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When the great conflict , with Napoleon was terminated , wflhadforgotten .-for ' -what principle we had been fighting ;—* hich tealtyVan , torestrain the tyrannous encroachment of a flesDot- Wo acted after victory as though no tyranny but Na-Tioloon ' ' s was formidable ; and we ensured to Europe despotism , oDuression , insurrections , invasion , all the past and the impendim ? struggles . When ministers are allowed to wield a . vast power , we ovt ^ St at least to ittsist that they shall give public reaspns for every act , as a judge does : Lord Caafclereagh . would . not have signed the Treaty of Vienna had he been expebted publicly to defend the details ;* ; ^ . -ui i a i ., • Again ' : Seprecy makes it impossible ; to form , public opinion beforehand ; hence public enthusiasm-is not forthcoining when the time of action arrives . Pefenders of the late ministry are heard to sayy that it abahdohed the Sicilians because itr feared that the English public would not support them ! Why , how could we . ¦?¦¦ ¦ ¦ Who of us can possibly unravel the web of diploout aicer tne iacra tnen
macy ? A blue boOK comes a year ; ana , at last , a few per sons who have much leisure get some insight ( but a partial one only ) into the case . The English public to this day is kept in total ignorance that we have any moral obligations to Sicily more than to France or to Sardinia ; and then complaint is made of the apathy and selfishness of the public I If En gland is to be a moral power , publicity is essential for all ber axjts . Her state papers should p e short , morally reasoned from broad and fundamental principles , and ordinarily published W the day of delivery , Without any vote of Parliament ; nay most of all when Parliament is ^ sitting . The half year's vacation is now a time of wholly unchecked despotism . The argument of " necessity of secrecy for the public service , " must be reserved strictly for details of military movements . In negotiations , conspirators and tyrants need to be secret ; but a great state , with an honourable cause , has nothing to gain by it , and
everything to lose . ,- ' .: = Publicity would not all at once secure , but it would conduce to , the habit of dealing on broad moral principles . No others can be right betweeli nations . Lawyer-like subtlety 'is- unjust and disastrous . > A War ' or peace which cannot be popularly and concisely expounded , is assuredly a bad cause . Ifot till the popular intellect is the tribunal before which out- statesmen plead , will our foreign and colonial be as moral ias our home policy . 4 . " Nob ought we . to admit , as a final criterion of international light the private decisions Of a few learned men . " Many Of our inconsistencies rise out of uncertainties concerning right principle . To recover a few hundred pounds for . 'Don Pacifico we blockaded Athens , spent and destroyed a hundredfofd of the sum claimed , and risked widespread ^ hostility . Yet when an Englishman is brutally cut down in the streets of Tuscany we revenge him by meek notes that receive insulting replies . Here the principle is in controversy , whether a private Englishman voluntarily residing or travelling in a foreign 01 Jtmtisn it
country , ought to be under the projection iayr . there is a treaty to this effect , of course he is ; yet such treaties may be ordinarily undesirable . If there is no treaty , one would think that no external jurisdiction shotild'interpose ,. except in the extreme cases which Justify intervention even on behalf of strangers . By claiming to enforce our own law . for the protection of our subjects abroad we involved ourselves in war with China , and are now again in war with Birma . These wars must be endless ; and unless checked by abandoning . ' our- principle of interference ,, threaten ruin to our" Indian , empire by its own growth . Far more discriminating has hithertoi been the conduct of the United States . Where their citizens trade or travel voluntarily , they have left them to the laws of the fcweign country : but now they are bravely Undertaking to enforce humanity on Japan , which murders or encages sailors driven by tempests on her shores . The distinction between voluntary and involuntary approach to a country seems to me here the
cardinal point . But pardon me this digression : I had meant to say , that all such questions ought to be solemnly and publicly debated by Parliaments , not settled in a private study _ by a learned jurist or historian . Where party spirit does not intervene , English assemblies have no lack of the highest wisdom . Did our Parliament leave to local authorities local and petty questions , and the mere application of principles , and' givp more time to great moralities , it would be far more dignified , and < fo far higher service . , 5 . " Nob , if forced into war , ought we to attack neutrals . " I vlobelievo many of my hearers will be amazed at my protruding this axiom . Many are not aware that this is our habitual practice and an avowed policy , to whioji no State in Europe has ; contributed ho vehemently as England . I do not now apeak of our having the other day attacked a neutral and inoffensive tribe of Kaffirs , and of having added them to our enemies by ravaging their country . Thia . no doubt , will be disowned as a . mistake .
But it was no mistake , when , having resolved to invade Af g hanistan , wo occupied the independent and neutral country of Sinde as passage-ground . That act of violence caused the Sinde war ; ana our conquest of Sinde precipitated the Seikhs upon India , with a long train of war , calamity , confusion of all moral principle , and infinite embarrassments to eomo . _ See now how evil breeds its like . Our unjust occupation of Sinde to aid our Afghan war stopped the mouths of our ministers when Russia , in November , 184 B , occupied the Danubian principalities with a view to the invasion of Hungary . We did not back Turkey in her resistance to this violation of her soil , for wo had a bad conscience . But it is from the seas that wo principally attack neutrals . If wo are as 3 ailod by France , we retaliate by capturing all merchant vessels which dare to trade to France . Thus , neutral interests , of inde finite amount , are confiscated at the will and convenience of any one powerful belligerent . This enormity is politely called the law of blockade . By applying it in 1798 wo ataryed to death 20 , 000 oppressed Genoese , men , women , and cniMron , in order to capture a Fronoh army . It surrendered tne
wun honours of war , " as noon as the innocents had been immolated . This is like stabbing a friend through the heart , in order jo priok an enemy who runs behind him . The atrooious deed look nine months in perpetrating ; and wo persevered , when irom our ships wo saw the starving ladiea gathering herbs and au'gin p roots oh the green embankments . Our two ferocious wiaoks on Denmark , a poacoful and friendly power , were a Btill moro marvellous example how , when onoo in a war fever , wo forhoz unmoral prinoiple , and , of course , with it all wisdom , in the Ht nifffflo for immediate viotory . As tothis luw of blockade , it ia : ; " ° "ttjaiUMJO whioh makes war contagious , and forbids all real n , tK' y War becomes too heavy a wonpou to uso » it turns ! ur Mediterranea n fleet into a ahum . Wo foar to help un in-«" ni , P ? ° Plo—ospeoiallyif it bo small , like Sioily ; for wo cry , ha i will cause a European war ! " Yes , if wo attack 1 H 19 ? ftml l ' Ps an American war , too , as in 1811 and flp « i ' -. tll ° > * Statos joined our enemies booauao wo on i ¦ oir » norohant vessels . That American war was then , " " « tuty . It is now our atrongfh , if wo ivro wise . It oimbloa lm-T V ' turn this evil praotioo Try uttering the word ; for we , ?*¦ „ *¦* Amorioa will join us . _^___ £ m > h ought \ j » to volunteer extending a war beyond its
irih . ' ° d > ato oonHoquonoo of our abandoning freedom in fhii . riT > l ; lmfc tho tm > » " » t'ons for whom wo had principally leilm « r a- wll 0 HO f ™ ° oonatitntions wo had aolemnly aolcnowvioU ' « ^ ttn ( l Spain , — wore both overwhelmed by doHpotlo .,,. „ i ° ? ' " P " 11 y / o ttirtod to doliver iVom Fronoh armioa in tho K ? > Kfi ; lo againat Napoleon , in order to boo it subdued by "' ttrmieB « « w command of tho Holy AUiance . This was liv 1 ocliou 8 and dreadful sight : but we ouraolvoa caused it , » y not protesting aloud for Poland and Xtnly in 1814 .
most inevitable geographical limits . "" , If BussiatotM attack Hungary , we may aid to repel Russian regiments from Hungarian soil : but by what moral , logical , or physical necessity does it force us to blockade or bombard St . Petersburg ? In 1 S 32 , we made war on the Dutch forces in Antwerp ; but we kept peace with Holland On the seas and every where else . If we wish to defend Sicily in Sicily , Home in Eome , Hungary in Hungary , we are able to do something more or less ¦ effectual J and certainly with the least possible risk of moral principle . But the moment that we justify attacks on . innocence , peace , and industry ; by the mere plea that this conduces to ' victory , we go adrift on an unknown and incalculable ocean . Suppose that , in order to carry on war *' more vigorously , " , we -sail to attack St . Petersburg . It may be that the Emperor yields , to save his capital . Good I But it may also be , that he is fanatically obstinate . We then either . retire abashed at our own empty threats , or we lay his city in ashes , enrage our good friends this Russian people , rouse their patriotism against us ,
and only do worse harm to the Hungarians . Moreover , to bombard St . Petersburg , is to ruin , hundreds of English merchants , and would thus raise among ourselves a powerful party favourable to the enemy . It is as unjust to call the commercial class selfish because they deprecate haying to pay for a war with their whole fortunes , as to expect provision shops to feed a town in famine . The ferocious Eoman policy of habitually carrying war to the enemy ' s heart mokes war essentially immoral , as an unlimited retaliation for a limited wrong . It is energetic ! Yes ! as it is to stab a man , because he will not pay us fiye shillings ! 7 i " We ought not to be too timid to speak truth publicly . " I admit that prudence may positively enjoin silence on weak States , like Belgium and Switzerland . If this is our case , it follows that we have no ordinary public duties in Europe . I do not treat that opinion as absurd . It might be urged that England is Bke a wounded warrior , whose first duty was to heal his
own wounds , before encountering fresh foes . Our National Debt is bur wound ; From 1823 onward , when we did hot dare even tp protest aloud for the liberties of Spain , which we saved from Kapoleon to abandon to the despots whom we had set up in power , —K > ur only wise policy ( in my individual judgment ) was to withdraw our fleets , economize , pay our debt , and nurse our strength for future service . If any one still says , we are too weak to dare to speak truth ; , thisis the policy he ought to enjoin . But if , since 1849 , it is too dangerous to be passive—if , wounded or unwounded , w $ must defend ourselves—if ^ armed neutrality is more expensive than a decided second part in limited War—if on these grounds it is right to be ready for contest , it is cowa rdice an ? folly alike , to shut our mouths through fear . The anger of the despots against an English minister who speaks plain truth in our Parliament , is some measure of the formidable nature of the weapon which we . hold against them . The
speaking of truth in English pubhc life would before long overthrow tyranniea in Europe . For freedom is an atmosphere , truth is a subtle spirit . It pervades foreign countries , it breaks through the barriers of despots ; it invades their quiet , it overturns their elaborate plans . Therefore they hate it , they dread it , they persecute f t therefore they cannot afford Freedom to exist in their neighbourhood . But the ministers and statesmen who urge and entreat us not £ b speak truth too loudly , hereby confess that they are themselves already half enslaved . They warn us what will next come , if despotism be conjinnea , and they point us to the wise course of doing the opposite of what they suggest . Finally , to what positive conduct do these negations point ? I know that if it be ever so right for England , in conjunction with the United States , to take an initiative in Europe , there is no time for the formation of a public opinion for that . Events isut l wiu revolu
must stir and guide opinion , imagine a new - tion to neutralize the forces of France ; and I then ask—What ought we , do , if some of the oppressed nations make insurrection ? If National Independence be our own right , if Legitimacy is indeed of value , if we would not be accomplices in Tyranny , we surely cannot desire—none of the great parties in England could desire—to aid the despots . All will m word avow neutrality , as the least thing which we owe to the nations . But we are apt to profess neutrality , yet by an unjust interpretation , and through the odious Law of Blockade , practically to take part against the insurgents . If we would be truly neutral , wo must recognise both contending parties alike , and defend- our commerce to both alike , so as to enable both alike to traffic with us , whether for arms or for any other purpose . At tho same time , considering low groat arc our obligations to Sicily , and that we are at this moment accomplices in the to to have debt to both
oppression of Rome , we seem me a deep these States , and that whenever -we dare , we ought actively to restore them to freedom ; but , as I said , without attacking neutrals or non-belligerents , or extending war beyond its most necessary limits . Moreover , if intervention of other despotic powers takes place , so as to manifest the conspiracy of despots , then beyond a doubt a league of free states to support liberty is just and expedient ; and until ifc can be made , England should act alone . ' Do you ask what we can do P That is a military question , into which it is too lato to enter : but I do not hesitate to avow a civilian ' s opinion , that if tho forces of France were but neutral , it would only need a ttrong will in Eng land , and she could , oven without the aid of America , revolutionize Europe in three months , in spite of all tho efforts of Russia and Austria ; and to do thja , at any imaginable expense of money and arms , would bo to us a very oconomioul and prudent proceeding . foar class
Allow mo one more topio . There are persons , I a , among ua , who love legal froodom by abiding scale of geography . They would die for lreedom in England , they abhor tyranny in Franco , they do not quite like it in North Germany , they are satisfied witfi it in Austria , they highly approve of it in "Italy , and they are spitefiil against freedom in Hungary . Like the ancient Persians , they vivluo the di gnity of nations by tho inverse ratio of geometrical dintunoo . To such I would wish to aay .-Gentlemen or poora I if you desire to load England , know your own race more wisely ! Breeds of men do dittbr ; but tho highest arc soon ruined whore yot law is overpowered , unless they becomo martyra in atruffgling for its restoration ; and tho lowest races aro quickly olovatod whore law and freedom are seourod by antagonist forces . You lovo , and aro proud of , English locality , English aoourity , and porhups English progress . Yet Englmhmon have not nobler naturoa than Itabans , or Bohemians , or Hungarians . Wo have no intrinsic right to liberty more than other men ; our island and a Dutch army , not our virtue , aavod ifc from . Tamos II . Lot ua not bo highminded . Our froodom and laws will bo exposed to a struggle of
infinite danger if despotism mako its conqucHts pormnnonfc over the breadth of tho continent . The Hungarians and Italians wore fighting your battle , and yon , alas >! know it not . * You liuieiod them enemies to order , because they struggled ogiunst ijrmeu foreign oppression I But if there l > o anything certain in tho mture , ifc ia , that deapots will now conquer topethor or full together . You cannot oaparuto the causo of Jjouia Bonaparte from that ot the . TcauitH , from tho misrule of imrdinala , tho brutal police ol Naploa , anil tho foHroaa-priaonH of Austria . You oannot have liberty at homo and contented aHwvy abrond . 11 over the HtriiMjloB for freedom on tho oontiuent bogin to tlio away , despotic intrigue will onjole nuoh Englialuncn as you , and an ominous future will rino before England , which it may bo too late lor America to avert . Wo have no reasonable aoourity that Ifiuropo nhall not horeaftor booomo what Asin . is , > f the lbrooa of tyranny prevail in the present stage of ovonta . Lot tho Enghsli frjomla of Austria look to the Eastern world , and to tho old lloinuu empire , and learn , that deapotiom triumphing by aolaiora is vonaervative of nothing but ruin andputrofiwtion .
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LETTERS FROM PARIS . [ FKOM OUK OWN CdKBESPONDBNT . } . ¦ ' . Letter XIX . - ¦¦ . .. . ¦; . . . ' . / - Paris , Tuesday Evening , 4 th May , 1852 . The noble conduct of'the ¦ Magistracy of Paris > in the affair-of the ' Orleans property , seems to have set an example , which it has become a point of honour to imitate . Instances are being recorded , on every side , of Provincial Magistrates declining to recognise the Government of Louis Napoleon , and refusing to take the oath prescribed by the new Constitution . Among these
intrepid men we notice M . Estancelin , member of tho Conseil General of the Seine Inferieure ; M . Granger de la Mariniere , member of the Conseil General of the Nievrej M . Lebeau , member of the Conseil General of the Pas de Calais ; M , Failly , deputy , and member of the Conseil General of the Deux Sevres j and another , a member of the Conseil General of the Somme . But , in addition to these individual cases , we have regularly constituted bodies adopting the same course : the Tri ^ bunals of Commeree of the towns of Havre , Thiers , and Evreux , have respectively refused to subscribe to the oath . I have also to relate another instance of the
courage of the Magistracy of Paris . The journal Le Corsair had been seized for an article criticising the government of L . Bonaparte . The question involved was as to the application of the new law , which transfers the trials for offences of the press , from the Civil Courts , and places them under the jurisdiction of the Police Correctionnelle . The case having been heard by the Conseil de Paris , a sort of Commission of Inquiry , was dismissed , the Conseil having decided that the article published by the Corsair was not culpable . The Government consideringitself disgraced by this verdict , has appealed against the decision ; and the affair will be brought before the Chamber of the Mises en Accusation ( Court of
Indictment ) . But the celebrated M . de Belleyme is the president of this court . It was M . de Belleyme who , in 1830 , on the occasion of the ordonnances of Charles the Tenth against the Press , delivered the famous verdict which condemned the printer of the journal Le Commerce to print the paper , notwithstanding the prohibition of the Government . It was M . de Belleyme who presided on the bench , in the recent trial concerning the Orleans property . We must therefore hope that in the affair of the Corsair he will dismiss the case . If such were to happen , it would be fatal to Bonaparte ' s power- —it would , in fact , be the re-establishment of the liberty of the press . The journals , shielded by the verdicts of the Magistracy , would be free , openly to criticise and blame the acts of the Government .
The Empire is countermanded ; there are too many obstacles in the way . Not that the soldiers will be less vociferous in their acclamation of L . Bonaparte as Emperor ; but the sequel of the imperial fafce-is to be cut short : a third menacing Note having arrived from St . Petersburg . The Czar tells M . Bonaparte , that "he is aware of the farce which is being rehearsed , and forbids its representation for M . Bonaparte ' B benefit . That
if tho comedy were played out , it should be followed by a tragedy which the Czar , in person , was ready to bring to Paris . " This declaration of war , in case the Empire should be proclaimed , was brought to Paris by tho Generals Paskoof and Pouskino , aide-de-camps of the Emperor of Russia ,. Tliese two . gentlemen have been giving themselves the malicious pleasure , of repeating tho words of their imperial" master , in all the salons of Paris .
So then tho Empire is not to be , at least for tho present . The Elyseo is greatly chapfallen . Our swaggering brawlers have dropped their loud talking . As for tho long boasted fUe of tho 10 th May , it has quito lost its value in their estimation . This new state of mind was particularly viaiblo at tho review last Sunday . Tho Society of Dtaembraillards wore there as usual ; but for tho first time these three months , these opon-inouthed knaves did not utter a flinglo Vive VMmpirevr . Probably their pay overnight had been forgotten ! " m
To tho flattering dreams of anticipated triumph , havo succeeded a complete fltato of dejection . Gloomy forebodings , and tho most absurd fears perplex tho ElyHiun mind . Tho f&te of tho 10 th of May , is to bo followed by a banquet and ball on tho 11 th , given by the army to Louia Bonaparte . All tho officers of the garrison of Paris' are to bo there , as well as tho . deputations from tho rest of the army . Tho Gonoral Corrolot had begun to send out tho invitations , when it
was discovered that many of those wlio had been invited hud given their tickets away . This caused a good deal of alarm at the ElyBe " o , and wan viewed simultttnoouHly as a conspiracy on the part of the army , a conspiracy of tho Legitimists , a conspiracy of tho Orlounista , and a conspiracy of tho Republicans . To prevent , therefore , tho future Emporor from coining in direct contact with his enemies , it has boon decided that tho seat of His Imperial Majesty shall bo raised at
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Leader (1850-1860), May 8, 1852, page 435, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1934/page/7/
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