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m% TH E LEAPOBB. [Satttrba% ^
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We are not the enemies of the Russian pe...
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THE NATION OF KEFUGEES. " The Polish que...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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M% Th E Leapobb. [Satttrba% ^
m % TH E LEAPOBB . [ Satttrba %
We Are Not The Enemies Of The Russian Pe...
We are not the enemies of the Russian people . Our only desire is that they should advance as rapidly as the laws of human progress will allow , and become one of the free and civilised nations of the world . . To hate them for being in an early stage of p olitical development is as irrational as to hate a foal for not being a horse , or a sapling for not being a tree . When they become the instruments of aggression and injustice in the hands of their autocrat , as they were in the case of Poland and Hungaiy , they must be repressed ; but the wisli to drive
them back into barbarism would be equally brutal and insane . The defeats which their armies have experienced are not likely to injure the nation : on the contrary , they may cure the Czars of their extravagant military ambition , and teach them to return to their natural task of developing the internal resources of their people . In their defeats , therefore , we may feel a joy only tempered by that pity which every field of carnage must excite . But as to the Russian people , we wish to see them conquered in the interest of humanity by intelligence , not with the sword .
Some men , even 1 / iberals , think the French alliance , in spite of the character of the Irench Government , a sufficient indemnification to us for the war . If it is an indemnification , it is not a justification . But we doubt whether the result of the war will be to place us permanently on a better footing with our neighbours . New scenes of rivalry , hitherto closed by Russian occupation ,
will be opened to us in the East , as Mr . Dbttmmond with , the licensed freedom of eccentricity intimated to the House , which was too discreet otherwise to approach the subject . The old questions between Despotism and Xiiberty , TJltramontanism and Protestantism , will still remain in the West . The present enthusiasm is somewhat hysterical . The old entente cordidle was less
brilliant than our present connexion , but perhaps it was also less brittle . In short , the more we reflect on this struggle , the more convinced we feel that liberalism and humanity have very little to hope from it , — nothing that can at all counterbalance the social , political , and financial evils of war . And therefore , what we
desire is a speedy victory , which will redeem our honour , save our prestige among the Eastern nations , and open the Danube and the Black Sea , though it will not render the powers of good much stronger , or the powers of evil much weaker in the world . Victory gained , we pray for the return of peace , the renewal of political progress here , and of preparation elsewhere for a nobler struggle .
The Nation Of Kefugees. " The Polish Que...
THE NATION OF KEFUGEES . " The Polish question" must be considered under two aspects . First , can England engage in such a struggle with Russia as shall end in dismembering that Empire , and effacing the political landmarks of a hundred and fifty years ? ( Secondly , is there sufficient vitality and coherence in Poland to restore it to a place among independent nations ? Theso are grave inquiries , and it is not for mere
enthusiasm to answer them . The object proposed is doubtful ; the means of attaining it are synonymous with a crusade against tho existence of Russia , as a first-rate- power . Generous Englishmen , therefore , an well as importunate refugees , must admit that the point should not bo hastily decided , for tho demand of tho Poles is nothing Iohb than l that we-should invite trial by flro , and march over the body , not of Russia only , but of Confederate Germany for the sake of reviving
Poland , and consolidating the tranquillity of Europe . It will not be disputed , that to attempt the permanent and recognised separation of Poland from Russia , would be to wage a mortal conflict with the most powerful military state in Europe . Whatever forces could be despatched from the body of the empire would still leave a large and prolific dominion to be exhausted and reduced by war . This part of the argument , thereh
fore , may be left out of view . We ave heard no serious politicians affirm that Russia , if called on to annihilate herself , would easily and speedily respond to the invitation . Possibly , if despotism were concentrated in Russia , the event might be worth the cost . Indeed , it is hard to say what sacrifice would be too great really to effect the deliverance of mankind from that which baulks all its aspirations , and extorts from it a perpetual tribute to violence and oppression .
The practicability of the idea , as set forth by its ablest exponents , is not so clear as we should like to see it . Of the statements put forward by Poles , the best is the last , by General Miekolawski . In this lucid summary that general suggests the difficulties as well as the advantages of his
proposal , though these difficulties he believes not to be insuperable . Poland of herself never can resume independence . This is a strong admission from a Pole , but it is a reply to the taunting counsel of half-willing friends . Moreover , the Poles could not rise until they had felt and proved the assistance offered to them . Their " social and national
organism is at this moment decomposed—at least materially "—so that they lie helpless in Europe , waiting for an armament to be advanced into their territory , to bear the first ^ shocks of the collision , and to form a centre for their new organisation . Greneral Miekolawski states a theory and a plan . His theory is simple . Russia is not a naval power , yet " it is as a naval power that the Western Allies are assailing her . Sebastopol and Cronstadt are but arsenals
prepared for her future maritime dominion , when she holds the supremacy of the Greek and Scandinavian marine . To reduce them would be to interfere with tho preliminaries of her schemes , but not to reach her vital parts , or to paralyse her dangerous energies . She has already destroyed one of her own fleets ; and when France and England , in destroying her forts , have sacrificed each an army , the injury to them will be worth tho cost to her . In Poland is the basis of her
power . To create in Poland a liberal state from the wreck of the Russian Empire , MiEitOLAWsia proposes that Odessa and Riga should be captured by the Allied forces , as ways of approach to tho interior . Thenco a concentric line , along the vast isthmus between the Black and Baltic soas , would cut the plains of the Dwina and tho Dnieper , and between
theso points a mass of living forces could bo raised to cleave into pieces the Empire which Western Europe professes to fear . The Polish Emigration , armed and equipped by tho Allies , transported to Riga and Odessa by their fleets , would pass from those places inwards , wakening tho nations as they went . And here General Mnsito & A . 'Wsici . 's vision is brightened by tho idea of more than half a million Polish soldiers march in er under tho
old whito and crimspn flag , and reducing "Muscovy" to its ancient proportions . But wo could winh that tho General had favoured us with some more definite information as to tho moans of transporting and provisioning nn army across tho dreary Htoppoa of southern Rusnia . Nor are tho Military Colonies to bo doapiacd that intercept tho lino of march , and which—on tho authority of JJord i > k
Ros—are capable of supplying a force of 27 , 000 heavy cavalry . That Russia depends on her Polish provinces for many essential resources in peace and war is self-evident , but we should be glad to see a competent and impartial criticism on the figures of M . Kosstjth and General MiEBoiiAWSKi . The General states that Poland , besides supplying grain to feed the Empire , horses to mount its cavalry , wood , tar , and hemp for its fleets , and -wool and iron to clothe and arm its soldiers , yields the
majority of those soldiers themselves . Aforeover , it would be necessary to show that this army , long broken in to the Russian yoke , looks for a national signal , and believes in a national resurrection . It has been the policy of Russia to assimilate the conquered population with its own , to extirpate its traditions , to unite it in social alliances , to obliterate its identity , and merge it in the immense Slavonian race . The German sovereigns , also , have had their part in the work of compressing this nation with others , and of naturalisms : a foreign element on the
Polish soil . It may be that the " political , religious , and social homogeneousness of Poland " constitute , in part , that lever with which the Czars move the great frame of Germany ; it such homogeneousness actually exist , it might possibly be the sword with its point in the side of Russia , and its hilt offered to the first hand that shall vigorously and faithfully grasp it ; but the remaining problem , which neither General MiEROLAWSKi , nor any other theorist , has solved , is , how may a dead body politic be restored to life—how may the state which was extinguished by Russia overwhelm Russia in its turn , in defiance of the two great German powers ?
Geographically , it is easy to understand how Poland has added to the opportunities of Russia . Her territories rest on the seas of the south and north , and " cut Russia into three sections and Austria into two . " They have added fifteen governments to the dominions of the Czar ; and they partially link the fortunes of the vast Slavonian race in Eastern Europe to those of the House of Romanoff . But to declare a Polish crusade would be to give a direct challenge to the Austrian and Prussian courts . It is admitted that their consent never could bo obtained .
Consequently , a war for Poland must be a universal war , including not only an insurrection of peasants in the Ukraine , but an outburst in every part of Europe where revolution failed in 1818 . Of this convulsion the responsibility would rest with the nation that provoked it—with Russia in the first instance , but with Great Britain also ; and , unless it succeeded , history would count it among tho crimes of selfishness and despair . is
At present tho British Government clearly resolved not to widen tho JieM or tho war , or to undertake the causo of the oppressed nationalities . The issue is to bo diplomatic , not political . But it is as impossible to guido a long war , as it is to gnido a great revolution . Among the chances of tho times , therefore , is the apparition of si national Polish flag on tho horizon of Europo . It may then bo tho policy of a wise nation to m-cent that new ally , and to enter into compacts Governments
with it . But were tho Western even disposed to Btriko at Kiifwiu llirougij Poland , justice , to the Poles , as well as nounU discretion , requires that wo should uiulerrttuiui tho capacities of tho people which it is proposed to restore . Do they still form a separate and substantial nation which , when onco raised , could continue erect ? . 1 h fcho whoio of Europo to bo summoned to n war 01 which no human foresight could prodict tno end , for tho pui-powo , literally , of < h * mnni » o and annihilating tho Russian Empire if
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), June 9, 1855, page 14, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_09061855/page/14/
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