon ' s attitude and manner the other evening , when replying to Lord Clanricarde ' s query , and announcing that . he had—the dignified British statesmau—ventured to ask explanation of
Russia ' s dictation about revenue to tho Wallachian Hospodar , that the no ble earl was profoundly convinced that ho was taking a very resolute and daring line of policy . But when this Cabinet believes that it is being bold in merely begging for an explanation , it is the inevitable inference that this self-governed nation is not to be allowed to fight if the governors can help it . The governors are very probably mistaken in supposing that they will gain popularity by escaping tho war . Undoubtedly the governed do not care about tho " cause" involved in this instance ; there is very
little indisposition to sen Turkoy erased from the map . Hut the inert and indifferent English peoplo arc not likely to endure beyond a certain point tho national dishonour of the present diplomacy . England is understood by Englishmen to bo pledged to defending Turkey , a pledge which may bo a mistake at tho outset ; and it would appear that , in tho event of Russia not , evacuating the Principalities , a declaration of war against Russia would bo hailed with British satisfaction . There are two reasons which keep tho
peace of England—general fear of the expense of war ; and general fear of disturbing trade : but neither of theso reasons havo force in thin question . To conquer Russia—completely to destroy her in tho East—would cost less thiin it cost England to Bubduo tho IvaflirB . And , tiH to tho trado nt stuke , it has lout more by tho negotiation than it would have lost by » direct war ; furthermore ; tl 10 commercial classes nro beginning to comprehend that their commercial interests arc agauittt le
the establishment of Huasiii at , Constantinop . Usually , the . se two are good reiiBCiiH against war , and will keep England a peace-loving tuition—until who is destroyed ; but they are no reasons against a war with Russia . It in known , on a calculation of cost , that wo should financially feol ft war with Uusum as little as wo fuol a war against tho HurmoHe . There w no realizing tho notion that ; England in afraid of war . England dislikes the notion of a Fronch invasion ; tlio question of that Horl ; of war comes to our hearths and homos , and ovon to our lodgings . But in a war with
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 6, 1853, page 15, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_06081853/page/15/
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