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Besides the numerous anecdotes and personal sketches these volumes abound in , there are many excellent ; remarks both on art and , life ; we must find space for one : our contemporaries have already been so liberal with the anecdotes , we may omit them : — - ' . . -,. v * ' Never disregard what your enemies say .. They may be severe , they may be prejudiced , they may be determined to see only in one direction , but still in that direction they see clearly . They do not speak all the truth , but they generally speak the truth from one point of view , as far as that goes : attend to them " ¦¦ ¦ .. , . - . . ; ¦
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ENGLISH : PHILOSOPHY . An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought ; a Treatise on pure and applied , Logic . By William Thomson , M . A . Third Edition , much enlarged . Pickering . An Enquiry into Human Nature . By John GvMacvicar , D . D . Simpkin , Marshall , and Go . Elements of Psychology . Part I . By J . D . Morell , M . A . Pickering . The Philosophical Tendencies of the Age ; being Four Lectures delivered at Edinburgh and Glasgow . By J . D . Morell . People ' s Edition . Robert Theobald .
[ SECOND AETICIE . ] Although Mr . Morell belongs to a school of thinkers to which we are fundamentally opposed , and his work therefore contains much both in spirit and in detail we very distinctly repudiate , our differences have not blinded us to the great and unusual merits of his \ Elements of Psychology a work we welcome and commend as beyond all comparison the most important of its kind which has been published for many years . We welcome it on these several grounds : It is written with admirable lucidity ; it translates into language intelligible to English minds the main results of German speculation ; and , lastly , it will serve as an effective mediator between the two antagonist schools of Metaphysicians and Physiologists . It will do more to destroy the old psychology than fifty works written from the physiological point of view , because it will iTispnsiWv lpfld fitRT 1 wsirian to the onlv real d where those l Oil tu but i cni yv ju . gi . vxl \ jo&
. m , » « s on erroun insensl - [ - ' - y -lead HUJliapuyolCiailS ; um ^ ^ muuu o subjects can be investigated . It is undeniable that hitherto mental phenomena have been treated ex professo by men ignorant of physiology , or else ignorant of psychology . The one alarmed at the very idea of mind being " degraded" by its association with physiology ; the other scornful of metaphysics , and endeavouring to identify things markedly separate . As organic Chemists endeavour to identify physiological phenomena with chemical phenomena , and make the most deplorable mistakes in consequence , ( witness Liebig , and many of his chemical reasonings on subjects to which only the physiologist is competent , ) so do physiologists endeavour to identify mental phenomena with those
more complex phenomena which form the special object of psychology . Mr . Morell , although a metaphysician in spirit , is eclectic enough to see the defects of both these schools , and endeavours to reconcile what is true in the point of view of each . He begins by ranging Psychology beside the other positive sciences . "So , " it will be said , " did Stewart ;" but although that agreeable litterateur talked incessantly of Bacon , and of the Philosophy of the Mind as " an inductive science , " in his hands it was in no sense a positive science : the physiological basis was left to shift for itself ! In Mr . Morell ' s work , the physiological point of view , although subordinate , is never entirely set aside ; and for this English philosophy will have to thank him .
Only the first volume of the Elements has appeared . It opens with a lucid and interesting historical sketch , bringing clearly forward the point to which European research has now attained . After two preparatory chapters , it enters on the analysis of Intelligence ; a second volume is to include the analysis of the l ^ eelings and the Will . A passage or two may be selected for consideration here , as specimens . On the old question of the unity of mind , he savs , —
"To conceive of mind under the idea of a multiplicity of powers and operations will always , in the long run , prove untenable . We know that it is one . The unity of consciousness is at once the deepest , surest fact of our nature , and the most rigid condition for a complete mental philosophy . The physiologist may point to the nerves , the phrenologist may apportion the cerebrum , and the empirical psychologist may enumerate his system of mental powers and operations , but still we say , where is the starting point ? What is the principle of unity which binds tho whole together P What is tho true idea of mind in relation to nature ? Where
can wo plant our scientific gaze , so as to see all tho facts of observation as one vast whole—having a beginning and an end , a method and a purpose , an essential idea , and a real destination which is ouch moment in process of accom plishment ? itational psychology attempted , indeed , to grasp this unity , but ran into barren abstractions . Empirical psychology has never been able to reach that unity at all , but stopped short at tho phenomena , without explaining the fundamental principle . " Hero the metaphysician Bpeaks ! He cannot rest contented unless ho
know " tho principle of unity "— " tho true idea of mind in relation to nature . " But lot us apply the same objection to tho Physiologist ;—lot us say , " You must not conceivo the body as a multiplicity of organs and functions , separating brain from liver , lungs from heart , pancreas from kidneys , —or if you do , wo still ask you what is tho principle of unity which binds tho whole together P what is the true idea of Life in ' relation to nature P" Ho would shrug contemptuous shoulders , and pass on his l in 11 to find out the
w 7 ' , . X K S " principle of unity "—the " true , idea of Life "—if wo could ! Mr . Morell ' s point of view is tho one taken by Scholling and many of hw Successors , —viz ., the identity of tho real and ideal , of object and Hulnoct . This makes idea the correlate of law ; and is built on tho lullucy that tho phenomena which wo enn interpret by reason into rational tormulro must themselves be reason ! We touchod cm this point formerly in reviewing ( Eratod ' a Soul in . Nature . Mr . Moroll thus indicates ' lus aianding point ( ho is speaking of Natural Scioneoand Mental Scionco ) —
cVff ^ T' thui' ° 'UC lhree ftMMlmnontnl relations , which these two sciences have at W « R . r # ° | T . " . tov ? r ( lH CIlch othor' Firet > t' ^ y h » vo i » a few instances U > i \ l i ' ¦ ' tde l fi ° * ' Mil ' lma l ) co » regarded "imply „« tho name we give ogaU « w ° t ° r ? T " - Th ° aCti ° of tUo 8 ° P ° ™ / oar ZttlS ° ^ ° tl " 8 prinCi P l 0 tO b ° WUtched nnd rcwrd ° <* iu tho « amo y M th 0 ftctlou of the Btomnch or lunga , nnd then tho facto which are brought
but , together with their legitimate deductions , W ul constitute all that we can possibly know under the head of mental philosophy . ¦ . nrnnu ^ 1 v " Secondly , These two sciences have , in some other instances , been completely isolated from each other . All truephilosophy , it has been said , is hased uponfacl * . The facts on which natural philosophy is built are all observed «* te «^ J » senses , ' whilst those on which mental philosophy is built are observed tW ^ by the consciousness . The two spheres accordingly must he wholly a P ™ ' , 1 cannot observe one single fact of nature by consciousness , nor one single tact 01 mind by the senses . Hence ; with the exception of the bare mefhod of procedure , the two sciences can have no communication whatever with each other . sciences
« The third relationship , which has been affirmed , between the two ' . ,, w based ' upon a deeper and more penetrating view of science itself ;—a view wnictt includes both regions of research under one higher and broader unity . ¦ ¦¦ 1 he science of nature , according to this third principle , is not merely a science of facts . * acts indeed must be diligently observed and classified , but then they must be rationally interpreted ; that is , the reason of man must bring all outward facts and jaws within its own sphere ; must see their meaning , their purpose , their hidden analogies , their perfect unity in the whole scheme of existence . Viewed m tins light ^ nature again becomes indissolubly linked with mind . The laws of reason are seen to pervade both alike , to bear the impress of the same creative mind , to be developed by virtue of the same great principles of universal existence , to conspire for the same ultimate and thus to form one harmonious universe ..
purposes , " Whatever general laws , therefore , we can detect in the one , will be applicable , more or less , to the other . In a word , we shall have in nature , as it were , an objective mirror , side by side with our inward consciousness ; a mirror m which the march of reason , and the laws of mind , are seen witha dim indeed , but-still with , a sure reflection . " On the first paragraph we would remark , that when " Mind is regarded simply as the name given to the functions of the brain and nerves , the error is precisely analogous to the error of the organic chemists before alluded to . The nervous system has other functions besides those of mental action ; it has quite as much to do with respiration , assimilation , locomotion . &c , vet no one can class these among mental actions : but
over and above these , it has the special functions of mind , and the speciality of these demands our separating them into a distinct science , founded on , but not limited to the science bf physiology . It is because physiologists have not recognised this necessity that they have incurred the stigma of " materialism , " and allowed " ^ materialism" its free passage through the vague inane . ^ # - Mr . Morell ' s chapter on Sensation is a striking contrast with those usually found in treatises on Psychology . It is very clear and ^ philosophical . We would remark , however , in passing , that suggestion he has adopted from Mr . JSToble of the corpora striata and optic thalami as the " actual centre of the emotions , " seems most infelicitous , as there stated . Mr . Noble is too good aji anatomist—especially of the brain—> not to be aware of the great structural differences of these two portions ; and as difference of structure involves difference of function , the two cannot subserve the same purpose . Mr . Noble must surely mean something else than here appears ? We can afford room but for one extract from this chapter ; it shall be an interesting one , on THE EAR AND THE EYE . " The nerve of the eye is nearer to the frontal region of the brain ; that of the ear to the cerebellum , and the posterior regions . The former , accordingly , being : more nearly allied to the intellectual organs , is calculated to convey impressions ^ which appeal at once to the understanding ; the latter , more allied to the region of passion nnd sentiment , is calculated to convey impressions which appeal rather to the deepest feelings and emotions of our nature . "' The one , ' says Erdmann , ' is the clearest , the other is the deepest of the senses . The same contrast shows itself in the objects by which these organs are severally affected . In the former case , the object shows its outward surface , as ifc exists unmoved in space : in the latter case it betrays , by means of the tone it givea forth , what exists within and under the surface . It is not the form and colour of an object which tells what it is , but its sound . For that reason . the sight of a thing does not penotrate so much to the heart ; it only tells' us what is its appearance . On tho other hand , the tone moves us ; it tells us how tho thing , or tho person , stands to the heart itself . On that account , we can easily explain tho phenomena so often observed , that deafness is hard and distrustful ; while blindness ,
is mild and confiding . " ' We see things only at rest;—their motion is only observed mediately , by comparing a moving object with a resting one . On the other hand , wo hear succession , i . e ., motion immediately ; an <| rest ( i . e ., the continuance of a tone ) , only by measuring it upon tho flow of our thoughts , and tho continuous pulsations of tho momenta . On that account , words ( i . e ., tho ever-recurring thoughts , ) direct themselves to tho ear ; only where thought perishes , and turna into a dead letter , can words become visible . Inasmuch as sight gives permanence and certitude , I write a bill in black and white , and that gives conviction . ' If I want to bo moved , however , I must hear . You may read many a thing quietly , which , if you read ifc aloud , would make your very voico tremble / " Tho chapter on Intelligence as Intuition is also full of intorost ; among the passages we should object to there is this : —
" A question might bo hero raised in the minds of some , whether tho fact of tho lower animals ' perceiving' objects as distinctly aa man , does not prove the nonintellectual nature of perception , and remove it altogether from any direct identity with those other regions of thought which wo have now placed on the came scalo with it . Such an objection , I imagine , could only arise from an imperfect analysis of tho elements respectively involved in sens ation and perception . That tho lowor animals possess every thing included in tho organic element of wonsation as perfectly an man himself , may bo readily admitted . But tho instant wo get beyond tho itself
nervous -impulse , a vast difference bocomea olworvablo in tho two canes . " In tho one caso , the organic affection appeals to and cxcitcH simply the brute faculty ; in tho other , it excites tho humanfaculty . Tho difference botwoen tho two , in the case of perception , lies hero : that while tho bra to percoivefl objects , and actB in roforonop to them only instinctivel y , cither for tho satisfaction of its appotiteH , or for self-prcaorvntion ; n conscious reparation ia instantly effected by tho human faculty between , tho subject and tho object . In thia . separation lien the Ar « t distraotivo act of human intelligence , an , act to which thore soon succeeds an appro-
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¦ . ¦ ¦¦; . . . . ¦ ¦ . ¦ i . ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ : ¦;¦ . 21 fi | THE LEADER . | Si 3 ^^
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Leader (1850-1860), July 23, 1853, page 716, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1996/page/20/
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