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340 THE It Jj A JL> Jfi JK. LSaturjxv
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THE FRENCH OFFICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ...
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THE VIENNA CONFERENCES. The sittings of ...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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War Miscellanea. Tsflb'sfia Of Azov And ...
Bear - Admiral Pbnaud is announced in the Moniteur as the commander of the French naval division in the Baltic _ The Women leaving Sebastopol . —The Military Gazette of Vienna contains a letter from" Sebastopol , which states that General Osten-Sacken , on the 18 th ult . published an order of the day enjoining all women to quit the town at once . The Grand Duke Nicholas , taking into consideration that a great number of these women possess nothing in the world , has been pleased to accord from his privy purse 100 roubles to each woman having a family , to enable her to remove , and from 20 roubles to 60 roubles to each unmarried woman , according as the case might seem to require ( the rouble is a little over 4 f . ) . It was supposed that this order was given in anticipation of active hostilities being on the point of being resumed .
Russian War Contributions . —For the second time , the clergy of the convent of St . Sergius , near Moscow ( which passes for one of the richest convents in Russia ) , have presented a sum of money to the Emperor for the purpose of carrying on the war , their gift on this occasion amounting to nearly a million francs . The Sardinian Contingent . —The Genoa Corriere Mercantile of the 6 th instant announces the arrival in that port , on the 5 th , of the English steamers Charity , of 1007 tons , and Cleopatra , of 1019 tons , with several sailing transports . Those vessels fprmed part of the flotilla which is to convey the Piedmontese troops to the East . The Military Gazette states that the expeditionary corps is to remain pro tempo re at Constantinople , with the French Imperial Guard . This is to be the army of reserve of the Allies .
The Russian Abmy op the North . —A letter from Hamburg in the Independence Beige asserts that the Allies will find in Finland 100 , 000 Russian troops , under the command of General de Berg , ready to oppose them , and that a force still more considerable will operate , under the command of General Sievers , against any attempt at disembarkation at Courland and Iavonia . Statements such as these , however , must be received with caution . Government Parsimoniousness . —The engineer officers have complained that the fusees employed have in many instances heen so old as not to be depended upon . Some , it is stated , have been dated as far back
as 1803 , since which time they have been lying in store at Malta or elsewhere . —Daily News Correspondent .
340 The It Jj A Jl> Jfi Jk. Lsaturjxv
340 THE It Jj A JL > Jfi JK . LSaturjxv
The French Official Explanations Of The ...
THE FRENCH OFFICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE EASTERN EXPEDITION . A very important article appears i p the Moniteur of Wednesday . It is , in fact , an o fficial revelation o the secret plans and motives of the French Emperor in connexion with the war . The document is very long ; but we subjoin the most important points . The writer thus summarises the chief perplexities which he undertakes to explain : — " In what manner was the Eastern Expedition conceived ? What are the expectations and the data that dictated its planT ? WTi ¥ t ~ are ~' thT' icauses ~ tn " at '~" m " o"di :: r fied it ? Why was the Anglo French army landed in the Crimea instead of acting on the Danube and making a campaign in Bessarabia ? How must we explain the long resistance of the besieged in presence of the ardour and heroism of the besiegers ?" ¦
Then follow the written instructions which the Emperor gave to Marshal St . Arnaud . They are contained in the annexed document : — 41 In placing you , Marshal , at the head of a French army , about to fight at more than six hundred leagues from its native land , my first recommendation to you is to bestow the greatest care on the health of the troops , to spare them as much as possible , and not to come to an engagement unless you have made sure of two-thirds at
least of the favourable chances . " The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as the chief place of debarkation , because it is intended to be , as a strategical point , the basis of our operations—that is to say , the ' place d'armes , ' whore we can place our de p 6 ts , ambulances , and provisions , and whence wo can oasily advance or re-embark . That will not prevent you on your arrival from stationing , if you deem it advidable , ono or two divisions in the barracks either to tho west of Constantinople or else at Scutari . 41
So long as you aro not in the presence of the enemy , tlto dislocation of your forces will bo of small moment , and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce a good moral effect ; but If , by chance , after advancing on the Balkans , you should bo constrained to boat a retreat , it would bo far moro advantageous to regain tho coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople , for the Russians would novor venture from Adrianoplo to Constantinople , leaving as they would on their right a choice army of 60 , 000 men . If , nevertheless , tlicre should bo a wish * to fortify tho lino of Karassu in front of Constantinople , it should only bo done with the intention of allowing it to bo defonded by tho Turks alono , since , I repeat it , our position will bo moro independent , moro formidable , by boing on tho flanks of the Russian army , than by boing blocked up in tho peninsula of Thraoo . " This first point established , and tho Anglo-French army onco united on the shores of tho Soa of Marmora ,
you will have to come to an understanding with Omar Pacha and Lord Raglan respecting the adoption of one of the three following plans : 1 . Either to march and meet the Russians on the Balkans . 2 . Or to seize the Crimea . 3 . Or to land , say at Odessa , or at any other spot on the Russian coast of the Black , Sea . ' . ' In the first case , Varna seems to me the , important point for occupation . The infantry might go to it by sea , and the cavalry more easily perhaps by land . In no case ought the army ever to remove too far from the Black Sea , in order that it may have its communications constantly open with the fleet . In the second case , the one concerning the occupation of the Crimea , it is necessary above all things to be sure of the
landing-place , in order that the disembarkation may be effected at a distance from the enemy , and that this place may be capable of being fortified quickly , so that it may serve as a support in case of a retreat . The capture of Sebastopol ought not to be attempted unless you are provided with at least half a battering train and a great many sacks of earth . When you approach that place do not neglect to seize Balaklava , a small port situate four leagues to ethe south of Sebastopol , by means of which communication may be easily kept up with the fleet during the continuance of the siege . In the third case , that in which an enterprise should be resolved on in concert with the admirals against Odessa , my principal advice is , never to divide your army , but
always to march with all your troops united ; for a compact mass of 40 , 000 men is always an imposing force ; broken , it is worth nothing . If , however , you are obliged to divide your army , make arrangements for reuniting it on some spot in twenty-four hours . If on the march it forms several columns , fix upon a point of reunion sufficiently distant from the enemy to prevent any column being attacked singly . If you repulse the Russians , proceed no farther than the Danube , unless the Austrians join in the movement . As a general rule , every movement ought to be concerted with the Commander-in-Chief of the English army . It is only on certain exceptional occasions , as when the safety of the army is concerned , that you should act on your own sole decision . in
" Marshal , I have ^ full confidence you ; I am convinced that you will remain faithful to these instructions , and that you will bring fresh glory to our eagle 3 ;" The writer in ' the Moniteur then defends these instructions seriatim . He says that Gallipoli was selected as the point of debarkation because it is easily defended ,-and readily provisioned through the Sea of Marmora and theThracian Gulf . . further consideration is . thus stated : " At the period the expedition was about to leave , that is to say in April , 1854 , inquiries were anxiously made whether our militarv forces would arrive in time
to cover Constantinople . A defensive war then appeared much more likely than an offensive one . Had the Turks lost a single battle on the Danube , the Russians would have been able to reach the Balkan in three days' march , and would have had the road to Constantinople open to them . The occupation of Gallipoli entirely covered that capital . The two allied Governments were fully alive to > tlie ~ fact , that , evenhaaaRussiaif army entered Adrianople , it would not have been able to advance upon Constantinople , leaving an army of 60 , 000 English And French on its right flank ; and this foresight is to bo found in the instructions of tho Emperor . "
When , however , the allied armies landed in the Crimea , " the scene began to b * e changed ; " the advance of the Russians was broken by the defence of Silistria ; and the French and English generals thought they should be able to arrive " in time to save Silistria , " or at any rate to hold the Balkans , "having , as it were , the two wings of their army protected by the fortresses of Schumla and Varna . " It is added that , " if the Russians had taken Silistria , the fall of which was announced as inevitable in the reports of Omar Pacha , the fate of the Ottoman Empire might have depended upon one general engagement . " Tho writer then says that , upon the retreat of tho Russians , it would have been madness
for tho Allies to pursue , as the state of tho country was such that it would have placed them in peril of starvation , or death from pestilent disease . An advance into Bessarabia , without the co-operation of Austria , would have been fatal , since the base of their operations was the sea , and they were without tho proper provisions , means of transport , artillery , or munitions for such an undertaking . The simple reconnaissance of two days in the Dobrudscha , in which the Allies suffered a murderous loss , is instanced as a proof of this . The help of Austria would have altered tho case ; but Austria was naturally waiting for tho co-operation of Gorrnany , with its 500 , 000 troops .
A state of inactivity , however , was impossible consistently with honour . The expedition to the Crimea was therefore decided on ; and Marshal St . Arnaud received " hints or ndvico" to the following oflcct : — " ' Ho will mako himself thoroughly acquainted with the nature qnd amount of tho Russian forces in the Crimea ; find out whether , those forces aro too formidable ; and land in a spot which may servo as a basis for future operations . Tho best place scorns to bo
Theodosia , called Kaffa now . This spot , howei objectionable ,. as being forty leagues from Sebas but it offers great advantages . In the first plac bay is large and safe . The ships of the squadr < there in perfect safety ; and . the same remark app the barques which bring supplies to the army . ' ] next place , our army , once established on the spot use it as a proper base of operations . If we o the extreme east of the Crimea , we can repel a reinforcements coming by the way of the Sea of and the Caucasus . We make our way onward to the centre of the country , at the same time that wi its resources at our command . We take possess
Simpheropol , the strategical centre of the peninsul have the road open to Sebastopol , on which , prol there will be a great battle . In the event of this against us , we may retreat upon Kaffa , and noth compromised . If , ^ t is in our favour , we can b Sebastopol , and by investing it completely we compel it to surrender in a tolerably short info Unluckily this advice was not taken . "VVhethe generals-in-chief had not sufficient troops to undt this long journey in the Crimea , or whether the pected a speedier result from a bold and unexpectei de main , they resolved , as is now well known , to h some few leagues distant from Sebastopol . "
Subsequent events are then briefly touched oi the writer adds : —" The consequence of retre towards the south was to give up the nor heights—in other words , to abandon the idea c vesting the fortification . . The Anglo-French ji in fa ct , was not sufficiently numerous to inves place completely . " The possibility of an assai thus alluded to : — " When the Anglo-French army arrived befor bastopol , perhaps it was practicable to attemp assault ; but such an enterprise would have been what adventurous , inasmuch as the allied forces ha sufficient artillery to silence that of the enemy . D less , nothing was impossible to an Anglo-French i composed of generals and soldiers such as those
for the last six months have manifested their charac the perils , fatigues , and sufferings of this long siege nothing short of success could have justified a co audacious . The responsibility of command imposes dence before all things ; and prudence prescribed t generals-in-chief not to deliver the assault with an ar 50 , 000 men at most , placed on a rock , wanting arti ammunition , reserves—not having its rear secured L trenchments in case of a check , and having no r but its . ships . That would have been to risk the foi and the fate of the expedition , and nothing shoul hazarded at a-distancc of 800 leagues from one ' s country . The coup de main , which the generals th < possible after the battle of the Alma , escaped them it only remained to proceed with the siege after the of military art . "
The Moniteur then goes into very minute tccli details with-respect to the modes of attack emp in the siege . Into these it will -not be necessar us to enter , as they would not be of interest even understood by , the general reader . The a . _ . __ j _ gg _ - ^ j ^ -j-g ; -pj £ jj ^ yy | Q-gj ^^ i e ^ inarf vellbu ' s ~ ft of the siege , and on the courage and skill o French and English .
The Vienna Conferences. The Sittings Of ...
THE VIENNA CONFERENCES . The sittings of the Plenipotentiaries have bee sumed ; the Ninth Conference being held on Moi According to a telegraphic despatch from Vi published in the 7 Y » i < w of Wednesday , the si was very short , and not satisfactory , and it is u tain when the next Conference will be held , thing , however , is decidedly known ; and the p is distracted with a perfect Babel o rumours hi no authentic origin , o ften contradicting one nno and tending to no other effect than confusioi uneasiness . Indeed , in the present lull , both 01
litical and of war news , tho probabilities nnd poi lities ( to say nothing of the converse ) arising tho negotiations orm the staple topic of profess politicians , both , hero and abroad , and nfiord tin magnificent field for the display of their conjee ingenuity . Somo maintain with undiminished ildcnco that tho consultations of the state physii will infallibly lead to ' peace ; others , with gr < probability , say they will but leuvo tho qu where they found it . But , at the entl of all 1 assertions and reasonings , we are forced to adopi modest self-criticism of Socrates— " We only h
that wo know nothing . " With respect to the alleged shortness of the N Sitting , the evening organ of our Government Globe ) remarks : —" Tho mooting notiiied . nhpvo have been for the purpose of formally introdu the new French and Turkish Envoys , nnd its br < may arise from tho fact , that tho Russian En had not repeived their instructions to rccomm tho formal discussions . Indeed , tho despatch , o to stato whether tho Russian Envoys even attoi tho meeting . " , ¦ ¦
, Tho Indipcndance of Tuesday talcos pains to move an impression that M . JJrouyn do Lhuys to Vienna with an ultimatum—to bo accepted i
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), April 14, 1855, page 4, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_14041855/page/4/
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