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HOW TO GAIN £ 1000 , 000 , 000 BY WAR . Three courses would , as usual , lie before any British Ministry at the commencement of an European war . There would , no doubt , be more than three , but the others would , to a certain extent , partake of the character distinguishing that sacred number . There would be , first , the course of extreme and dilatory caution , protracting , as much as possible , negotiations , and
postponing action by palaver . Secondly , there would be a mixed course—endeavouring to conduct the action of this country according to old rules , avoiding the principal part as much as possible , and leaving the chief hostilities to be carried on by the litigant parties ; this country reserving itself for a merely auxiliary position . Thirdly , there would be the course of taking a decisive and active part , and carrying aggression into the enemy ' s camp .
The policy of negotiation has been tried during the last six months , and the results are not such as to make . us anticipate anything but loss from the continuance . By devoting six months to diplomatic action on the side of the Allied Powers and of European law , the effect has been , thaf the material preparations for action , when it shall become necessary on that side , have been principally left to Turkey , a semi-barbarous power , whose means of organization are not strong or perfect . She has , no doubt , obtained time to construct fortifications at Varna so extensive as to be
a burden rather than a strength ; and slie has mustered upon her European territories hordes of barbarians from Asia Minor and Northern Africa , which cost her much to maintain , and which threaten as much as they support the authority of the Sultan . In the meanwhile Russia has been permitted to collect and dispose her forces where it best pleases her ; to undermine the allegiance of the vassals of the Porte ; to talk over , half way at least , the Emperor of Austria ; to pursue , with comparatively little counteraction , his threatening persuasives towards the King of Prussia ; and , in short , to make liis combinations with as little hindrance as if they were unsuspected . England might , if she pleased , continue the plan of
disguising pusillanimity under the name of negotiation oven after Kussia should have proceeded to actual hostilities with Turkey . While the Turks were fighting , England might talk , and correspond , and in the end , either Russia would gain her point , —gain , perhaps , the whole Ottoman Empire and vanquish England before the world ; or , England at least would have to buckle herself to the labour of resistance , with all the disadvantage of having permitted her adversary to gaiiiHuch an enorniou . s start . It is evident that the policy of negotiation in lieu of action could have no other but one of those two results , . since Russia bus proved by her acts that she will not scruple to negotiate while she continues to work .
The medium course , of supporting one . side in the hostilities without taking a foremost position , would very much resemble the position which England occupied during a great part , of the last European war , and it would bo necessary for her to proceed iu the name manner . . In the first place , her support to States carrying on hostilities would have to be rendered , in the form of money ; and in the second pined , if we fell short of miece . ss , England would have to furnish armies of her their
own , to sustain her allies on own ground , us she did in Spain and Flanders . It would be difficult , at the present day , to recover the bill for the expenses of the armies in Portugal and Spain , but it was very considerable . The subsidies also form no small " item in the general account . The total cost of that war may bo reckoned nt ; about l , 0 () 0 , <)<) 0 , 0 () 0 / . of money ; ami if thi . s country is prepared to carry on the next ivar in tbo mine way by proxy , —^ -iu the first instance by subtudicw ,
and ultimately by undertaking the business of the Continent herself , —it is more than probable that our national debt will be doubled . Small chance of getting rid of the Income Tax in 1860 , if we recommence the mistake which procured us experience at such an enormous price 1 England has not yet tried the third plan . Napoleon attempted it in part , but he could not thoroughly throw himself into it , because he
never was really devoted to the interest of his country , or of any country for which he professed to act ; but had always an underhand purpose of his own to be gained by crooked means . Those crooked means he pui'sued at the cost either of the foreign country or of France . At the commencement of the century we witnessed the prosecution of a war by Napoleon to establish great empires , in which he would have been content io divide
the world with the Russian Emperor . Mankind , however , would not consent to be partitioned between Alexander and Napoleon , and they themselves could not complete the partnership . By the mistake of England the war against . Napoleon was converted into a war to establish what we called " legitimate" thrones , —States for the sake of families ; and to that aim Europe was then sacrificed . Families have repaid the favour by the grossest and cruellest mismanagement . It has been necessary to depose more than one since that settlement , and those who have not been
deposed , like Ferdinand of Spain , Ferdinand of Austria , or Charles the Tenth of France ; or set aside like . Cohstantine of Russia , Miguel of Portugal , or Carlos of Spain , have themselves infringed the law upon the strength of which they were ' established , and have subverted the very States that we set up with their own thrones . The war to establish legitimate families has not succeeded in any of its objects , direct or collateral . The great result is , the enormous tyranny and cruelty which rules legitimate Europe , from St . Petersburg to Naples .
In 1848 we saw a move directed to establish Republican Government ; a purpose in which this journal could sympathise , if the state of opinion amongst numerous classes of Europe were sufficient to hold out any promise of success . But , if a war to establish a Republic is a calamity worth enduring for the result—a rebellion not to establish a Republic is a calamity which we deprecate , because we do not get the price for it ; because , in fact , we depreciate the public itself by the fiiiiurfi .
It is for England a most remarkable fact , that in all those Avars , —in some of which she took an active and conspicuous part , and in all of which she professes to exercise tin influence ,-r-slve abstained from upholding the principles to which she owes her own political existence and independence , and which she vaunts as peculiarly adapted to the welfare of mankind . England exists by constitutional government ; bat she has never
taken the opportunity of movement in Europe to seek the direct extension of her own principles . The result we see in the general decline of constitutional principles on the European field . Lord Pahnerston has habitually boasted that we have established the form of Constitutional Government in Belgium , Portugal , Spain , Sardinia , and France ; but except Belgium and Sardinia , what has he now to show beside a form that mocks the
boast ; while a real constitution of genuine growth h ; ts been extinguished in Hungary . We believe that this failure is in part due to the fact that England has nowhere . sought to ally constitutional principles of government with the victory and glory of States , —associations that go far to make the multitude reverence the institutions to which they are attached . Louis Philippe himself , who was called to the throne by the acclamations of the French people , mifFered a kingdom to slide under him because he neglected to do anything for the glory of his country , and the people censed to respect their king any more than the tradesmen who made his army , and whose uniform he wore . Commerce itself follows in the wake
wake of viet . nrv . il'flio viciiwu lio rnL > il livn iuiu . > oI victory , if the victory be ruled by a wise spirit . England has now before her an opportu - nity which she has often had , and never used ,- — that , of entering into the contest of Europe with a determination to use her victories as a means of propagating her own principles . By this course , too , England would at oneo incur far less expen . se , and obtain far more certain returns , than by either of the other two . As to the expense , she would not need to mibsidiso governments as n meana of propping them up against the
will of their own peoples . In the last war aha I spent 1000 , 000 , 000 / . of money to force particular families upon reluctant nations . It is a very ex pensive process , and one which offers no return " political or commercial . If she were to raise th ' standard of constitutional freedom , she would have to deal , not with reluctant , but with willing peoples , and the families she mi ght defy . She would not then need to subsidiseforeijnr armioa' f ~ her armies would be supplied by the peoples themselves of Europe . The thing they want is not men nor money , but an accredited leader ; and if the flag which bears the three crosses of the ' United Kingdom were raised with the avowed purpose of fighting' to establish constitutional govern ment Europe itself would furnish the army to follow that flag .
The return . ' Already we know that the trade which we carry on with Europe , is but a fraction of that which the peoples of Europe desire to carry on with us . The German trade is but a fragment of what it might be , if anti-commercial Austria and customs-intriguing Prussia , did not interfere ! Corn , wool , and wine , which we could take in such large quantities , could not be sent to us unless we were permitted to pay the people in consignments of our own produce and manufactures . Hungary has by its accredited representatives offered us a trade : in Italy a latent trade only
waits permission to burst forth . The very people of France are already influencing their own government to adopt our commercial principles ; and-if we could secure to the French Emperor such a title as an alliance under the sanction of a victorious flag would confer , he would but too gladly adopt all our commercial principles and some perhaps of our political ; for belt observed , that freedom after the English fashion is not incompatible with monarchy as is the theoretical freedom which has so often waged an unsuccessful contest with the families .
We have said nothing here of the American alliance , but we well know that in such a war the American flag would be raised by the side of our
own . Such a course then would involve no outlay of 1000 , 000 , 000 £ , but would return all the influence of a genuine victory for the peoples of Europe , and not against them ; wou Id establish on the continent many a constitutional State to be an outpost of our freedom , and would open to us a trade worth the outlay of the 1000 , 000 , 000 / ., which we paid before to close Europe against us . The only thing wanted is an English statesman to appreciate the opportunities and the instruments which lie ready to his hand .
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THE BURNLEY MASTERS' COMBINATION . The strike of masters as well as men in the cotton districts appears to continue , we regret to say , with no improvement of feeling on either side . Both sides exhibit that want of intelli gence for which both will have to pay the penalty . Wo say this with regret , and we know that we say it Ihe
at the expense of some odium from both . ' masters cannot tolerate any journal which sees reason on the dde of the people , and , on the other hand , the ^ orking classes will not believe in the friendship of a journal which at the present day does not advocate a rise of wages , through thick and thin . We kave no doubt , indeed , that some of our readers in that class who have watched
our writing for three years and more will understand why we now say that a time has arrived at which the working classes should be very careful in pressing claims , the commercial merit of which is a matter of question , and by sudi readers we shall be respected not the less because we persist in repeating what to us appears to be the truth . A mere rise in wages is not in ltsclt good , unless it stands upon a real basis . It i « true that masters have frequently retained for them-Helves a larger share of the returns of trade than had known
they could have done if their men the ' whole state of commerce . And we arc anxious that the working classes should increase thoM knowledge of such facts , in order that they may preserve themselves from being defrauded when the state of thu labour market and the ffoo < w market would yield them higher wflges . . Hut , at present , there are Hovoral circumstances wlncn contribute to check the profits in the cotton trade . Although the trade has extended , tno value of the manufactured article lias not , «|> o » the whole , advanced . As we showed not long since , while our exports have increased in 'l '"" " ^ about one hundred per cent ., the gross value liiw
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There is nothing so revolutionary , because thereis nothing so unnatural and convulsive , rs the strain to keep things fixed when all the -world is by the very la-w of its creation in eternal progress . —De . Arnold .
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SATURDAY , OCTOBER 8 , 1853 .
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970 THE LEADER . [ Saturday ,
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Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 8, 1853, page 970, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2007/page/10/
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