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December 29, 1855.1 THE LEADER. 1247
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POLITICAL SYM1TOMS. Tin; deplorable infa...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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A Year's Campaign. Twelvk Months Ago The...
were the countless transport-ships , some of them the finest ever called forth by a stimulating commerce , which , ceaselessly pl ying between the Crimea and the French , English , and Italian ports , entirely sustained the vast fleets and armies engaged in actual warfare . The theatre of the contest , viewed from end to end , was on a scale corresponding with the magnitude of the contending forces . It involved points in a territory—itself one- seventh of the globe—stretching from Archangel to Petropaulovski , from Constradt to the Crimea , from the Sea of Azof to Lake Van .
The central figure in the group of separate operations which go to make up the whole of the year ' s campaign is undoubtedly Sebastopol . Here we find the troops supplied by the Allies rising from barely 50 , 000 , twelve months ago , to nearly 200 , 000 ; we rind the guns used in the siege gradually augmenting as difficulties arose , from two to eig ht hundred ; we find an amazing quantity of work executed on both sides , miles of trenches , batteries and forts , colossal in magnitude ; mines and galleries sunk : in the Russian works a chaos of
underground habitations ; and all this m addition to the constant and dangerous watch in the trenches , relieved by midnight encounters , and midnight onsets . We see a railway made and locomotive engines at work . Gradually , as the army increases , the troops cover more ground , until Balaklava is defended by a triple line of works and soldiers in position , Baidar is occupied by French and English , and an offset from the army seizes Kertch . The Eussian external army augments , but it dares not fight . Week after week , the circle of attack
contracts , and rises up closer and closer to the fortress ; each bombardment is more redoubtable than the last ; each day the slaughter of the enemy becomes more terrible ; and , as his situation grows- insupportable , ho ventures to assail the covering army of the Allies on the Tchernaya , only to be beaten with great loss . Then the Russian General begins to build a bridge for the retreat of his army ; the final bombardment , unexampled in the history of sieges , precedes the ussault and capture of the MalakhofF , and leads to the evacuation of
the city . Properly speaking , the attack upon Scbastopol was not a siege—it was an attack upon an entrenched camp . Surrounded on the south by positions , naturally very strong , Sebastopol in the hands of Todtlishen became almost impregnable . But it was throughout a battle of lines against , lines , and cannon against cannon , the Russians having an overwhelming number of guns in reserve .
The issue even <>( ' the last day showed the soundness of the nwixhn I hut . holds entrenched camps open in the rear to be inaccessible ; for on every point , but one , notwithstanding the searching / ire of tin' Allies , their storming columns were repulsed , mid in the instance ¦ where . Llicy succeeded ihe entrenched work * were closed to the rear . We doubt Avliclber there is on record any operation . similar to I lie so-called siem ; of Sevastopol , either in mn ^
nitude , duration , or necessities . When . Sebastopol was abandoned it was anticipated ( hut . ilic Russian army would be driven from the Crimea hy skilful and rapid operations on tln . 'ir / lank and rear . Such an anticipation has proved ineorrecl . It has been found that , the rear of I lie Russians is covered by desert , waterless sleppcs , and 00 , 000 inci ' u in position ; and that tin- front and left , ( lank are , secure behind inaccessible rocks and defiles , manned by above u hundred thousand troops . The two iinnics have ,
therefore , practically gone mlo winter qitar tera , and sonic persons speculate ihut then will bo no more cmnpningi . ig in tho Crimea .
What has been gained by the campaign in the Crimea ? For more than a year the Allies have compelled the Russian Government to send men , money , and stores of all kinds to a remote point in its dominions— -a process of exhaustion far greater than can be conceived . The Allies have captured the " standing menace" to Constantinople , and destroyed that fleet of nearly a hundred ships
prepared to follow up the threat by a blow . As a consequence of the operations in the Crimea , the enemy has been forced to abandon the mouth of the Danube , to surrender Kertch , and lose his supremacy in the Sea of Azof ; to abandon Anapa , and retire across the Kouban , and to surrender Kinburn . In other words , the fruits of fifty years' toil have been snatched from him in a single year by the military and naval operations of the Allies .
On the other hand , the enemy has gamed some compensation for his losses by the capture of Kars . The Russian army was only fifteen or twenty miles from Gumri—its base of operations ; the Turkish army was shut out from the world . For six months this isolated garrison sustained itself against twice its numbers ; and at length capitulated , not to force of arms , but force of hunger . In the meantime , Omar Pacha had won a battle on the Ingour , and passing southward , had gained the hig-h road running from Redout Kaleh to Tin is by Kutais . What will he do when he hears of the fall of Kars ? The balance of a
year ' s warfare , alone Avith Turkey in Asia , is greatly in favour of Russia ; the fruits of her patience are Kars and the road to Erzeroum , Bayazeed , and the road to Persia ; and against that Ave have only the fruitless battle on the Ingour , and the probably fruitless , but able march on Kutais . Except in the Baltic and the Sea of Azof , the naval campaign has been made in conjunction with troops . In the Baltic our success has been negative—keeping down the commerce of the enemy ; compelling him to maintain large forces around St . Petersburg ; and forcing his Avar fleet to rot ingloriously in harbour . The positive services have been the destruction of the smaller forts east of
Sweaborg , and the bombardment of that fortress . Undoubtedly this Avas a smart , although an imperfect operation ; and highly useful inasmuch as it , demonstrated the value of the gun and mortar boats . in the Sea of Azof the services of the ( lotilla have boon positive , inasmuch as they have consisted in the destruction of vast stores of food and forage for the cnemv , and tho closing of one of his lines of communication , not only with the Crimea , but with Transcaucasia . In all these proceedings there has been no lack or gallantry and daring ; it , is evident that the pluck of the navy is " as great as ever ; and that prudent and darin" - leaders and adequate means have been
wanting to complete success . _ > On the whole , we have cause to be waUshed with the campaign of this year , except in the Baltic and Asia . In the former , great success was impossible , because inadequate means had been provided ; in the latter , . success wa . s impossible , because for some reason or other ihc war wan . starved , and a brave , enduring garrison sacrificed to iho laches of the Allies . II
peace bo not made , it , is in the Baltic and in Asia , thai we shall have , to make up for lost lime ; and k'l us hope that no political jealousies in cither quarter will cause the enemy to bu spared .
December 29, 1855.1 The Leader. 1247
December 29 , 1855 . 1 THE LEADER . 1247
Political Sym1toms. Tin; Deplorable Infa...
POLITICAL SYM 1 TOMS . Tin ; deplorable infatuation that has induced some of tho middle and industrious classes to .. ive up the idea of political reform has not , proceeded far . We have received th « strong !
testimony on this point . The inattention oi the mass of people to domestic politics may be ascribed to two causes . First , they are preoccupied by the Avar ; they understand little oi foreign affairs , and dare not assume any initiative , lest they should fall into blunders . Consequently , diplomatists and Parlimentary leaders have a clear field before them ; the onlyquestion on which the popular voice is prepared to decide being that of Peace or War . Before the War began , hoAvever , the same inactivity , amounting almost to apathy , was displayed . The reason was , that the political organisations of the country had been dissolved . There was a confusion of parties in the Legislature , an extinction of parties in the nation . The old leaders were either dead , or had
deserted their ranks , or stood aloof m cynicism and disgust . Exhausted by the Chartist agitators and by the Anti Corn-law League , the people fainted at the close of the first epoch of Reform . The Second Bill , Lord John Russell ' s Appendix to the Act of 1852 , is now a curiosity , and Avas never more than a piece oi paper . It alarmed the Tories , it disgusted the Liberals ; no one believed in it , and liad not the War come to supersede all home questions , it must either have been stifled ignoininiously , or so modified that its author might have become its opponent .
As matters stand , the question is not dead , but sleeps . It Avould be unseasonable to disturb it , were it not that Englishmen have a tendency to ignore the future , and to blind themselves to the domestic struggles that must follow tho Russian War . If , after tho actual conflict is ended , a revolution in Europe , or a collision of governments in the Avar , do not prolong the succession of distracting events abroad , a great agitation is inevitable at home . How is the nation preparing for it ? There are throe " movements " in existence ; the
Administrative Kelorni Association , which is a degradation of Whiggery ; the National and Constitutional Association , 1 o Avhich not a man of character , and scarcely a man of sense , belongs ; and the hysterical Midland League , whielfniclts down the frittering of Chartism , the refuse of diplomacy , the enthusiasm of some men , the egotism of others , and the ignorant suspicions of a very small section of the middle and industrious classes . Clearly , none of these has any life or power . The first is a formed to abolish tion et iimiwi wik ^ w ^ j
,.,. w , rvmv corrup , y cv < mpany L " "" "' ...... , - based on the worst princip les thai . uphold class and family government—narrow , exclusive , . and totally dJ . stiLule of intellectual stimulus . The second is so obscure , and has published such unreadable petitions , thai , it is only noticeable as a , symptom of the little vitality remaining in English polities . The third , of course , is a chimera , partly an imposture , partly a . delusion , only intcresling to the persons whose
consequence it . seems to increase . li" we consider tin : tone of the press , it is generally devoid ol ' political feeling . One or two Liberal organs in the metropolis , and a luw journals in the secondary towns and cities ' , represent all that remains of the . spirit of Reform . The explanation is , not that Reform is obsolete ; but lhal no organisation exists to keep it moving Soim .- «»/ ' < h < : " Chartisl , leaders would be willing < 'i . uii « li to put themselves at the head of theirOrder ; but Iheir Order will n » l hnvu ihe . n-H , , s Uv <« l / A illiterate rhap , o . lV . The chief of the , hughs ! . democracy imp . ^ nn . Uc < -:: * l as monitors
, !„¦ . he war , are in , v . n ,. l . Mr- < -ulu > K * i . in uV feat , ofAuiM . u . s ; Mr . UiiHiJn , upon ., ,, ( .,, crul election , mi-bl leum how ty rannical a ,,, I uuMmteful an K . itfli *! . con ^ il uency may | , ( . The youi » K" > ' m : !'"" "I" i . imuiIhmI Liberals __ nieu of lli-s K «'"" l > of Lord (; oj > kui « : ii—pro ¦¦ .,. rve their « . ni < 'ln < l- ; a few individuals who
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 29, 1855, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_29121855/page/11/
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