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August 23, 1856.] —— —
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AUTOCRATIC NAVIES VERSUS THE REPUBLICAN ...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Italy In Progress. We Think It May Be As...
to mind that Febdinand would not have possessed Naples but for our interference during the French war , and that Naples would not have possessed Sicily but for our interference in 1815 . It has been our practice , exemplified in Naples as in Spain , to set up thrones upon certain conditions , and then to neglect the conditions altogether , and sacrifice everything to the thrones . In 1848 we propose to take Sicily from its unworthy master , and create for the Duke of Genoa a royal realm in the Mediterranean . We also encourage the Neapolitans to enforce a constitution . Then retreating from that position , we leave Sicily to be devastated , and Naples to be governed by a system which drives every man of honesty and sp irit—soldier or civilianinto conspiracy , which , under an absolutism , is the only possible form of political opposition . These things endure for years . We at last remonstrate , and are insulted in reply . Whereupon , there is a magniloquent demonstration of zeal for Italian liberty . The Neapolitan King is threatened with a sentence of deposition ; we allude to our lme-ofbattle ships ; we declare that , if Italy chooses to follow the instincts of freedom , France and England will not move a hand to prevent the breaking of her chains . This would be a cheering , if it were a scrupulous declaration . But it would be more encouraging if our journalists were to guarantee the conduct of England only , not the conduct of France also . They do not , and cannot , know what are the plots of Louis Napoleon . When , therefore , they promise for him , as well as for themselves , a policy favourable to the national restoration of the Italians , we are enabled to set their proper value on these- liberal professions . Italy will not be duped . A few guns may be subscribed for in England , to point from Alexandria across the Austrian frontier ; but the British Cabinet does not address Austria as it addresses Naples , and that is the test of its sincerity . A demonstration in the Bay of Naples would , probably—as is predicted—be the signal of an insurrectionary movement . But we cannot map out the limits of an Italian war . Suppose the Neapolitan King unable to cope with his subjects , one of two things must happen—the Austrian Government will come to his assistance , or the insurrection will spread into the other Italian territories and revive the crisis of 1848 . lo thi 3 point we must carry our anticipations . We must be prepared to say what would be the policy of England in the event of a general conflict in Italy ; and here it is impossible to discern , through the cross-purposes of diplomacy , any definite course which we may feel assured our Ministers will select . They are committed to France , to Austria , to Sardinia , to the Neapolitan Liberals , to uumniiii uu uuu j » uu ^« j
deny ; xnoy arcs ^ uu «»« home , and to various governments and parties abroad . Until the way seems clearer through this maze , we trust that the Italians , though they may recoivo a brass gun from Sheffield , and may hear of official remonstrances addressed to their secondary oppressors—will not be convinced that England is really ready to carry out the principles upon which her institutions are supposed to bo founded . It is not for them to expect deliverance from diplomacy . The weight of two empires presses on their northern and central territories , and with those empires Great Britain in too intimately leagued to permit tho hopo that , without a dissolution of her political partnerships , she will ever render an effectual service to tho liberties of Europe . For tho present , however , tho union has been ratified by tine Triplo Treaty . Wo protest against the doctrine that tho
Neapolitans ought to be excited to insurrection , unless Great Britain be prepared to support a national movement throughout Italy . Naples cannot be free while Lombardy is in chains , nor is the administration of the King Ferdinand in any respect more brutalizing than that of the viceroy of the Emperor Fbancis Joseph . With the gaolers of Paris stand the executioners of CrcEKirACchio . When we hear of a patriot scourged by the Caeaffas of the Oapuan Gate , we say we hear worse from Milan , where an Italian has the skin stripped from the crown of his head , and from his fingers , before he is shot by the Austrian Mohawks . And the people of the Legation , who have dared to represent that they are taxed beyond endurance without being protected against military brigandage , —and the people of Borne , whose dearest friends are fettered in pestilential cells , —shall we send our line-of-battle ships to Venice , or to the central coast of Italy , to make demonstrations in their favour ? Shall we warn from the Sardinian boundary that gathering mass which is now almost equal to the whole German army of Austria ? Will Sir De Lj . cy Evans , or any other sympathizer , be empowered to raise a British Legion for the defence of Alexandria ? If not , it is cowardice to bully the King of Naples , who has no fleet , and whose national troops are disaffected , and it is mere hypocrisy to sigh over the woes of the Italian race . The French Republic would have defended Piedmont , and perhaps rescued Lombardy , in 1849 ; but British policy interfered . In the previous year Lord Paimeeston discouraged the national party in Venice , and recommended Manin to submit to Austria . We thus lost the confidence of the Italians , and we shall not regain it by making noisy professions , and engaging , in behalf of France , in favour of a revolution . Let us be sure ot our own intentions . Louis Napoleon , probably , is sure of his , and the Austrian Emperor of his , —which were represented when Schwartzenberg said , " It would be better for Austria to perish with arms in hand than surrender Lombardy . "
August 23, 1856.] —— —
August 23 , 1856 . ] ——
—THE LEADE B . 8 O 5
Autocratic Navies Versus The Republican ...
AUTOCRATIC NAVIES VERSUS THE REPUBLICAN NAVY . Mb Marc * has exposed , and exposing resisted , one out of the several juggles attempted in the Paris Conference on the now notorious 8 th of April . At that sitting Count Waleavski brought forward the question of Italy to burke it , by stifling it between the supererogatory " Greek question" and a beggarly question about some anonymous Belgian newspaper ; and he crowned the labours of that sitting by promulgating liia famous Declaration on Maritime Law . The declaration was worthy of Professor Anderson . He enunciated four iipinninlns— " Privateering is , and remains ,
abolished ; " the neutral ilag covers enemy s goods ; neutral goods are safe under enemy s ilag ; blockades to be binding must be oftective Now , few states had disputed tho lnst principio except France ; but she made a grand concession by pledging herself not to renew paper blockades , whether from JJerlin or Milan : that whs tho contribution I of France . England had rather stickled against the two middlo principles , but France wished the concession , and that was her contribution . It bo happened that America had proposed tho very same prm-! ciplea two years previously , so aho would obtain her pleasure , even if Wamcwski obtained tho credit . Could the Eepublic , therefore , refuse to contribute her imto , by giving up the rieht of employing privatoors . She could not make her selection ; for Count Walkwbki declared that the princip les muBt be taken
together , or not at all . Nay , he went further : on his invitation the Plenipotentiaries of England , Prussia , Bussia , Sardinia , and Turkey , " agreed that the Powers which shall have required and shall have acceded to it [ the Declaration ] cannot hereafter enter into any arrangement in regard to the application of the right of neutrals in time of war , which does not at the same time rest on the four principles which are the object of the said declaration . ' ' Now this agreement evidently had three effects besides those which appeared on the surface : after they entered into that agreement , the signataries were less free than before to co-operate in any improvement of the right of neutrals ; the " endeavour which the Washington Government had made to procure adhesions to the same principle was effectually cut off ; and if the Americans desired to obtain recognition to that principle , a compulsion was put upon them to concede the right of privateering . In order to appreciate this cunning device , let us remember the calculation made a few months back , when there was an idea that France and England might go to war with the United States , a propos to Cuba or Central America ; it was then reckoned that the Republic would be quite unable to face the navy of Engifrnd alone ; that she would probably remain in a condition of inferior naval strength for two years , before she could get a navy built ; so that the restraint against privateering woiild have bound her hand and foot in presence of the allied fleets of France and England . We do not know whether there were any special reasons for making such a proposal just at that time ; but the circumstances are unluckily suspicious . England had conferred great obligations on France , adopting her Emperor from his birth out of the President , by taking up _ his coup manque in the East and converting it into a most successful coup , by helping to place him at the very pinnacle , of Europe , and by supporting him there with British timbers for the props . All this was done in the most liberal sty le . No misunderstandings were allowed to mar the alliance . If the French did rather get the weathergage of us in the Crimea , there was no jealousy—at least no official jealousy ot the manoeuvring Pelissier . If the French fleet in the Baltic did prevent our getting the weathergage of it , while it ineffectually tried to steal that same from us , our sailors were drilled into the utmost patience ; so that literally British timbers were used to prop the throne of Louis Napoleon , and thus to help the advancement of his numerous lieutenants—the advance , for instance , ot Walewski towards his Polish estate . These were large favours ; and the attempt ' to chain Great Britain's only rival at sea was ¦ exactly one of those recompenses which would suit Parisian generosity—since it would help uci ^
the calculations or j . < rnncu u . — France , God wot ! calculates just now on making herself a maritime power . Now the French cannot be made a maritime people as the Americans are ; so if the Americans would bo persuaded to cense to be so , there was a gain to France as well as to England . It so happened about that time , too that France and England had views of " settling the Central American Question , " possibly by an appeal to arms by sea . That ia a significant fact . , If ; so happens , moreover , that 1 ranee and England hml previously tried to bind the Uintecl Mtatos not , under any circumstances , to take Cuba . The pretence for this now attempt to iockoy the United States ia " humanity •—tho sparing of private property . France and England desire to undertake ft chivalroua
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 23, 1856, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_23081856/page/13/
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