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December 15, 1855.] THE LEADER. \W>
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NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS. No notice can...
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SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1855.
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There is nothing so rev"Ol"ationaiy, bec...
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T3IE DIPLOMATIC SEASON. The idea of fcea...
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THE POISONER IN THE HOUSE. Ik you feel a...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
December 15, 1855.] The Leader. \W>
December 15 , 1855 . ] THE LEADER . \ W >
Notices To Correspondents. No Notice Can...
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . No notice can be taken of anonymous communications . WBatever is intended for insertion , must be authenticated by the name and address of tbe writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his ffood faith . Communications should always be legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we re-^ ceive . . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted , it is frequently from rea-- sons quite independent of tbe merits of the communication . A . J . J . ( Nicholas-lane ) . —A . n acceptable bint . * L , ate a Middy , " " B ., " " An Old Indian , " and " H . E . W ., " next week .
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Saturday, December 15, 1855.
SATURDAY , DECEMBER 15 , 1855 .
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There Is Nothing So Rev"Ol"Ationaiy, Bec...
There is nothing so rev"Ol"ationaiy , because there is nothing so Taniiatural and convulsive , as the strain to teeep things fixed ** ien all the world 13 by the very law of its creation in "eternal progress . —Dr . Abnoi-d .
T3ie Diplomatic Season. The Idea Of Fcea...
T 3 IE DIPLOMATIC SEASON . The idea of fceace has received hitherto no official sanction . Nevertiieless , a negotiation of a vague , -suggestive character has commenced . It originated , to all appearance , with Austria , ' wMch fears the next campaign ; & ad it seems to have h & d this effect in London : that- the ( Srovernnieiiit , which lately treated the smuggle-of 1856 as inevitable , is now-weighing tferifcs and conditions . We do Eot go so
Ifer as to say that any formal reply has been . ' given to the * sounding" despatches from "Viensa ; it is only for young Toryism to ; ama 2 e the fcowit by hebdomadal disclosures . dBut it is next ' - " tx > certain that a general scheme of peace has been transmitted from Vienna . 1 to part of -which , at least , the Russian Govern-1 xnent is disposed to a 4 here . That which znay be considered positive is , ffcat no propositions will ' be made by Great Britain .
The Austrian Goveruwraent has many reasons for desiring the discoastannaWoe of the present conflict . It has gaiised , oti the Danube , substantial ^ advantages which it fears to lose . Moreoifer , the war is dangerous to despotism , chiefiy'because it uaasettlcs . Far as is the policy of the Allies from « aiy project of the emancipation of * Europe , tlae contest , as it widens , disturbs * the complex and ' delicate system construct ed by diplomacy . It approaches more closely the tertnibories Of the disatfected ; it gives promineaaoe to-f the conatitutional State
of 'Biadmont ; it compbls the German Governments to keep their ' military establishments , at '•> least , on . a modified war footing ; and , though it iKDoronfies French absolutism , and feeds with CuedTa blood * tho Papal \ power , it is perpetually < au ftihe verge of an incline , down which at suny momcat it may a'oll , carrying with it rulers and nations beyond the control of CaA & inc * s—even beyond the arbitration of standing . armies . This is the fear of despotism ; tMs is still , in some quarters , the hope of liberalism ; 'it is only this chance that
renders tolerable , to * thc democracy of . Europe , the prospect of-a mew campaign . Official Austria estimates ' . these contingencies , and redoubles her effortsito obtain peace . We may say with < confide « ee that , among other influences -exerted iby her to- conciliate the British Goveram « nt v will be an act of dramatic magnanimity towards Colonel Tuna , He will not , anwall probability , bo executed , or tortured , . oriiflpg'ged , or immured for life ; xmd , though ihe » u » a , y he kept within reach of the Impeonal [ police , Europe will be spared at present iifae * scaad & 3 . » . 6 f his . aacuilice .
Something is thus secured , for humanity ' s sake ; but enough is not done for English credit , or for justice , until Colonel Tukb is * placed at liberty beyond the Austrian frontier . The incident , however , illustrates the disposition of the Government at Vienna , which takes the initiative in the movement for peace . Some mutual understanding exists between , that government and the Cabinet of Berlin . Though Austria has , from the beginning , assumed a more contemptible , because a more wavering and less frankly-avowed position than Prussia , the English public feels itself so insulted by the stolidity of King Frederick William , that it prefers the hypocritical expectancy of the Emperor Francis
Joseph . The question , then , is reduced to one of terms and conditions . Peace is possible , if it be possible for Russia to make adequate eoncessions . . That is the difficulty . The offer must come from her , and must be an avowal of coercion . Whether wise or not , whether just or not , we represent , we believe , the opinion of nine-tenths of Englishmen when we say that the public opinion of this country ttrould stigmatise as dishonourable a peace concluded on any other basis . Further , the war has a tangible object—that of giving a is not
xjheck to Russian power . The object high , not has it been sought by worthy methods ; but , once announced , it must practically foe accomplished : —of that there is no doubt . Any negotiations , therefore , to have a palpable result , must proceed upon the assumption that Russia is to submit , and that the Allies are to retire , as acknowledged victors in » just cause . The most moderate supporters of the war must admit this . If the Russian Government concedes so much in principle , and ratines its moral assent by acts of practical submission , the question is settled ; if not , it must be settled by a new campaign . be
Of course , ^ there will a subtle contention among dip lomatists , and a violent public debate as to What are , and what are not , suitable terms . Too onany crotchets have been intruded into the discussion to render it easy of solution . What is to be done with the Crimea?—is a question put by those who ignore the possibility of its restoration to the architects of Sebastop ©! . Guarantees are demanded ^ for Circassia—concessions for Sweden , as if Sweden , up to this point , had established any claim , or as if the Allies could require the
surrender of Finland without having previously -conquered it . Were Great Britain arid France to insist on the evacuation of FihJand , what more natural reply for llussia ! than" Come and take it , " and a prolonged aod , desperate war ? Our claims must be in proportion to onr successes ; they will represent the amount of the superiority we have esta-r Wished , of our own power over that of Russia ; We have gained nothing in the Baifcte , except a temporary suppression of the enemas nava ascendance , and the capture of an unimportan f and isolated fortress . Consequently , in that
quarter we have nothing to urge in corvobora tion of our claims—except , possibly , that the Aland Isles should not be ro-fbrtified . But the Government , ignoring in public tho underplot of passing negotiations , presents its account of military and naval preparations . It promises for next year campaigns of g igant ic proportions , with decisive results—iho moBt gigantic , and the most decisive ever witnessed ; We filwill then make war with a hundredthousand inen in the field , combined with 'the hundix 5 < i thousand of our allies . We » hall not leave the Russian * to choose their own field ,
but shall drag them , perhaps , over a vast surfttc < i , i to defend the northern point of their empire . Or , it may bej that whHc they ft re
^^ ""¦• ¦¦ . " ¦ . -WWIJ ! . » ' . *•¦ -It-I- l **^ S * W ¦ feffry-AK a * *~ X + * - * t . * Bfx > l *< lX *** 4 X * rW .- ^ MMKCA , **(*»• gathering in the north , they will be attacked across the Danube . Two hundred and forty vessels , including ibrty line of battle ships , twenty corvettes , and a hundred and eighty gun-boats , besides the French navy w ^ ll rang « the Baltic to assail its coasts and fortresses . The utmost might of England will be put forfeit , the enemy must reel tinder her blows . Such—results included— -is the official
prpgraninie . Perhaps it is designed , with its style of reverberating menace , to give t % c Emperor of Russia a new reason for peaqe . We trust that it indicates something more ; that ifc is a plain statement of the works in progress , in anticipation of a new campaign . To relax the activity of our naval and military departments would be the worst policy for the friends of peace . We have not made that figure in the war which would justify us in relying upon the prestige of our feats in the Crimea , or of our indecisive demonstrations in ell
the Baltic . We want great and w-appointed fleets , a sufficing number of gun-boats , an army in the field , and an army of reserve , a spirited attiUide in the people , proofs of a better system in the public service , signs of patriotic feeling in the ruling classes , candour and fidelity iu the Government , and a display of courage aud honour before the world , before our allies , rivals , and foes , to enforce the stipulations on which our diplomatists may , hi sist . Then we have to meet the result of an unsuccessful negotiation—an extended war , with new Russian armies in the field , new
generals iu command , and a broader scope . p operations . All this will bring us to dishonour if we continue palteriug with our purpose , dividing ourselves between aristocratic interests and public duties , neutralising activity in one quarter by neglect in another , disgusting our soldiers of all ranks , while requiring their most loyal exertions . We must not only prepare new forces for the campaign of 18 ij 6 , but a new system .
The Poisoner In The House. Ik You Feel A...
THE POISONER IN THE HOUSE . Ik you feel a deadly sensation within , andj grow gradually weaker , how do you know that you are not poisoned ? If your hands tingle , 'do you not fancy that it is arsenic ? How can you be sure that it is not ? Your household , perhaps , is a " well-regulated family ; " your friends and relations all smile kindly upon you ;• the meal at each period of the day is punctual , and looks correct -, but howcaft you
possibly tell that there is not arsenic in the curry ; something more deliberate and malignant than the poison in the anchovie 3 , or the pickles , or the preserved fruits ? It literally , without exaggeration , is impossible to tell . It is quite evident that persons die of poison , ; tfau cause being unsuspected . It has been proved by the records of our criminal courts within the last few days , that poison- may be detected and challenged , and y < it that the poisoner shiall
escape detection . May wo not have reason to doubt whether sometimes innocent pevtWQK have not been sacrificed—the real poisoner being undetected . The Borgia has not , in our days , courage to brave accusation , but he has a greater cunning for concealment . How can we possibly affirm at tho present day that Madame Lawarob was really ffuiity of her husband ' s death V Mr . Joskj » ii Smaotii ¦ WooLiiit is acquitted , arid we tliink jueUy acquitted . When the evidence was imperfectly stated , lii * guilt looked almost . established ; but whoa the complement . of * hc evidence i » brought forward—when -it ¦¦&
shown how oonspicuouHly affectionate he-was to hi « wife ; " « w ho brought her' in « ad « Jo her howho pressed the medical men to state her wyinTJtonjH , and strove to throw light . upon her iflnous ; how lie mwl « no concealment ol
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 15, 1855, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_15121855/page/11/
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