On this page
-
Text (3)
-
Ai>fe*ii 2S, 1855.] T it E I* .WAID E B....
-
THE CRISIS OF DIPLOMACY. Thekm is at lea...
-
COPYRIGHT IN NEWS. The advocates of a. C...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
-
-
Transcript
-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
The Moral Of The Reception Last Week. "I...
understood it . It would even have been well to flatter to the utmost any tendencies . that he might show . to . promote the prosperity , and still more , the future emancipation of his country . But we have invited to a personal triumph , and covered with personal adulation , the author of the coup d'etat . ^ Louis Napoleon sought consecration for his deed elsewhere in vain , even from the Popk . He has found it at the hands of the English court and aristocracy , in a country which boasts itself the guardian of freedom . Legitimacy in the
person of despots has been more true to its own honour than liberty . Legitimacy has repelled the usurper ; liberty has crowned the liberticide . All the world imputes this to our cowardice . Louis Napoleon himself will impute it to our cowardice * We change the name of the Waterloo Gallery . He pays the legacy of his uncle to the man who attempted to assassinate Wellington , and forbids a eulogy , of- Wellington to circulate in France . Eight hundred years ago England felt a conqueror ; now she feels a patron .
We can scarcely veil this cowardice under the mask of gratitude . Lo t is Napoleon proclaimed that the Empire was peace , and then sent out Lavalette to bring on a war . The conduct of that war was claimed in the name of a dreadful obligation by a moribund desperado , who wished to . die a hero , and who hurried us to the Crimea in spite of " timid counsels . " We blame bur own Ministers , and justly , for nepotism ; but what is nepotism to the motive which led Louis Napoleon to entrust our
armies to St . Arnaud ? We have mortally offended all parties in France but that of the coup d ' etat , and staked the French alliance on the continuance of a detected power and a precarious life . It is difficult to induce French Liberals to make just allowance even for the mass of the people , who had no thoughts but those of hospitality , and of the French army fighting side by side with our own ; who saw the tricolor , and looked no further ; and to whom the passive acquiescence of France , staggering to all , is perfectly overwhelming .
We have done wna * * s worse than endangering any foreign alliance . "" We " have endangered the source of our own liberties by publicly degrading law and duty . We have taught some , who are ready to learn the lesson , that there is no crime but failure , and that there is nothing more interesting than a liberticide , unless * perhaps , it be a liberticide ' s wife . The Tory party , on the morrow of the coup d' 6 tat , rapturously proclaimed , even in the
British Parliament , the triumph of Louis Nafoleon over liberty and law . They at once accepted him as their patron , and began to threaten with , the consequences of his anger any who denounced his crime . They have assiduously proclaimed that the late ovation was a tribute , not only to the French alliance , but to the personal career of the usurper . Let us compare , the adroit flattery of " liberty without danger" with the allusions and insinuations of the Mo ? iiteur . Lot us remember
that in this country , too , wo are not without bayonets and Jesuits , much loss without conspirators , and that ten years ago France seemed eternally and securely freo .
Ai>Fe*Ii 2s, 1855.] T It E I* .Waid E B....
Ai > fe * ii 2 S , 1855 . ] T it E I * . WAID E B . 3 ft &
The Crisis Of Diplomacy. Thekm Is At Lea...
THE CRISIS OF DIPLOMACY . Thekm is at least one merit in the policy of Austria . It is" based on serious calculations . This may not b , o evident to those who estimate all things by a British standard ; but the statesmen of Vienna have their own interest in view , as wo have ours j and though theirs may bo the narrower , it may , for that vulgar reason , be the more definite . Nothing is- easier than
to argtcer in platitudes in behalf of another-nation ; but for Austrian diplomatists there is < a » Austrian method of reckonfeg between Turkey and Russia , and this political parallax milKfies the conclusions of eager patriots , who , whether selfish' or generous , are liable to the same errors . In both cases they forget that there are men at Vienna who are more than puppets round the throne , and that were the Emperqb convinced , he would have to persuade his
advisers . Half the arguments of the warlike party in England are unintelligible in Vienna . What is it to Fkancis-Joseph , for example , that a loyal union with the Western Powers might deepen the foundations of his empire , if it might also imperil the domestic quietude in which his throne reposes ? What is it to his Cabinet that war would be glorious , if peace is safe ? They seek to be wise for themselves , not for their posterity , and there can be no doubt that neutrality , if it were possible , would do more to avert the deluge than any policy which would rouse the forces of the State .
Its possibility is a question of fact , which must work out its own solution , Austrian statesmen , therefore , naturally and fairly take advantage of every chance in their favour , and adopt every suggestion of diplomatic casuistry , as a ground for further delay . Before the Vienna Conferences sat they were armed with an obvious retort to all reproaches— -war could not be commenced until negotiation had failed . Negotiation did fail , from the English and French point of view , but not so surely from the Austrian . For it must be remembered that
the Plenipotentiaries at Vienna did not join issue between "Great Britain , France , Austria , and Turkey on one side , and Russia on the other . They had to harmonise the Allies as well as the belligerents , and were probably successful in neither . Turkey itself- is indisposed to be quite so docile as the two Western Cabinets would desire , while Austria always has remained in a state of partial isolation . Nor could it be otherwise . Her policy might be different from that of Russia witnout being identical with that of the Western Powers . If
she entered , on the war , therefore , it would be for herself , ' not for the British or Ottoman Cabinets ; and thosePowers had to prove , by their representatives , that an active league with them would be more profitable for Austria than an armed neutrality along the flank of Prussia . The Vienna * Government , never forgetting
that in peace is its salvation , may have supported the two points in which Prince Gobtschakoff acquiesced , and then held that enough had * been conceded . Upon no other ground is her hesitation to be explained . Her aim was selfish and personal ; she gained her objects on the Danube , and had no anxiety concerning fleets or forts on the Black Sea .
If the argument ended here it would be futile to expect the co-operation of Austria . She is not bound to fight for equity , and any further reasonings must be addressed to her interests alone , Consequently , if within the next month she takes the field , her statesmen will act under necessities not yet apparent to them . First , there will be the pressure of external influences , which will bo resisted
untiL they become irresistible . Next , the Austrian , army , maintained in idleness on a war footing , threatens to devour the imperial revenue . The elements of disaffection He ready to be quickened by an opportunity , and thus Austria may resort to the desperate remedy of war , with its concomitants of loans and guarantees , in preference to the alternative of financial collapse and intestine anarchy . Practically ; moreover , the first and second of the Four Points remain to be contested in the field ,, no loss than the third , since tho wan can . have but ono of two results . It
musfr force Russia , to reliBquial ^ thiltfWhich ^ the Western- Allies demand , offr iti'iWgt disable those Allies from * ¦ insisting ;< on- thje > * ernas , they proposed at Vienna * ; It is clear to Austrian statesmen thajt wa # would i briog incalculable forces into the field ^ and commit the destinies of Germany to- a ppr- * tentous issue . Neither o £ the Germans Pow « r % is certain of the other , or of France * or of Gr « a < j | Britain . Neither can foretel how far Russia * wU }? resist , or Turkey forbear , or France and Gpeatff Britain act in concert * Here , are- considenafr >
tions which excuse delay on the : part- of- »> government which provides only for the present hour . Complications and uncertainties add daily to the hazards of the future ; the Western Alliance itself depends on a single will , - determined in secret , enforced by decrees . A hostile army may appear on the Rhine , revolt may rush like flame through Lonabardy . These are the elements of the calculation , and Austrian statesmen prove at least that they . are ? careful of their own brief futurej when they 1 cling to peace , and shrink from the horrors and * ' perils of war . 1
Are English statesmen as thoughtful ? Is the English public as deliberate ? We may now be approaching a . general convulsion which will divide Europe against itself for years ttf come . If so , a tremendous waste of blood and . treasure , the rupture of innumerable relations , the exhaustion of productive power , the paralysing of industry , the demoralisation of civilised states , are sure to follow , and there are .
questions which must be put with irresistible force . Do we , however , pause to interrogate our Government ? - Is Great Britain as careful for herself as Austria ? Is she contending . for selfish , or for generous purposes- —or foe neither ? Is there a plan or a principle in her action ? Or have we " drifted" into thisi fearful war with no . other prospect than that o £ getting out of it , at some future day , how we ; can ?
These are questions which we do not leave to the Manchester party . They are worth examining , however , that we may know whether fifteen thousand Englishmen have rotted * in the Crimea for the sake of a dip lomatic quibble , or whether we are fighting in the hope that a good cause will turn up worth fighting fon " -
Copyright In News. The Advocates Of A. C...
COPYRIGHT IN NEWS . The advocates of a . Copyright of intelligence ^ seem to suspect that it is an impossibility > which is fortunate , aa it is also an absurdity and an injustice . The only rational objects of copyright are those ; to which we apply the term of authorship , that is to say , ideas and language . These are the products of the author ' s own brain ; and he- has as good a right to a property in them as another man has to a property in tho work of his hands . But a fact , or an event , belongs like light and air to all mankind * Directly it transpires , no matter by whafc means it becomes a part of the general knowledge of the world ; and yon have as good a right to republish it as you have to repeat it —the latter right being ono , wo presume , which nobody denies . Are we , writing within twenty-four hoursafter an important p iece of intelligence has been published , to . ignore that about which nil the world is talking ? H we do not ignore it wo ropublfoh it , and full within the prohibition . Wo cannot oven allude to it or repeat it for tho purpose of confuting it , without rendering ourselves liable to the penalty
of indirect repubhcation . We presume , that as proof of an lndepondont source of information , tho action must fail . Aud how is it to , bo determined what oi ? e independent sources of information ? If
-
-
Citation
-
Leader (1850-1860), April 28, 1855, page 15, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_28041855/page/15/
-