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October 30, 1852.] THE LE * A ti E R. 10...
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Butler's Analogy V. Modern Unbelief. The...
point to be proved—is assumed . And what we find at the outset we fl d continued through the work—an incessant and unjustifiable assump-* l of a \\ that is undertaken to be proved . Let any one quietly assume Ih t the Koran is what it professes to be , a Revelation , and all Butler ' s aloffical reasoning will " confirm" it , as it " confirms" Christianity . What we desire to know is not whether a Divine Truth can be confirmed h the analogy of ordinary truths , but whether this particular scheme really is the Pivine Truth- it pretends to be . Butler , in his introduction , says : — " Hence , namely from analogical reasoning , Origen lias with singular sagacity 1 erved , thafc 7 te tvho believes the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is i 7 Author of Nature , may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as
re found in the constitution of Nature . And in a like way of reflection it may 1 e added , that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God , upon account of these difficulties , may , for the very same reason , deny the world to have been formed w him . On the other hand , if there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence , which Revelation informs us of , and that system of things and dispensation of Providence which Experience , together with reason , informs us of , —i . e ., the known course of Nature ; this is a ^ resump tion that they have both the same author and cause ; at least so far as to answer objections against the former ' s being from God , drawn from anything which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter , which is acknowledged to be from Him for an Author of Nature is here supposed . "
The eis ^ ° f the Analogy lies in that passage . To it we reply—1 . Me who believes the Seripttvre to have proceeded from God , is already convinced , and cannot therefore need convincing . The only man who needs an argument is he who does not already believe it , and does not believe because of the " difficulties . " 2 . The " difficulties" we find in Nature arise from our being unable to trace the train of causation through all its stages . We do not doubt the facts ; our difficulties are not external to Nature . But with regard to Revelation , the main difficulties are external to the Bible—i . e ., arise from our being unable to believe that God did write such a book for such a purpose . We are in a similar position to the Bible as the Christian is to the Koran ; both are assured that the books are revelations , and both find the fact asserted to be a " difficulty" they cannot get over .
Therefore at the outset we might say that , as regards the antagonism between the Old and New Theologies , this book is totally ineffective—it eludes the main difficulty , assumes the point in dispute . If for no other reason , then , we might call upon Orthodoxy , as it values its existence , to produce some better champion . We will , however , descend with Butler into details , and see if , failing in the general , he may not yet succeed in the particular . " If there is an analogy between Natural and Eevealed Eeligion , there is a strong presumption that they have the same author . " Take away from this , Butler ' s fundamental position , the assumption quietly intruded under tlie word " revealed , " ( and we have a right to insist on this removal , ) as begging the question altogether , then we say Butler ' s argument will be found to amount exactly to our own . Thus—¦ Natural Eeligion is that interpretation of the various phenomena of I \ ; ilnre which has grown up in the minds of men : its author , therefore ,
18 man . Revealed Eeligion is a systematizing of the scattered interpretations into a distinct code , with the assertion—to carry conviction with it—that the work was " inspired , " or even actually written by God . Its author , licnvever , still remains man , unless we believe the assertion ; and that belief we are not entitled to assume here , at this point of the argument . jBut it is Butler ' s method , as we said , to assume the truth and to " confirm" it by analogies . Ho reasons , moreover , as if analogy wero not , as it generally is , a most fallacious method . We shall seo into what fallacies it leads him .
The first chapter is devoted to the arguments in favour of Immortality . We do not think those arguments very forcible ; nor , indeed , can we lay much stress on any logical proofs of a transcendental question . Wo believo iu Immortality , though not on the precise grounds here suggested . It is enough , however , for our present purpose , to say , that as wo believe in a future state of existence , wo may consider this chapter as proven for lie nonce . The result is , that Natural nn , d Eevealed Eeligion both agree in ( he belief of a futuro state . It does not carry far , as Butler himself admits : — " The immortality of a soul , and its existence in a future life , an a Hinted : ni ( l fixed law of ( Jod's providence , must then bo admitted on the evidence of rctison .
" Hut wo must observe , that no proof of a future life , not even it amounting to 'I'l'ioii . si ration , would ho in itself a proof of the truth of Religion ; for the . notion Ut'tL we . are to lire on hereafter in as compatible , with Atheism as the fact that wo «>¦<¦ now aline . Hut as tlu ' » Christian Religion implies a futuro stale , any argu-HH'iit . mhluced against a futuro Hlnte is in iiu : t an argument against Religion . 'I'lh'so observations , therefore , l > y removing Mich presumptions , prove to n high 'tfiv ,. of probability one funtlamoatal doctrine of Religion . " ( We quote from tho Analysis givon in tho edition before uh . ) Before his Haid res nil , can liuve any considerable weight , it must haveattached l () 't the belief | lm ( , ( jo <| goverim this world by rewards and punishments , "" d therefore , " reasoning by analogy , " the next world is also to bo no J > ven , od . Unless 1 nmim-tality bo the gate opening to J . ' aradiso or to "ell . analogy can inako nothing of it .
" It is consonant with , and analogous to , our present slate , to believe Unit ; we ! il "il ! lienafler he punished or rewarded for our notions here . Tho present , pivcrn" ' " ' of ' Uodis conducted , as to sonio extent wo am nee , upon it law of rewards and ' "' " ^ hni .-nts ; iiikI if so , there in mi a priori probability that Mie sumo will bo the < ilS ( ' with l , li ,. future on .-. Wo infer Unit , the system under whieh we now live in "n
governor who rules by rewards and punishments , and leaves us , his intelligent creatures , to foresee the consequences of our own actions upon ourselves . " We shall now be able to grapple with Analogy . God is considered as a Governor ruling by rewards and punishments . What he does in this world , it is inferred he will do in the next , viz ., punish or reward according to the lives we have led . At a first glance this seems a satisfactory inference ; but look deeper , ask yourself earnestly and boldly , How is it possible for the creature to sin against the Creator—to irritate and anger him P Imagine the supposed sinner to be pervei * se , brutal , unenlightened , subject to his passions , and still we ask how can the mind , having any exalted idea of the Deity , believe that such a creature can excite the wrath of his Creator P Do we incriminate the vase which cracks in a too-heated
furnace , or the marble which is rebel to our plastic hands . In attempting to fashion anything , and knowing the material has a dpfect which will most probably cause the failure of our attempt , when it fails do we wreak vengeance on that material ? The child does , and the savage ; the enlightened man , whether he foresaw the failure , or whether he hoped to overcome the defect , would equally blush if a flash of anger made him destroy the thing . And shall we say of God , that lie who made us what we are , who saw the very extent of our defects , and foresaw that they would cause us to fail , will condemn us to everlasting torture because wo did fail ?
For let it be distinctly understood , — -unless you deny the Author of Nature ; to be the Author of Nature , the Creator of all that is , —unless you bringf ' mto the field an equipollent Evil as the antagonist of the great prineiplejof Good—a power every way equal , unsubduable by God , acting in his own way , intersecting the paths of goodness , —unless you take up some such position , the very notion of sin becomes , when deeply considered , a blasphemy . Sin against man , sin against humanity , sin againat one ' s own ideal nature , there may be , but sin against God is impossible . It will be said that in the old Hebrew myth , of Satan there is a power of Evil , not equipollent , indeed , with that of good , but immensely active for evil , whose activity God ' permits , in order that man ' s virtue may be tried . We have within us a Light and a Strength which will enable us to defy Satan ; if we neglect to use them , we fall , and are punished for the neglect .
But unless we are created Ha cruel sport , this permission of Satan , who might be obliterated at once , is little less than diabolical . What ! shall God permit a Power second only to his own to tempt men to their fall , and give them no better safeguards than those which daily experience tells us do not avail , and which he must have foreseen from the beginning could not avail ! The idea is preposterous ; yet if you look steadily at the doctrine , it comes to that . The dilemma , therefore , into which you are thrown is this : the Author of Nature , if lie is benevolent , either cannot be omnipotent , otherwise he would prevent Satan ; or he cannot be omniscient , otherwise he would see that men , constituted as they are , must and would sin . Choose your horn ? If God made us , he made us with the passions which are sins in their indulgence . He made the passions ; He also made the objects which are temptations . If Ho did not—if he is only tho Author of one part of us , who is the author of the other P
The attempt to escape from this dilemma by means of Free Will is futile . Beside the passions which lead to vice , it is said there are the restraining principles of Virtue ; our lleason and our Moral Sense speak plain warnings , and our Wills are free to choose between the Right and tho Wrong . The argument 13 pitiable . Freedom of the will means freedom to will what we will , and what we will is determined by the strength of the motive , and the force of the motive depends on the constitution of tho God-given mind ; for , us Butler says : — " Temptations from without , and temptations from within , mutually imply each other . For when we talk of external temptations , we imply that we . have within us some inward susceptibility of temptation ; and when we talk of being misled by passions , we imply external temptations and objects of gratification . "
Now , until you can assign any other author of this " inward . susceptibility" than the " Author of our Being , " until you can say that in point of fact God did not make us , but that we ( or another ) made ourselves , — that God only gave us the material , and that we fashioned the material as its inhorent defects allowed us , —you cannot escape the dilemma ; you must still continue that shocking passage in the otherwise beautiful Lord ' s J . Vayer , wherein the creature implores his Creator not to lead him into temptation , but to deliver him from evil ! The Now Theology thus distinctly separates from the Old in its repudiation of tho notion of sin against God . But as we have here to deal , with Butler , who enforces Mint notion , let uh , by way of argument , grant that man can sin against ( Jod by criminal treatment , of his fellow creatures , or (" for . lie is a jealous ( Jo < l" ) ' by not believing in bis edicts , the ; question then arises , —How docs tho Analogy of Natural punishments confirm the
doctrine of Divino eternal punishments P Analogy shall bo our guide . Would any human , governor condemn a Chartist to eternal torments for open revolt- against tho " snored institutions of the country V" Would even Louis Napoleon , with all his coldhearted recklessness , condemn those who fought at the barricades to an eternity of HuM ' ering V And it' he did , what would he thought ol hiniP Philosophers publish nvhU'Iiis which are to dispel error for ever ; ( hoy send forth tho Truth , and call upon men to accept it ; they are angry when bad logic , perverse views , or natural st upidil y , nrevenl their renders from accepting tho Truth , but would they for tlml , refusal inflict Ihepnngn of everlasting damnation F Tho philosopher , if renlly one , would nay , " My friends , you riro , wrong to reject the light of truth , and as all wrong brings its punishment ^ you will HiuTo r ; but it he punishment will be one . m kind with the wrong ; you will b ( 5 without the advanfngcH of truth , —you will be criled berror . "
pp y In Homo suck hoiihd can wo understand Divino Punishment l . o Immhi ( i of kind and proportion , no that the men who livo brutal and ignoble I . voh hero on earth may livo Iohh nobly in the lifo U > conic . . 11 «<¦ i » «• 'igher privilege to livo " a huini . n lifo than to live that of a dog , it ih a higher privilogo to lead a no Wo human life , urnl to lono that privilege iu tho
October 30, 1852.] The Le * A Ti E R. 10...
October 30 , 1852 . ] THE LE * A ti E R . 1045 . _ . —¦ ¦¦¦ ¦¦¦¦ ' . " ' ~~ " . .... ¦¦ - ¦ ... - ¦ - ¦ . . . ¦ . ' ¦ : _ L _ : _ :: _— ¦ ——^^_^^_^ MMMMI ^ ^ ^ MMfcM ^ M _ M ^ ^ MMM ^ ^ ^ MM __
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 30, 1852, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_30101852/page/17/
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