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1128 THE LEADER. [No. 296, Saturday,
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JHOTICB3 TO COBBESFONDENTS. No notice ca...
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BBRATA IN OUR LAST. In the review of " I...
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^- ^~ y ^ y + . -SATURDAY, NOYEMBER 24, ...
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There is nothing so revolutionary, becau...
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THE DIPLOMATIC LIMITS OF THE WAR. The qu...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
1128 The Leader. [No. 296, Saturday,
1128 THE LEADER . [ No . 296 , Saturday ,
Jhoticb3 To Cobbesfondents. No Notice Ca...
JHOTICB 3 TO COBBESFONDENTS . No notice can be taken of annpnymon * communications . Whatever !* intended forinsertion must bo authenticated by the name And address of the writer ; not necessarily for vnhhcatioa , but as a guarantee of his good faith . Communications should always be legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difli' culty of finding apace for them . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we re . peive . Their insertion is often delayed owing to apres 3 of matter . ; and when omitted , it is frequently from reasons quite independant of the merits of the communication .
Bbrata In Our Last. In The Review Of " I...
BBRATA IN OUR LAST . In the review of " I « ong , on the Moral Nature of Man , " p . Ill , for "we hare scarcely a right , " read " we have surely a right . " Same page , Tor " or the root of evil , " read " on the side of evil /'
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There Is Nothing So Revolutionary, Becau...
There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing ao unnatural and convulsive , as the strain . to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . - Da . Abnolb .
The Diplomatic Limits Of The War. The Qu...
THE DIPLOMATIC LIMITS OF THE WAR . The question between peace and wai * cannot be debated without reference to the disposition of the enemy . No doubt in Grreat Britain and in France pacific opinions spread and strengthen daily . But this is because the conflict with Russia has been hitherto supported less by opinion" than by bluster . The men who find it necessaiy to modify their views are not those who , from the beginning , have
considered the war exclusively in its relation to the interests and liberties of Europe . With the majority the adoption of any distinct purpete . would be a convalescence from delirium . Fortunately the winter comes to give an opportunity for discussion . If the public decide upon another campaign , let us know its objects , and whether they are such as are impossible at this stage of the war .
Several parties have approached the idea of a peace ; but from different sides . Most prominent , because most indifferent to principle , are the political mercenaries who follow Mr . JDisraeli . They desire to stop the war because they are not permitted to conduct it . First seeking to excel the Whigs in martial patriotism and in their denunciations of Russian sympathisers—of " connivance and collusion ; " they found the nation disinclined to give them the conduct of a war . While Bluster
was supreme , no man , or set of men could outbid Lord Pauhebston ; But the Disraeute Tories found a new basis of opposition ;—the disgust of thinking men , —the dissatisfaction of large classes , —scarcity irritating the poor , —the dangers of the French alliance coming in sightyfragments flying off from the agitated mass of the public and adhering to Mr . Gladstone ' s policy , —an organised movement in favour of peace , —with all the elements that arise from popular impatience and vacillation . They offered to ent the idea
repres of Peace , satisfied that Wings should botch the war , if Conservatives were called in to conclude it . But the Liberal party will paralyse itself if it trust these jobbers in policy . Who shoxild know , if we do not , that it is an act of suicide to summon your enemies to punish the shortcomings of your friends ? Wo have not forgotten that when Lord Aberdeen resisted the clamours of a nation that knew war only by tradition , the DiSRAELiTJes pursued him with vulgar taunts , as did the rabid demagogues with the l'eproach of
treason . They accused him of sacrificing the national honour to the policy of delay , which he adopted partly because he waited to see the last hope of peace disappear , partly because lie would not commit England to such a contest , imperfectly prepared and . precariously allied . These , doubtless , were the motives of the Aberdeen Cabinet , and whether wise or not , they -were pure . When the struggle had commenced , cowardice and " complicity" were imputed to the Government for its hesitation in attacking Sebastopol . Sebastopol was attacked , disasters provoked a public outcry , and the Disraelite faction accused Lord of
Aberdeen as the author a desperate adventure . Sebastopol captured , and the Allies so far victorious , Peace baits the Tory trap . But the policy of a national contest was indicated many months before the Disraelite ballad-mongers undertook to explain it . Should a sound peace be possible , and should the existing Government blindly bluster on against the sense and interests of the people , there are statesmen of tried honour and capacity ready to complete the p lan of conciliation . Only the most intemperate or the most unreflecting of Liberals would elect Young Toryism to represent their disgust .
Certain other opponents of the war , honest beyond suspicion , appear impracticable . These form the absolute Peace party—a small , and , as we think , a falsely-reasoning section ; but infinitely more respectable than the riotous advocates of a war without a purpose or a principle . Mr . Cobden is not of this party ; Mr . Gladstone and his friends of course are not . But the question between a pacific and a warlike policy is not practically a comparison of abstract War with abstract Peace ; it is whether the Russian war " was necessary , whether it has fulfilled its original objects , whether larger and better objects may be developed , and whether Russia will agree to fair terms
without further coercion . The last clause is , at this stage , the most important . Without a disposition on the part of Russia to concede as much as the Allies , by their success and by the judgment of Europe , are entitled to , the war cannot end . The Four Points proposed at Vienna were not in themselves the objects of contention , but tests of the moral submission of Russia . They were conventionally agreed upon as a tender from one of the belligerent parties to another , to sound hi 3 disposition . The original object of
the war , as Lord Clarendon at Jirst expressed it , was to abate the naval preponderance of Russia in the Euxine . The real object , in a diplomatic sense , was to check the progressive encroachment of that empire in the East , to limit its means of self-aggrandisement , and to secure Europe against the existence of one overpowering state . Then , in the course of the dispute , a larger object was developed , and it contained some semblance of a principle : that of proving to a recalcitrant member of the family of nations the necessity of acknowledging and obeying the public law of Europe . By accepting the Four
Points—supposed to represent the difference between her policy and that of the Western powers—Russia would have signified her recognition of that public law , and her willingness to obey it , and the diplomatic idea of the Avar would have been fulfilled . But , though the Allies gained two points at Vienna , could have gained a third by proposing it , and have taken the fourth by force , no positive settlement has been attained . By destroying Sobastopol and occupying the Black Sea , they have demonstrated that the " navul preponderance" of Russia in the Euxine cannot long survive a declaration of war by the Western Powers ; but Russia has not yet Sfesented to the
conclusion . Sebastopol falls , but the Russian dynasty does not submit . Though unable to enforce its pretensions , it refuses to lay them aside . As we stand , the moment we withdraw our costly fleets and exhausting armies , Russia is again the chief power in the Black Seawithin a year Sinope might be le-enacted . Probably , whatever m ight be determined at Vienna , the material effect would be the same . Turkey , in the Euxine , would continue to see a rival empire overshadowing her own . But the submission required from Russia is not to Turkey , but to Europe ; and this submission has not yet been obtained .
So far as the object of the war admits of any definition , it is this . We have always believed that Russia is a real danger , that her system is aggressive and overbearing , and that to relieve Europe from the pressure and the peril of her predominance an act of resistance was necessary . However , we are not fighting a people , but a system ; and we are opposing to it another identical with itself . We ask
despotism to save us from despotism , standing armies to rescue the world from military tyranny , the invaders of Italy to repress the aggressions of a power that conquers by " protecting . " Wedged between lawless Imperialism in France , and German monarchies -which have shared the spoils of Italy , Hungary , and Poland , -we affect to maintain the cause of
civilisation and liberty . Deceiving ourselves , we exasperate the Russian Emperor by playing before his imagination a scheme which we never have intended to fulfil . Why not be frank with an enemy , and tell him that , if he will conform to the rules of diplomacy , we shall leave liberty and civilisation adrift , to gain what benefits they can from martial law in Austria and ^ systematised terror in France .
To pursue the war on such a basis beyond its diplomatic limits would be a crime and a folly . We infer that the Leaguers of Peace do not propose that the Allies should recant to Russia and withdraw unconditionally from the struggle . Some information on this point is necessary . The proposals , as we think , must come from Russia , and must be in the nature of concessions . But , with no prospect of a blow being struck against the principle of military despotism , what infatiiation is it that would tempt men to pusli on a frantic effort , as if war
were a game of hazard , in which tyranny may turn up at one throw , and liberty at another ? There is time for calm decision . Do not impatiently close the debate . The winter is long , and may develope a new situation in Europe . Upon that we may conclude . Meanwhile there is a singular incoherence of ideas in the public mind . They who cry , " stop the war 1 " do not explain how . They who profess to be the friends of a free Europe
exhibit , in some instances , the most incomprehensible want of perception . Mr . Ernest Jones and others of his stamp urge on the war , call for its " vigorous prosecution , " and would fight in one quarter and another , but , " under protest "—as if war were not too destructive , and demoralising , too burdensome on those whom Mr . Ernest Jones professes to personify , too favourable to the propagation of despotic doctrines , to be supported " under protest . "
We arc here met by the objection that a proposition was made at Vienna of an equipoise of naval power in the Black Sea , and that this would equally have tested the moral submission of Russia . But supposing that a treaty were concluded , allowing each of the maritime powers to have six ships of war in the Black Sea—the powor that could build fortresses on the coast , store up in its arsenals inexhaustible munitions of war , and keep in every dockyard an uncommissioned fleet , would surely prepon-
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Nov. 24, 1855, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_24111855/page/12/
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