On this page
- Departments (2)
-
Text (10)
-
740
-
TEftWiS OP SUBSCRIPTION tO «*&******• " ...
-
^^ S^S^^^s- ^^ toSTsince died of cholera...
-
NOTICES 3"b CORRESPONDENTS. f^^ISs w^^gf...
-
• * Fttepenck is now the price for an Un...
-
. '. ' gap ^5*r ' ¦' ' ¦¦
-
SATURDAY, AUGUST 4, 1855. ¦ ¦ _j i " —*
-
i£nUk Mofm
-
ismssssss^
-
> : $ , ; f SURVEY OF THE WAR. lFithetru...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
-
-
Transcript
-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
740
740
THE LEA DER .
FNo . 280 , Sattjrpat , I L . _^ mmmmm ^ I
Teftwis Op Subscription To «*&******• " ...
TEftWiS OP SUBSCRIPTION tO «*&******• " £ Q it 0 Fora Half-Year * To be remitted in advance . jg &^ £ g ^*& ii n . TTnnriv . atNo . KHi » tr » ¦ l
! s & . man heights , and resting on the entrenchments and forts to the north of Sebastopol If an attack is to be made , as ye hear it is upon this position , the choice would lie between a movement on the right upon Albat , £ C-S £ S ? J 3 S £ nmrcheZin Sep tember , 185 * . In the former c ^ se the army would act in a diffi c ult countrysteen mountains intersected by deep defileshut not more difficult than the Pyrenees _ or the Affghan passes ; in the latter there is too much rfaso / to fear that formidable earthen batteries , as at the Alma , would have to be carried , unless , as at the Alma some weak unguarded point can be discerned , and forced . Bui Z L yhe that the operations which we are warned to expect relate more directly to the siege ; at the same time , it is impossible not to perceive that some important preparations are afoot for action external to the trenches . If the Mackenzie heights cannot be carried , the Allies can land an army either at the Katcba , or Alushta , or Kaffa , and break upon the Russsian line from some un-;
expected quarter . , The Swqe . — With respect to the actual operations performed in front during the six weeks that have elapsed since the 18 th June , we are necessarily but poorly informed . But enough light has been thrown from various quarters to show that the troops have been extremely active with the pick and spade , the gabion and sand-bag , and have advanced so far as to be below the level of the guns of the Malakhoff . There is also some Season to believe that the batteries on Mount Sapoxme . will be able to annoy the ships , if not to destroy them . It is a mistake to suppose that because we have heard little news , little work has been done . The silent activity in the front has been appreciated W the enemy , whose frequent sorties ought "to prove to us that the Allies were becoming unpleasantly close neig hbours to the garrison . At the same time we have no doubt the enemy lias accumulated defence on defence in the rear of the Malakhoff , and that the Allies will have quite enough to do to hold that work when it falls into their hands . The fortification of Kamiesch with earthworks greatly strengthens the position of the Allies , forms a place of arms where large numbers > : may assemble for any secret expedition , and $ secures a point of debarkation in case of un-. i
looked-for disaster . The position occupied "b y the four armies is now one of great extent . The French cavalry fill the valley of Baidar ; the Turks cover Balaklava ; the Sardinians and X rench hold the line of the Tchernaya ; and the plateau before Sebastopol is covered with an encampment , stretching from the great harbour to the Monastery of St . George , and from the ; Col di Balaklava to Kamiesch . Eupatpria is still in their possession , and may still become formidable to the enemy , and Yeni-Kaleh is secured against all attack , ' Sea of A ? of . --Vti 6 are without any definite iinforination from the Soa of Azof , except the narrative of tho gallant exploit against Genitehi . Tlic enemy had connected the Ton £ iic of Ariibat with tho mainland by a floating bridged lieutenant Hrcwr / rr with the Beagjb determined to destroy this bridge , — i-iitask DriUiaiitly accomplished by t \ vo boats ' . iCi ' eW under a fierc' 6 flr ? of musketry . , But this Is' not the only' lino of communication with the Crimed frmri Southern Russia . i > At >{ nit tWenty ' miles' ' wtest of , Geni , tcl » i there iis " a Bccorid route ' across the Putrid Sea , , . call 0 < J iilib bridge of Tchcrgar ; and Prince ; , G 6 jiibotiA . Jtoi > i * , apprehensive " of a visit from f thp Allied flotilla , ^ has Ordered ity fpfrtJflcatioriB , , < .
to be streng thened—a convincing proof of I its importance to the enemv . It is to be regretted that the operations in that direction I have- not been followed up ; but from Bub-~ sian reports it appears that more has been I doL on the shoi 4 of the Sea of Azof than has yet been made public b y ; our Admiralty . Asia .-The fate of Kara is still uncertain . According to the latest reports from Trebi- I zond , General Mouuavieff has abandoned the investment of the place , and Kars and Erzeroum are once more in communication This alleged step on the part ot the Russian General has been brought about , we are told , bv an advance of Schamyl upon Tiflis . We cannot say that we entirely believe the rumour . But no doubt an advance of the Circassians would sufficiently account for the retirement of the enemy ^ . and the position of Motjbavieff , as described by hmiself , up to the 8 th of July , leads to the belief that he has not found the conquest of lurkish Armenia so easy as some among us would nave
the public believe . It appears that in addition to the maitt body which advanced directly uporf Kara , a detachment proceeded from Erivan , along the southern slopes of Mount Ararat and that it has advanced beyond Topnik-Kaleh , on ^ at road to Erzeroum . The plans of the enemy seem , therefore , to have included the seizure of Kars , and the march of the main body and the Erivan detachment in a combined movement upon Erzeroum . General Mouhavibff , as we know , found Kars too well p repared for a coup de main , and he passed it by a flank march , establishing his camp at Mougaradjik . Here the rain put a stop to his movements for several days ; but on the 25 th the weather cleared , and on the following day he made a careful rcconnoissance of the town . Moving his camp from Mougaradjik to Kany-Kieni , he left there a part of his troops to watch Kars , and proceeded with the rest on a promenade infco the Soghaulu Mountains , The object of this movement seems to have been to obtain information , destroy all thB provisions he could find , and completely cut off the garrison of Kars from Erzeroum . In three days he reached tho western incline of the Soghanlu Dagh , occupviug the pass ot Bardous , and seizing hard by a large convoy destined for Kars . It is remarkable that although he pressed into his service all the vehicles he could find to carry olf all the provisions , yet that he had not enougii , and ho was compelled to destroy a considerable quantity . Lingering three days on Wife Soghanlu , he withdrew his troops on the 4 th . July , and returned to his camp at Kariy-Kieni on the 6 th July . During the time he remained on the mountains , he sent patrols . to Kara Ourghan and Zeviue , two stations on the road to Erzeroum , and found that they were not occupied by the Turks . It has been remarked that ho did uot penetrate as far as Hassan-Kaleh , tho Key of the valley ot Erzeroum , and from this it has been inferred either that"General Mour , a . vieff had no intention of marching on Erzeroum , or that difficulties arose in his path of which ho has not informed us . It is probable , indeed , that notwithstanding the * progress ot the Erivan detachmont , tho Russian general did not feel that he should leave either flank ot his communications secure fro hi attack ; thatj , he learned too much of tho state oi'defonco m which General Wili . ijvmb left Erzeroum to hazard a coup da main ; arid thatoii reflection , if ho ever had the intention of leaving Kara behind him , ho considered such ji step would be too full of danger . Further than this we , havo no authentic news . Wo havo not been able , to look upon , this offensive lnoveihont of tho enemy in any
^^ S^S^^^S- ^^ Tostsince Died Of Cholera...
^^ S ^ S ^^^ s- ^^ toSTsince died of cholera .
Notices 3"B Correspondents. F^^Iss W^^Gf...
NOTICES 3 "b CORRESPONDENTS . f ^^ ISs w ^^ gfflS ^^& 'g ^^ eeted coxnxnunicatW .
• * Fttepenck Is Now The Price For An Un...
• * Fttepenck is now the price for an Unstamped ItextZ ?* as -s = t : we = 3-S 2 S ? rihat the stamp be clearly visible on the out--fes ^^ S ^^^^ S b ^ nd the United Kingdom on payment of the proper rate of postage . ¦ , <
. '. ' Gap ^5*R ' ¦' ' ¦¦
. ' . ' gap ^ 5 * r ' ¦ ' ' ¦¦
Saturday, August 4, 1855. ¦ ¦ _J I " —*
SATURDAY , AUGUST 4 , 1855 . ¦ ¦ _ j i " —*
I£Nuk Mofm
i £ nUk Mofm
Ismssssss^
ismssssss ^
> : $ , ; F Survey Of The War. Lfithetru...
SURVEY OF THE WAR . lFithetrue ^ and thW « s 6 mereaaon _ tobe- Ueve the report-the Alltes will shortl y test the strengttfof that Russian position so succinctly described by General Bnmos m his d ^ Lh of the 21 st of July . . Accordin g to thia despatch , the Kussians are posted as in previous' remarks W ventured to anticipate they might he , nahiely , so as to cover the roaL an 4 practicable paths leading ilpon Bakstchi-Serai . There may be said to ^ be three outlets from the valley of the Tchernaya : one leading throug h the valley of Baidar ^ alopg ^ the Woronroff road , to ^ the nnaercliff of ^ the Crimea ; a secdnd by Aitodor to the Upper Belbek ; a third up the ^ p _ road thfif leads directlV ' iipon Maikeniie's , Jarm , havingthe Inkerman heights on the left , and the Mackenzie ridge on the right . Xhe Woronjsoffroad lqadsonlvto tb . OiQoastltpT « ma ; but it is reported thaiv Alujpka is occupied in a way tbnt would . > ar ., the , road , at least to caivalry , and it abounds , in pensive positions , which , honm ^ Wight All be turned ^ were anything to be , gmnQ 4 , ^ y th «« operfttion . bylanding » force » t Alushtd . Xh © pewfc At Alupka is compwatively i » 0 lated < but itno doubt comjoumoatea , ( wiUi ithe : iWuasiaia Jctt stationed at Aitodarf , ancLAlba . t , ibyi , the , pass from Yalta to tho , vaUey ; off Oaeinbaeh , ! ,., ® hv Buesian » rmy the * extend * fxofa Albatf ^ o the north side of ^ ebaefcopol , , Uv * n &' , the . tfmg post of . Aitodor . in front of , fcJU * left > wtS ** iM outnosts pushed down fche valley , ot ( JboJm , ( wifch ; the troops behind . tK MaeUenaw r ; dge campW ywavering the centpe , statioixed m the vffiei lying , between Albut ^ nd > Maolfienr ^ a Sterna-Mid withits right holding the Inker . ; ., .. , :. v ' 1 < VMA ~" ' ¦¦ •* *
-
-
Citation
-
Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 11, 1855, page 8, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_11081855/page/8/
-