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country , however , has some vested interests in . the welfare of the European structure , even of its Ottoman wing ; and it is as well that we should understand the consequences of permitting the fire to spread unchecked . If we regard it very closely , we shall perceive that there is something more than the abstract diplomatic idea about the balance of power , which disinclines the English statesman to the Russian appropriation of Turkey . The most material interests of Englishmen are immediately at stake ; and , in the further prospect , the political safety of our own country is in peril . " JProximus ardet . "
CONSEQUENCES OP THE FALL OF TURKEY " He who watches the conflagration of a great building , views with melancholy yet excited curiosity the successive fall of one towering pile after another into the roaring sea of flames , which is to leave behind it a smouldering and blackened mass ; the feeling is something the same with which we note the progress of Russia and the toppling of state after state into that , mass of despotism . Russia is " the devouring element" of Europe ; and now one more state is tottering to its fall into that " hideous ruin and combustion . " This
In the first place , English trade , especially English manufacturing trade , haa some interest in the matter . Turkey is a Free-trader ; Austria inclines to Protection , and is now actually negotiating a protective league with Southern Germany , if not with the Northern ; Russia is selfproteotive to a prohibitory degree . Xiot us state these facts specifically . The Turkish tariff imposes a duty of three per cent , ad valorem upon our manufaoturea . Austria imposes on cotton and woollen manufactures sixty per cent . Russia totally prohibits printed cottou , iron , hardware , and woollons . It was tho promise of the Free-traders , howevor , that , as soon as we could establish Ereo-tra < lo ourselves , these groat foreign customers would see thoir own Snterent , and
would reciprocato froo intercourse . . Now what are the facts P In 1827 , our exports to Russia amounted to 1 , 4 O 8 , 97 OZ . ; and , in 1851 , they . amounted to 1 , 209 , 704 £ . ; such is tho preaent result of dealing in tho expectation of reciprocity . In 1828 , our exports to Italy and tho Italian islands amounted to 1 , 942 , 752 / . ; in 1851 , Austrian Italy took only 812 , 942 / . ; less than Tuscany , which took 8 (> 9 , i : U / . There can bo no doubt that if Italy were froe wo nhould take from lior a very much larger proportion of lior produce ; and she would bo consuming our manufactures to an extent at , least as grout
as Turkey , which is not more rich in resources than Italy , nor moro in want of European articles of wear . But now , what arc tho facts with regard to Turkey P in 182 / , our exports to Turkey , Syria , and Egypt wore 595 , 328 / . ; in 1851 , they amounted to 3 , 549 , 959 / . Thus Turkey , with its smaller population and territory , couhuuioh nearly three times as much a 8 Russia ; and if wo rogard tho proportion of the population , it may be said that the annexation of Turkey to the Russian empire would involve the Jobs of all that has been gained during the hint quarter of a century —a loss of 8 , 000 , 000 / . of manufacture . How
would Manchester like that ? But we shall say a word more upon that presently . Our enormous trade with India has been for some time transferred in considerable part from the Cape to the Suez route ; our correspondence passes by the latter channel ; and the political connexion of that important dependency with the empire is much strengthened by the frequency and facility of this correspondence and the transit of officials : this path between England and India , and the Australian Colonies , this highway for all the wealthier classes of passengers , for
officials , and for official correspondence , passes through Egypt , a province of Turkey : if Turkey be , seized by Russia , some portion must be rendered to other powers , to purchase their consent ; and the most obvious probability is , that the western portion would be ceded to Austria , according to the Viennese Note which we recently quoted , and thatEgypt would be ceded to France , at least for a time . Our path to India would therefore depend upon the good will of France . And . even if France did not possess Egypt , the presence of Russia in the Mediterranean , of Austria , and of France , all powers
anti-commercial in their policy and Absolutist in their sympathies , would , render the passage of English merchandise , persons , or correspondence , extremely precarious . We say nothing now of the fact that Austria has recognised agents of Lloyd ' s extending down the Adriatic line , and so on into the very centre of Asia ; nothing of the fact that agents of Russia have actually been collected in India , enquiring , if not intriguing , to undermine native allegiance to English rule . But these circumstances must increase our distrust in the event of Egypt ' s being removed from the custody of our ally , Turkey .
With interest thus awakened to trading risks , perhaps Englishmen may not feel indisposed to take note of an important fact—that the interests of freedom , political and social , are strictly on the same side with the interests of commerce in this affair . Should Russia obtain possession of Constantinople and the Dardanelles , which is the main part of the plan for dividing European Turkey between Austria and Russia , the formidable power of the North will gain much
more than so many miles' advance of territory . She already possesses a fleet in the Black Sea , which is subject to check by tlie want of the right of way through the Turkish territory by the Dardanelles , and which it has not been worth her while heretofore to render anything better than a show fleet . To obtain a passage at present , Russia must hazard war , or obtain leave from a power which is in free communication with that of England . Remove that power , and tho Russian fleet is in the Mediterranean on the
rnere issue of orders ; and then , of course , it would bo worth her while to render her fleet efficient . Russia can then from a new point overhaul Greece , Italy , and even Franco and Spain ; can surround Malta ; and , in short , is in a position to occupy the Mediterranean with advantages very superior to those which England could command . Hut this sudden promotion of a new power in the South would much further inolino the balance against the spread of freedom which England is supposed to represent .
Half Europe would then be Cossack de facto . Tho commanding points at both onds , with military railways on her own territory , would be in possession of the Cossack power ; and with a very little coercion or cajolery , the Cossack army would really be in undisputed possession of tho whole continents ; England isolated . Our economists profess the greatest dislike of war , as a waste of money ; but they will observe that peace—that is to say , undisputed encroachment , is likely to entail the most BeriouH money Iohs upon the industry of this country .
Mr . Cobden was at ; the head of that Free-trade party which pledged its reputation on a , reciprocation of free trade : a section of the same party —though not , wo believe , a very numeroiiH section—in now doing its best to induce this country to adopt absolute peace on the name calculation of reciprocity . Lot us for oneo refer these freetrade fanatics to the lesson convoyed in their own favourite St . h . d . Wo havo always waid that ponce must be earned , and M . Ennle de ( -j irardin tins just put forth a proposition for earning peace by a coup de main . ife proposes that , art the Russian fleet in tho Black Sea , now , by virtue of these new encroachments , menaces Wontom Europe , tho English and French fleets should
unite , and should " go in and win "—should enter the Black Sea and , in true Copenhagen style , destroy the Russian fleet . That is his recipe for " securing peace , " and truly we believe it would be both an easy and effectual way . War is very expensive ; but if we regard the trade of the Turkish empire alone , we may perceive that we are threatened with the loss of a yearly trade which would in itself represent the interest of a very large outlay indeed . It would be impossible to estimate the
loss which might follow from the obstruction of transit with India , if not from the severance of that dependency , followed possibly by still greater losses on the occupation of the Mediterranean by hostile forces . In short , the possession of Turkey by Russia would very probably be followed by an expansion of the Russian tariff to a much larger portion of Europe . It is time , therefore , for our merchants , as well as for the true lovers of peace , to calculate whether passively recognized aggression is likely to prove the best economy after all .
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PRACTICAL GOVERNMENT . Some of our contemporaries have discovered that Austria has abandoned all disguise in Italy ; makes no attempt to conciliate the people ; disregards even the appearances of justice ; violates the rules alike of international law , of constitutional right , and of property , to maintain her rule solely by the exercise of naked force . W ^ e have made the same assertion for some time , and are only surprised at the lateness with which the discovery dawns on our contemporaries , who have had the facts before them as long as we have .
In like manner Turkey is now menaced with extinction , and the sole question upon which her fate is delayed is , whether the two powers who are competing to divide her can either of them safely take more than its share , or whether they can safely defy the other powers of Europe . Diplomacy is charged to arrange this matter , but it will do so mainly upon two grounds—namely , that if extremities are hazarded by either of those two great powers , tho other powers of Europe will feel it incumbent upon them to maintain a better attention to the balance of
power ; and secondly , that if tho two powers push matters to extremity , a war in Europe may endanger the supremacy of legitimate authority . It is only arguments of force that will obtain any serious attention in that discussion . It is true that diplomacy never speaks directly , and that the intimation of those disastrous consequences will be conveyed in language very indirect . But the involutions of diplomatic meaning arc never difficult to follow , and wo all know that , substantially , the representations , however courteously they may be couched by
" the undersigned , " will strictly point at the violent consequences of * violence . The great powers will regulate their own course , its excess or its moderation , in j'roportion to thoir selfreliance or their fears , and in either oa . se the result will turn upon the mere question of force : that is the true ruling power of this time . We hear much of " public opinion , " but of course those who rely upon it do not mean the public opinion of persons no better informed than the ignorant masses , or common soldiers , or even the ordinary run of military oHirers . Now ,
public opinion resides , for the most part , in the hands of those who have made a study of history or scionce , and of their application to the daily business of life . On . the whole , it may be Haul , that tho high public opinion of tho world resides either amongst tho literary classes , professionally so called , or amongst those educated classes of society which are as highly informed as tho literary classes . But those classes neither constitute nor furniHh tho hulk of military men , they
do not command in the military department of any capital of . ICuropo . One would not go to a Radetzky or a Ilaynau for any profound exposition of judgment . Yet thcij govern ; and this public ; opinion in its best form scarcely possesses any important hold on the administration of the world . In Franco wo have seen it actually deposed ; it has boon imprisoned , exiled , transferred to penal settlements , or shot ; and the true eonduct of public affairs has been handed over to a few inferior intellects at the sorviro of one man
whoso intellectual elevation is a subject of grave inquiry . In tliis country , perhapB , apart from these biterary and refined intellects , which are
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There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . —Db . Abxold .
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ir SATURDAY , MARCH 26 , 1853 . .
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TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted , it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . M " o notice can be taken of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his good faith . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . All letters for the Editor should be addressed to 7 , Wellington' street , Strand , London . . Communications should . always be legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them .
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March 26 , 1853 : ] THE LEADER . 297
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Leader (1850-1860), March 26, 1853, page 297, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1979/page/9/
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