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1Q6 THE LEADER. [No. 414, February 27, 1...
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SPECIAL LETTERS FROM INDIA. * (From a Mi...
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THE ORIENT. CHINA. Canton was completely...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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1q6 The Leader. [No. 414, February 27, 1...
1 Q 6 THE LEADER . [ No . 414 , February 27 , 1858 .
Special Letters From India. * (From A Mi...
SPECIAL LETTERS FROM INDIA . * ( From a Military Correspondent . ') Nagpore , December 27 , 1857 . The King of Delhi , the supreme ideal of legitimate sovereignty among both Hindoos and Mahomedans , the popular dejure Emperor of India , has been struck down in an open and formidable conflict with the de facto rulers of the country . He has leagued himself with mutinous traitors , and whether that league and that conflict -were planned , or accidental , or forced upon Mm by the rebels , they were not provoked by any actual breach of faith on our part towards the Delhi family .
The house of Timour , even if not literally annihilated , has for ever lost that calm and lofty position of acknowledged legitimacy , whose power alone , and not its right or its dignity , is in abeyance . No member of the family who survives , after having been dragged through the bloody mire of Delhi , can be an object for the pride , respect , or hope of any section of the Indian population . The political importance of this change , produced without any aggression or breach of faith on our part , must be very great in such a country and amid such a people as those of India , and if duly appropriated and improved by us , may be the golden opportunity of our
empire . The wonderful rise of the territorial power and influence of tlie East India Company is a just source of national pride . Its progress in India was natural , defensive , and founded on no fixed design or treacherous combination ; and perhaps its early and unwilling conquests could have been effected so justly and so prudently by no other machinery and by no other motives than those of a trading company , more anxious for solid profits than for glory . But the abolition of its commercial privileges , and at last of its commercial functions , virtually extinguished its independent existence as a power in the State . The Company has become a mere name . The authority and specific duties of the Court of Direc ^ tors have been gradually so curtailed and hampered by
the Board of Control , that it has sunk into a very cumbrous and not much respected Board for consultation and registry , whose members are substantially remunerated by patronage . The patronage so created , so fostered , and so justified , has grown , as I have endeavoured to show , into the greatest burden and scourge of India , and the greatest danger and weakness to its rulers . The East India Company is now a mere obstruction , a veil between the Sovereign and her Indian subjects , between the people of Great Britain and that of India . Its decay as a ruling power followed its decay as a trading company ; its part had then been played out , its possessions had swelled into an empire , its vast affairs and interests required imperial guidance , the control not of a single Minister , carried on almost in secret , but of all the balanced forces and all the healthy publicity of our free
constitution . In India , the mystery which formerly enveloped the name of the Company has quite faded away , and it is now very generally regarded as a body of farmers or contractors , standing between the nations of India and the Queen of England , and it is credited with the usual attributes of farmers and contractors . This impression , although essentially false , is in its terms so near the truth , and it is so difficult to define the exact nature and the actual cause of the continued anomalous relations of the Crown and the Company , that only the best educated and best informed natives can ever be brought to a clear and correct view of the case . And even then they are universally of opinion that this apparent contract is really injurious to the interests of both countries , and to the honour of England . The time has obviously come for thi $ fiction to disappear , and for true imperial relations to be established and avowed .
There still remains one question proposed for our consideration in this letter , which I think may be answered in a very few words . What effect , we asked , has been produced on the public opinion of India ? When all opposition lms ceased , when every trace of the rebellion has disappeared , will the popular belief in our invincible power have been strengthened or diminished ? The question la not an agreeable one' to face ; but It would be the blindest and most short-sighted policy for the present rulers of India to try to flatter themselves or the people of England into a state of self-satisfied security by a hasty and superficial reply . We may at least bo certain that wo have loat nothing in reputation ; the numerous successful combats of our troops against tremendous odds have taught the natives that tho old stories of the prowess and determination of tho Feringhees wore
no exaggerations , Tho strongest and boat disciplined assemblages of the rebels , such as those who opposed Havolook ' fl flrafc advance towards Lucknow , and tho < d . waH « rjnjitinjMjr 8 near Gawnporo , have had their guns taken from thorn by much anfallornumbero-of-Europeana ,-with those daring bayonet charges which convince a beaten enemy of their inability and inferiority more than any other description of defeat . It will be long before that conviction wears off . A long familiarity with tho appearanco of British eoldlora la our peaceful cantonments had perhups begun to breed contempt ; but there -will bo new and fresh accounts sent abroad now of his etorn though buoyant courago , hla physical atrength , and hla over cheerful energy and devotion . And when tho full tldo of tho reinforcements from England begins to flow through Hindoatan , tho crushing destruction and
punishment of all resistance will be so rapid and so exemplary , and the demonstration of force , both during the advance and the subsequent triumphant disposal of the troops in their quarters , will be so striking , that a much higher estimate of British resources in men and military power in general will be formed than perhaps ever existed before in the East . But on the other hand , it must be remembered that a great part of our prestige depended on the popular belief in the indissoluble cohesion of our establishments ; our rules were so elaborately definite and distinct , our payments so regular and punctual ; there was so little scope under our administration for the efforts of ambitious intriguers who might attain to high office with a view to the subversion of our power ; all went on so calmly , obediently , and noiselessly , without any
appearance of passion or caprice , forming such a contrast when compared with the procrastination , irregularity and arbitrary commands , frequently disobeyed , observable in so many of the native states ; and the main springs of our power were worked at such a distance , and by such unattainable personages , that all despaired of seeing any great convulsion or disturbance in our provinces , or among our own servants . But now theyand here I allude chiefly to our doubtful friends or wellknown enemies in the native States of India—have seen at once the lowest and most liberally paid of our servants , our own disciplined troops , spontaneously throw off their allegiance and commence a war of extermination against us . This is a lesson the full significance of which they cannot have failed to learn , and which they will never forget .
The rebels , the disaffected , and the ambitious have also learned two other lessons ; they have learned that two maxims , very commonly , indeed universally , current in India , are in a great measure true . First , that the enormous numbers of the warlike inhabitants constitute a vast and overwhelming power , which , were they but unanimous and true to themselves , not even all our military science and resources , and all the bravery of our European troops , could subdue- The second is , that England is faraway , and that we require many months in order to procure reinforcements from thence .
It is a proverb in India , that if every man were to throw a stone the English rulers would be buried beneath the shower . And they have seen the rebels , by sheer dint of superior numbers , for four months hold Delhi against all the forces that our Government could collect against them . They know that day by day they sallied forth to harass and annoy the besiegers , and that though the quality , and spirit , and tactics of the troops of Government were incomparably better than those of the rebels , still their numbers enabled the latter to hold the city for four months , and after the assault to defend successive positions until they were enabled to withdraw leisurely with a large quantity of stores and plunder . They know . that the defenders of Delhi did
not meet with the support and co-operation from outside that they had a right to expect ; they know that if , for instance , the ten or twelve battalions , with cavalry and guns , who mutinied in the Gwalior territory , had promptly come into the field , instead of allowing themselves to be kept idle by the Maharajah Scindin , , and had attacked the Delhi besieging force in the rear , the siege must have been raised at the least , even if by this combination the complete destruction of the army of Government had not been effected . Let it be observed that I do not answer for the absolute soundness of these calculations and suppositions ; but many calculations of this sort have been made , and they are very far from being absurd or ridiculous .
They know that by the mere pressure of overwhelming numbers Hftvelock ' s victorious little band was compelled to retire from the Oude territory without effecting the relief of Lucknow ; that again a still larger victorious force under Outram and llavelock was , by a similar pressure of hostile numbers , prevented from relieving tho garrison , and was in fact compelled to seek protection within tho same walls , eo long defended by tho gallant handful of soldiers they came to save from a fate that could not hnve been much longer delayed . And finally , they know that Sir Colin Campbell , after eight months with a still larger force and a superb train of heavy guns , after signally and repeatedly defeating tho rebels and rescuing tho British garrison , w « s compolled , by sheer pressure of overwhelming numbers , to evacuate tho city of Luoknow , and to withdraw tho greater part of his troops from the Oudo territory ,
leaving only a gurrison in tho Alumbagh to form a basis for hia future operations when reinforced . And it must hot bo imagined that tho robols have no exploits or auccoasos to boast of , to romombor , and to rocord . Like all boaten forces , and especially liko all igqorant and half-civilized people after a defeat , they wiU-noy , er ~ p . verrat ( M $ GALJP ^^ on particular occasions of battle , and wW ' alwayfl m ' agnlfy ours ; and in short always endeavour to save thoir own credit and fame . And thoir partial successes will bo swelled by report , and rumour , and frequent narration , Into glorloua victories . They will not , In ahort , have a worse opinion of thoir national prowess after tho cessation of all resistance than they' lmd boforo tho mutinies commenced . In all probability thoy and tho people at largo will havo a much higher opinion of thoir capabilities than they ovor had boforo . Tho very faot of thoir having darod to oppose , and for a yoar to combat
against , the great English Company Bahadoor , will be a new and memorable possibility that ¦ few would have dreamed of twenty years ago . On the whole , I must arrive at the conclusion that we shall have gained nothing in prestige , even if we have not- lost , at the termination of this tremendous crisis ; and I must repeat once more that we must not think of garrisoning India , but of governing her . A continent held against its unwilling and awakened inhabitants by the physical force of foreign soldiers , even if the notion were not indeed the bloodiest of chimeras , could never be anything but a source of weakness and expense to the dominant nation . E . V .
The Orient. China. Canton Was Completely...
THE ORIENT . CHINA . Canton was completely taken on the 29 th of December . On the 5 th of January , Commissioner Yen . and the Tartar General were captured . Yeh was taken in the dress of a coolie , and was sent on board the Inflexible on the 8 th . He remained a prisoner off Tiger Island . The Cantonese at the last dates were returning to the city but the blockade had not been raised . When Yeh was captured , he trembled excessively , and showed great trepidation . The Tartar General is described as an immense fellow , above six feet in height .
Copies of correspondence between the Earl of Elgin and Commissioner Yeh were issued on Tuesday morning , for the information of the Legislature . In a note to the Chinese Commissioner , dated Hong Kong , December 12 , 1857 , the Earl of Elgin apprises that functionary of the nature of his Lordship ' s powers as Ambassador Extraordinary , and proceeds to refer in general terms to the various infractions of treaties by the authorities of the province of Kwangturifr . These offences have led the Governments of England and France to unite in a determination to seek by rigorous action reparation for past , and security against future , wrongs . " Under these circumstances , " continues the Earl , " the undersigned thinks it his duty to state distinctly to the Imperial
Commissioner that he cannot assume the responsibility of arresting the progress of hostile operations against Canton , until the following demands of the British Government are absolutely and unreservedly conceded : — The complete execution at Canton of all treaty engagements , including the free admission of British subjects to the city ; compensation to British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for losses incurred in consequence of the late disturbances . " Yeh , in his reply , recapitulates ( in terms of great courtesy ) the circumstances of the original quarrel , and contends that the Chinese were in the right , but does not give any definite answer to the demands . Another communication from the Earl is answered in like strain ; and the
correspondence then ceases . The following letter is one of the series which has already been commenced in these columns . It was written before the final operations at Canton , but contains some points of interest : — " // . M . 8 . , " Canton River , Dec . 27 , 1857 . " The mail goes out to-morrow , and as we commence operations on that day , I thought you would like to hear from me before I start for Canton . The Naval Brigade is formed into three divisions . Our company is tho first of tho third division , aud we are to carry the scaling-ladders . We go up to-inorrow morning ( Monday ) , and form the division during the bombardment , which commences at daybreak , sleep on the ground
as near the . place as possiblo on Monday night , anil storm tho walls of tho city on Tuesday at dawn , close to a place called Blindman ' s House , between tho east and north-oast gates . Tho Naval Brigado then is to take tho north-east gate , and storm tho heights within tho city . So far wo have orders for at present . Gough ' s Heights and Fort in roar and commanding the city will have to bo taken next ; this will probably bo tho Wednesday ' s work . Tho Chinese are said to muster thirty thousand men , including nine thousand Tartars . If this bo tho caao wo sliall have tough work of it , as wo only muster five thousand , including Frouch artillery and everybody . It is impossible to know anything for cortain , as they havo closed tho gates for above a month and keep everything very dark . There arc all kinds oi yarna flying about ; some say the place is all mi » o » r and tho
others that thoro aro no ond of pitfula , grounU Btrowod with aharp spikes , & c . & c . ; but wo must talic it , liko a wife , for better ox for woreo . Wo nro now ly' »(> off thut village whoro tho Bantoror ' s mcu woro attacked , but all is quiet there now . Lieutenant I ym behaved very pluoliily , covering tho retroat of "in w 6 undcd-men-with > -ft-rovQlver ,. ftlthpugl ^\ LVii"jL c .. J '""" eolf in aovoral placoa , Wo had a very quiet Christ " ""; in conaequonco of the nioii not being able to yot < m \ grog . It ia generally a very wild day on bourd <"""' "" tho commanders allow tho crow to havo thuir "'"» pretty wolj . You must not bo aurpriaod to rocoivi' ft lottor next mall in aomol > ady oIho ' b handwriting , boouuse if wo have to remain up at , Canton , I ahall not bo auiv to got writing materials , in which caao I shall comniwalon , who remains on board , to drop you n l » l ) 0 mo , and lot you know how all gdoa oh . "
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 27, 1858, page 4, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_27021858/page/4/
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