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September 16, 1854.] THE LEADER. 881
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* The poaiiisuln of tho Kertch.
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IDA MAY. Ida May, By Mary Lnngdon. Edite...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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: ' ' The Seat Off War. A Military ' Tou...
What that state was before the war may be gathered from the following interesting passage : — " Circassia is nearly all of the same topographical character , and toTits peculiar formation its inhabitants , in great measure , owe their independence . It is known to be composed of an immense number of elevated plains , of a very productive character , separated from the low country , and from each other , by precipitous ravines , which regular troops , even without cannon , find it extremely difficult to traverse , while the inhabitants move about from place to place with a quickness and facility which wear out their pursuers , who are often obliged to act on the defensive , and have as yet never made any permanent impression on the country . The bravery , and capability of supporting privation , which these mountaineers possess is well known , and is admired by none more than by the Russian officers who have acted
against them , many of whom I heard declare , that so long as the Circassians can obtain arms and ammunition , there is no prospect of their being subdued . One year , the general who commanded only advanced a distance of twelve miles , and had afterwards to retreat and abandon the country . On this occasion several thousand Circassians , profiting by liis ab sence from the neighbourhood of Stavropol , his usual head-quarters , threw themselves unexpectedly upon Petigorsky , a . district considered so far from the dangerous parts of the Caucasus , that the mineral springs there -were the resort of many wealthy invalids . The incursion is described as having been completely successful , and occasioned great alarm at Stavropol . Not long afterwards an equally bold attempt was made on the town of Georgrefski , where there is one of the forts of the line , and notwithstanding the resistance of a considerable garrison , the mountaineers succeeded in rendering themselves masters of the adjoining town , and kept it for several hours . "
A . few pages further on General Macintosh adds some suggestions , probably as useful now as then : — " A border clan , in a feud with more powerful neighbours , may , at times , have promised them allegiance as the price of intervention , but no more general submission to foreign supremacy has ever been recorded . " The resolution of the Circassians is indomitable , and I may observe , in conclusion , that a few light guns , ifthey could be brought to work them efficiently , would render them verv formidable . A single six-pounder would , by report , make Gagra untenable . The Circassians are excellent marksmen , but are said to be slow in reloading their rifles with the fo rced ball ; hence arms , especially rifles of better make , are much in request , as well as arnraunitioiv These , it is to be hoped , have now been abundantly supplied . '' parties In Russia , though differing as to the means , agree-that the entire subjuga - tion of the Caucasians is apolitical necessity , both in reference to the" security of the Russian
provinces beyond the mountains , and for the development of her power in Asia . The circumstance of an intervening region , inhabited by a warlike arid iadependent people , through wbich communication is often impeded l > y then-occupying a single defile , has ever been a subject of inquietude arid mortification ; and this obstruction mav now be raising a more intense feeling , with , the expectation of its becoming an insuperable ' barrier . " ^ A _ t the present moment , however , the reader will naturally 'inquire what General Macintosh may have to say about the Crimea . On this subject he has , indeed , a great deal to say , arid as he says it better than we can , perhaps it will be as well if we permit him to speak in his own words—premising that a description of the well-known defences of Sebastopol preceded the pages we extract .
" Having mentioned the state of the fortifications at Sebastopol , at the period of my visit , I may observe that it is , perhaps , unfortunate that "between that time and the year 1853 , almost no attention should have been given in England to their condition and progress . I is true that it was visited soon after I saw it , in consequence of my having reported what was then going on , by officers who more than corroborated my view ; but when the war broke out , we had absolutely no positive information in England as to whether or not the plan for fortifying the land side of the great-naval arsenal of Russia , on the Black Sea , had , in tlie intervening period , been carried to completion . So late as last year ( 1853 ) travellers , who , however , were not military men , reported that the town was still altogether open to the land side . . Detached works may , however , have existed even then which escaped their observation ; and there is little doubt that , since the occurrence of war , the Russians have been busied in extending the defences on that side * The landing-places near the monastery of St . George are too precipitous to be surmounted in the face of ' a defending force prepared for such an attempt , —and any force landing on the level shore between Capo Kherson and Sebastopol , would most probably find itself at once engaged in a general action , and would to lor
nave tight a space large enough to encamp upon . I am , therefore , certainly of opinion that a descent made in the immediate neighbourhood of Sebastopol , even with a strong and well-appointed force , especially after so much time has been allowed to Russia to erect fortifications there—though these may he only field-works—and to collect forces for their defence , would be a very told and hazardous undertaking , and that while a subsequent hasty re-embarkation , should it occur , without any object having been attained , would , in itself , be inglorious , a gteat loss in men and materiel would hardly fuil to attend euch a repulse . " When we consider the great scale on which arrangements must be made for attacking even an imperfectly-fortified place , the heavy and cumbrous cannon and siege stores which it would bo neoessary to land here , the great quantity of provisions requisite for the support of thc _ besieging corps , to last possibly some months , and which must be collected in a secure situation j and when we take into calculation what a largo force ought also to bo kept in front to resist attempts to raise the siege : when wo consider further that the army must land oh a level shore , commanded at no great distance by liei slits of very considerable
strength , and that the area where it would have to make all its preparations , is too confined for the operations of so largo a force , as would he required for Buch an attack , I feel per-. suuded that nay view of the subject will bo admitted to bo just by all who Imvo had experience in such matter * , though it may not meet tho wishes of many who arc too impatient that a blow should be struck at any cost in that direction . If tho object , howover , were to take permanent possession of tho Crimon , as well as to capture Sobustopol and the fleet , it appears to mo to involve a mero question of tho adequate magnitude of tho attacking force , and the proportionate scale of tho operations engaged in , with dua perseverance , in carrying on tho struggle ' " " In attacking an insular or peninsulur territory by disembarking an expeditionary foroo f rom a licet , ono gircat difficulty which attends it consists in establishing a firm und permanent base on whoro from whence to commence subsequent operations . J ? or us this ougtit to ho effected hi tv aituation affording a good harbour for men-of-war and transports , and tho local configuration should bo such that tho troops disembarking might bo able at once to tnko up u position covering thtiir lodgment—if I may uso tho oxpresttion , —which would give thorn a secure baoia for future proceedings , and nheltor when making arrangements proparatovy to their advance . . ° ' *
' Koxlof , or Euputorin , on tl » e Odessa side of tho Crimea , lias » harbour and good roads , ending towards Symphcropol , tho seat of government , as well as to Sevastopol . But this lundmg-placo in too liable to risk , from its proximity to the muinliind , and tho roads pass over open steppes , whoio an enemy tho strongest in cavalry would Imvo greatly tho advantf ( go . I think , therefore , tliat Kuffu , Moinetnnoa called Thuodosia , ia preferable for a disembarkation . It is an excellent mid capacioua harbour , and stands « it tho entry of a minor punnBula * in winch a body of troops of duo strength might , aftor a short struggle , establish UHuir , paaioulnrl y H a simultaneous doacent wore to bo made at Kprtoh . They might then ™?« s , i i ; f bmufl » preparatory to flushing forward : for it will bo understood , that I t f « , i ' wouW . by no Queried coup cte main , bub only by a period of utwuly and continued warfare , thut we could effect tho aubjugution of the CrnW . nf if , « n ' t ™ Un J ? 01 ' twilt proUiniiwry step , it . appears to mo tluib Anapa , on tho nearest pint SeaStZT ^" ' , 8 houla bo lttkou md K « rrlHO » oil , and in wdcWuirly to liberate tho I IM . lrlij £ , 'rt * ' J mt ftny (> rtB ° " th ° C 0 "Ut Whlcl » lnUV HlU 1 l ) O '" R »»» i « n pOHWJBbloil , a other tribe ! Zf * r ^ ' Tl ' ° C » ro «« . liinB , who are very ofllcient . irregular homo , and Sll i ? r " - ™ 118 wh (> °° <* -opw » to , should bo invited to hiuton to Annpii . » na as tho mi « it lending u » lu tU « Sw of Aw * (» U »« ro narrow mid nUftllow , the rnon un & Lhukr
horses could be passed over by means of rafts or lighters , of which there are many at Yeni-Kalleh and other adjacent places , and the native horses could even be swum across a distance of several miles astern of the boats , so as to pour into the Crimea a countervailing force to the Cossack and other cavalry of the Eussians . Much the same course might be adopted for the introduction of supplies of cattle and sheep from the Caucasian shores , for the use of the army . " As to a plan of campaign , although such suggestions as are matter of stndy at a distance are too often liable to objection , yet from what I have seen of these countries , I think I may , without risking the imputation of very great presumption , venture to point out the advantages of commencing and corn pleting operations in tho strongest part of the country , before risking a final advance . The district , called the ' south shore' of the Crimea , cons it , ts of what is evidently a low and narrow continuation of the Caucasian range , rising above the sea to an occasional altitude of 5000 feet . Its southern slope is divided from the Euxine by a narrow and often rocky plain , indented by the harbours of Sou dag , Onrsouf , Yalta , and BalaKlava
- , all of which are good . To the north the ridge rises in steep hills and often in rocky walls , wooded at the summit , and occasionally pierced with valleys , having roads leading through them into the interior . The roads to the westward of Aloushta are much the best , and are now excellent highways . " I shall suppose th ; it a strong force of the allied armies has effected a disembarkation , and having cleared the peninsula of Kertch of the Russian troops , raised such defences towards the mainland , and so effectually secured the sandy ledge of Arabat , as to be able , with perfect prudence , to leave the peninsula in its rear . I consider it might be possible for a column of light troops , accompanied by sappers and artificers , and supported by steamers , to pass along this shore , securing each strong point in the passes through the mountain , while the main column of the army would advance along the sloping northern face of the range , where it dips towards the steppes of the Crimea . As Tooth columns , advancing parallel to each other , reached in succession the small passes leading across the heights , they would seize and fortify them sufficiently to secure the means of future reti-eat through , them , if retreat should unfortunately be necessary , as well as to prevent any attempts on their rear : and for these reasons the improvement of the roads through the passes would be very
desirable . These measures would , in case of necessity , afford means of re-embarking at whatever might be the nearest harbour on the coast , when a retrograde movement was called for , leaving only a sufficient rear-guard to coyer the retreat in the strongest part of the pass , which , as we have , supposed , would have been previously strengthened by fieldworks , so situated that the enemy could not make them available against the covering corps , when it abandoned them , or against the army should it again advance . ! . " The roiites along tlie shore near the sea , below the mountain range between Kaffa and Aloushta , -were , unlike those to the west of the latter place , -very rugged ani unconnected at the time of my visit to the peninsula ; and should they still be found too difficult fora column o light troops , descents might probably be made from the steamers at the landing-places opposite the small passes , so as to co-operate with the main column above , as it reached the debouching points , which would possibly answer as well as the continued advance of a light column along-the shore . , , " I imagine that the whole mountain tract of the south shore might thus be taken possession of from . Kertch to Sebastopol ; but it is , of course , to be expected that some h & rd
fighting would occur before this result could ; be attained ; and even afterwards the flat country of the Crimea might become the- theatre of a very severe struggle . But while « £ lie , q } lies would have in their ' rear a strong country bordering on the sea , from whence they { Could draw their supplies , the Russians would have a flat country without a single position to retire upon 5 and in the event of being beaten , they would be forced back ttpon the isthmus of Pericop , and driven over it beyond the limits of the peninsula . Their supplies , tooj in the Crimea , must all pass over this isthmus , as our supremacy afloat would enable us to ; stop all water transit , not only over the sea on the Odessa side , but also on that of Azof , as small steamers , gun-boats , and the very launches of our ships pf w , ar might , 1 have , been told by good naval authority , enter that shallow inland sea , and sweep it clear of ? v , ery description of vessel . . ¦ . . ' ' . " The capture of the town of Sebastopol , from , the land side , would not bea serious Undertaking to a victorious axmy , supported by a powerful-fleet , and its sea batteries and the ships in its harbour would then fall easily under their combined fire . . For . this purpose siege-guns might . be required on shore ; but Bala-Klava and its excellent harbour , would then have fallen , and would afford facilities for landing , if no nearer place should be
available . Numerous ships and many troops would be requisite for these operations ; but without such a force , all thoughts of disturbing the Crimea to a serious extent must be abandoned . Wliile advancing along the south shore , the allied column on the north side of the heights , as well as fto the south , would have the advantago of manoeuvring in a country where a large proportion of cavalry would not be indispensable ; but on advancing . across the steppes towards Pericop , a field eminently calculated tor the employment of tliat arm would begin : and it is to be hoped that by that time we might assemble a strong force of cavalry for the purpose . ' ,.-... " The foregoing seems an approximation to the best plan of operations whichcould now be adopted in an attack on the Crimea . from tho sea ; and as a largo Russian force , if not already on the spot , would certainly bo hurried into the peninsula when it was known to bo threatened , there is no denying tliat it is an undertaking of great magnitude , and of no little difficulty , especially if the passes through the mountains of tho . ; sout ^ h sbaro , should have been lately strengthened ; which , as the possibility of such an attack , in the event of a rupture with the Western Powers , has long been quite obvious to tho Eussians , ia by no means improbable . "
It by no means follows , however , that because General Macintosh has sketched this plan of a campaign , based on the supposition tliat the Crimea is to be conquered as -well as Sebastopol taken , such plan will be followed . Indeed , ao one can say what plan the allies will adopt . At present , the idea that finds most favour among the correspondents of the journals is that of a landing to tho north of Sebastopol , somewhere near the mouth of tho Katcha . Should this prove a good guess , it is cl « ar that tho genernls look to carrying the place at once , and trust ulterior operations against the ? peninsula until next spring . By landing so near the fortress they wou ) 4 , fl . t once find themselves in iace of a Russian force , eq ually on tho north as on the south side 5 and they would act under the disadvantage of being cpmpoiled to deal with tho northern defences before , attempting to take : tlie town which lies nearly op . en on the southern side . At th . 9 same . timei 11 landing on the north , while it would present some difficulties to the troops , would , these difficulties overcome , rapidly enable them to destroy the Russian ileet , lying at anchor in tho iuner harbour , or force that fleet to sea . 3 The descent on the Crimea ia one of tlio greatest ; enterprises ever undertaken in tho face of un active enemy ; bub not until it is over will tli « public he able to appreciate its hazards and itfi difaculties .
September 16, 1854.] The Leader. 881
September 16 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 881
* The Poaiiisuln Of Tho Kertch.
* The poaiiisuln of tho Kertch .
Ida May. Ida May, By Mary Lnngdon. Edite...
IDA MAY . Ida May , By Mary Lnngdon . Edited by mi Eugliah Clergyman . SuinpsoxiJLow , Son « nd Co Av no small cost to ourselvos wo have never hesitated to condemn the unthinking philanthropist , who periodically insists on n crusudo for tho abolition of slavery in America . It excited some astonishment —wo should rather write , indignation—that this journal , profoaaing as it does to be in advance of other public organs , should never have joined the ubohtiohists : but our reasons are logical ; and wo arc temperate in tho perusal oi abolitionist literature—from Mrs . Stowo ' a books to Mr . George Thompson ' s speeches . We lmvo said thua much by way of introduction to Ida May , which is » n Aiuwican story , iiitQiid < jd to philouophwo o » slavery . Misa Langdon tella ua that there may be brightov , and that iliero cortiunly are darker scenes than
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 16, 1854, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_16091854/page/17/
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