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February 9, 1856.] _ ^ rn^sr^i =
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_ ^ rn^sr^= — NOTICES TO C ORRESPONDENTS...
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Jktnh&t. r^T3T^__—
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^—' v s SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1856.
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necessities, to exhaust still farther he...
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^ ali l it Moirs .
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There is nothing so revolutionary, becau...
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SIR JOHN MolTEILL'S REPORT. It is a popu...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
February 9, 1856.] _ ^ Rn^Sr^I =
February 9 , 1856 . ] _ ^ rn ^ sr ^ i =
t ! he leader . M
_ ^ Rn^Sr^= — Notices To C Orrespondents...
— NOTICES TO C ORRESPONDENTS . ¦ ssKBffl & sssaiErSBS Scationbut aVa guarantee of Ms good faith . t * . \* 5 mnog 8 rt ) le to acknowledge the mass of letters we re-? 0 M ^» K « iSdwSm . t 0 f the merits of tie eommumo .-tion . ' ' . , ° tssstt $ &^ s £ S &* culty of finding space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . During the Session of Parliament it is ofteu impossible to find room for correspondence , even the briefest .
Jktnh&T. R^T3t^__—
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^—' V S Saturday, February 9, 1856.
^— ' v s SATURDAY , FEBRUARY 9 , 1856 .
Necessities, To Exhaust Still Farther He...
necessities , to exhaust still farther her impdverislied Lombard dominions ; her bank schemes and her railway schemes have failed ; Prussia has detached from her interest several of the lesser German States . ^ Prussia , besides increasing her weight in the Frankfort Diet , has profited by an extensive neutral trade . She has availed herself of an elastic revenue to arm the Rhine frontier . Excluded from the Congress of Paris , she knows that , if a . peace be signed , her signature will be invited to render it the common act of Europe , to ! ^&
gov ernments , and remember that , when the wxir rias ended , we have no further reason to abate the influence of Prussia . For , after great collisions , the tremor of the political system does not immediately cease . We shall do well , not only to keep our armaments in the highest efficiency , but to regard , with the most farsighted and solicitous discretion , both nresent and possible alliances .
when it will be her option to assent or protest—though it is not probable that the Prussian King would repudiate a treaty accepted by the Russian Emperor . The influence of Prussia , it is true , has operated ambiguously to the Allies ; hut she had no goodwill to forfeit in France , and England is well aware that half-a-million bayonets in Prussia form a va . Tiia . blfi counterpoise to any other half-million
THE GERMAN CONFEDERATIOlir AND THE WAR . The idea that Prussia has forfeited her European position is a fallacy . Her influence has not lain dormant , nor is it ignored by the other Powers . It has been exerted in accordance with the historical policy of that kingdom , and it is not easy to decide whether Austria or Prussia has played the winning game . There has been an essential difference in the action of those governments ; but their object is one . It is the aim of Austria to increase her weight mis
within other frontiers . Some of the organs of opinion in Central Germany deny that Prussia is the representative power of Germany . It is true that she is controlled by wary and vigilant r ivals . But the King of Prussia occupies in the Frankfort Assembly a position something like that of a . ^ .. > . „ . * - : »» + 1-. ^ -fti # - »/ - » r \ -C q -fVwmirlaTVJ p . OTYDOS 1-3 xcbvsv ^ wi ""«»
ffO Y ^ JXMJ . JLU . dll' XXI vHv v ^* «^ XX tion . This opposition , however , is not entirely embodied by the Austrian Emperor . The quasi-liberal Constitutions of some of the minor states are obnoxious to both the leading powers ; and , feeble as these states are , in a military sense , they are amenab le to the public law of Europe , and can only be attacked insrdiously and undermined by slow degrees . Austria , and Prussia have a common interest in quenching tke little liberty still possessed by + 1-. ^ a . ^™* - * r * ne .- imt thev are themselves tvsvs
in the general councils or . Europe , oecause decides her position in Germany . It is the aim of Prussia to secure preponderance in Germany , because this decides her position in Europe . ' - ' & ¦¦ - ¦<< ~^ % § 9 Prussia is , de facto , the representative German Power . Nearly all her territories are purely German ; she has many more German subjects than Austria . Austria , with the maiority of her population non-Germanic , lies , ot Jb ainexianauejouu
l / AAV * VICillUUiJLi , « . «* j » v — ^ j divided , and partly by virtue of their dissensions the remnants of Constitutionalism survive . A peace , concluded at Paris , might modify the relations of the German powers to each other , and to the rest of Europe . The public has been accustomed to believe that Prussia is a . neutral nonentity , but her influence has at least been forcible in the sense of peace . Great Britain , in fact , were she disposed . pursue the R ^ ccno-n win * wrm l rl find herself opposed to an
in great part , outside , the national frontier . Thus , ib would be unwise and unnatural in her Emperors to depend , for their influence in Europe , on their German " following" alone . Prussia , on the other hand , which governs mo Germans than are contained in the whole of the minor States of the Confederation , knows , that to be paramount in Germany is to be important in Europe . 5 olio win ujlbujujij iuota */* ^
undeclared coalition in Europe . The Continent , represented by its dynasties , is agreed on the necessity of a pacification , partly because it fears that the real invasion of the North mig ht light up a dangerous enthusiasm ; p artly because , a continued war would chiefly serve the practical interests , and might chiefly promote the naval and military prestige , of England . What does M . de Larociiejaquelin say , in the namr > hlet lie addresses to the statesmen of
J g mese uu , *» .-. «*» object in view , Austria and Prussia have not deviated from them during the present war . As a consequence of her isolated position , Prussia finds herself , at the approach of the Paris Congress , excluded from the consxiltations of the belligerent and mediating Powers . Austria , as the result of her participation in affairs external to Germany , gains a leading place at the deliberations ; "but while her diplomacy is engaged abroad , that of Prussia is active at home , and , we repeat , we are not sure which of the rival powers has approached most nearly the object of this diplomatic competition . Austria is conspicuous in the negotiations ; she has gained the confidence ol France , and the formal amity of England ; she has -extended her influence on the Danubo , and checked a war which gave Piedmont an iuduenco in Italy , dangerous to an alien power . But she hats kept a vast army , daring a year and a hall ' , on a wai * footing ; she has mortgaged a large portion of her revenues ; her financial weakness is notoviews ; ahe has been compelled , by military
Europe generally ? That the Russian navy ought not to be destroyed , because it may be useful to France ; that the conquests of Russia in Asia ought to be encouraged rather than opposed . Simultaneously , the Austrian press utters identical sentiments , and there are not wanting politicians to interpret these signs as ominous to England . But , when the Russian conflict ceases , viru lent as the German press may be , and fiercely as the hybrids of Belgium may Ibark at the great power to which they owe their half-developed vitality , there ivre continental interests which preclude th < 3 military union of all the Powers , which divide Austria from France—except where they meet in Italy—and which would render it unwise , on the part of England , to court the good-will of Austria to the too great disparagement of Prussia . Unhappily , the nations of Europe are not self-governed ; they arc the sport oi" thoir rul « cvs ; too often they identify themselves with dynastic vanities . Wlnlc _ this system lusts , and supersedes natural human interests , wo must consider the probable relations ot
^ Ali L It Moirs .
^ ali l it Moirs .
There Is Nothing So Revolutionary, Becau...
There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is fe t £ g ^^^ ^ S ^ % ^|| S 5 law of its creation in eternal progress . —Pb . Abmoep .
Sir John Molteill's Report. It Is A Popu...
SIR JOHN MolTEILL'S REPORT . It is a popular opinion that , had not Russia in +. ovm ^ t . pd . "hv concessions , the progress of
the war , the next campaign would have been an unbroken course of victory . Something like disappointment has piqued the public mind , because our gun-boats and our floating-batteries will probably be laid up in ordinary , without testing the "impregnability" of Cronstadt . It is said , and by many believed , that , on agiven signal , our army in the Crimea wouldn t J * j 3 . 1 . 1 . » n «« ^ wtTr enimQ OCCkrl tH ^ V ouij / i ^
nave u . eie <* v cu . me cucu ^ , -v- — - French , and restored the prestige of 1815 . Nay , as a man discharges his gun before he hangs it up , there are politicians -who , consenting to a treaty with Russia , would seek another war across the Atlantic , or anywhere , so that our ' preparations might not have been in vain .
Can we be sure , however , that , were l » o b to be a year of warfare , no signal blunders would neutralise our preparations , no signal disasters interfere with our successes ? We have a larger arnry , and a more manage > - able navy ; but have we repented xis of : our ways , driven " the system " into the Desert of Sin , and invented a new organisation ? Great forces mismanaged only aggravate confusion , and the reproach it brings . It is a wholesome reflection to keep in mind , that we might have
despatched our Baltic fleet , tor tne unre- * uu « , without all the essentials of warfare . A real sea campaign would have severely tried the capacities of the Admiralty Board . What guarantees Lave we that , in the Eas # , our eighty thousand men would have attackedthe North side of Sebastopol without & re ^ petition of the Redan disaster ; or , that marching Tipon the interior , their means of transport and supply would not have failed ?
Our administrators have broken down so deplorably , that their own Commissioners expose error after error , not of routine only , but of personal conduct . Sir John McNeiix and Colonel Tuixoch , reviewing the successive misfortunes of the first Crimean winter , attribute none to unavoidable circumstances . The information they collected was the counterpart of that which was collected at Westminster , by the Parliamentary Committee . It would suf
be superfluous to retrace trie story , —uA « - ferings of the army , the unhealthy and scanty diet , the dull bigotry of Peninsular precedent , negligence in London , and negligence at headquarters , the supercilious apathy of individuals , and the unintelligible stupidity of departments , the ruin that followed and the magnificent self-devotion displayed by omen * and men . Bat two or three of Sir John McNeili / s illustrations are equal to the worst which , in England , were attributed to the versatile malice of « Our own Correspondent . While the scurvy was at its height , nearly twenty thousand pounds weight of hme-juxce lay for two months in the Commissariat stores at Balaklava . The Commander-m-Chief had never heard of its arrival . But no one was responsible . " The glorious company of officials stood excused , because there were ' no " regulations" directing the issue of hmc-jtace to soldiers " on land . " Therefore , the " Inpcctor-Genoral ' s" reports were written mvain . The Adjutant-General , in November nnd December , was warned that the troops
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 9, 1856, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_09021856/page/11/
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