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TO OUR READERS AND SUBSCRIBERS . TABUAMBNT SKETCHED ON THE SPOT . " The Stbjlhgsb" wIH resame his sketches of Parliament in the " ! Leai > b « " of the 4 th of February next , to be continued weekly daring the Session . The ftillomng is an extract from the last number of THTC WBSTMINSTER REVIEW : " The author , who does not give his name , seems to have the most perfect familiarity with Parliament and Parliamentary matters ; and , indeed , appears to have sat in the House of Commons every' tfight during 1 last session . His observations there , and Ms reflections on what he saw and heard , lie published from week to week in the form of news * paper articles in the 'XiEajder . ' The papers , as they first appeared , attracted a great deal of notice in London , both from the freshness of their information , so different from the matter served up in the ordinary Parliamentary reports , and from the wit and stinging sarcasm with which they commented on the men and the events of the day .
" Never before has the public had such an opportunity of seeing things as they actually are in Parliament , and of known ? the physiognomy and habits of that great assembly . In thisTespect the book , small as it is , is worth files of all the Parliamentary reports of the last ten years . Add to this that , m point of style and literary execution , the book is equal to the very best newspaper-writing of the day , while yet it is distinctly original in its spirit . Shrewdness , sense , and satire are its characteristics ; tmt there are touches of something higher . The author does not -write as a Whig , a Tory , or a Radical , but sketches Parliament , as he himself saySj' from a hitherto unoccupied point of view . ' ' What Thackeray is to social snbbtoism in general , this author is to Parliamentary mobbism .: and we are much mistaken if the terror of his satires has not already had some wholesome effect - even within the walls or St . Stephen ' s . We sincerely hope he may continue . to ' take notes and print them' daring the coming session ; and we believe that so decided a talent in so important a department of literature , will not remain long anonymous . "
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NOTICES TO COBEESPONDITNTS . " A Democrat ? cannot have read Non-Elector carefully , or he would have observed that the satirical gibings of that writer-are not to be aeoapted in their literal meaning . Non-Elector did not mean that all well-born and scholarly men acting democracy are hypocrites , except in the sense £ haA they are unconscious hypocrites . Sir P . Burdett tnought he was a democrat , and so did the democrats but we all now know that Sir Francis was mistaken . . ¦ . "T . H . B . " — The subject las , already been discussed ia full in these columns . ¦ ¦
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There is nothing so revolutionary , p e cause there is nothing ao unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all th . e-world . ~ is by the verylaw of its creation in eternal progress . —Dk . Arkoud .
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there no otTxer untoward conaderaHon , tfee ^ onld * at least be this-that France does not come into this conflict with clean hands , and that any S ^? J P } 0111 ^ alliance between the Erench an 3 -British Governments fo * the conduct of the war would almost inevitably make Britain a consenting party to certain ugly transactions , past or now meditated , Of Louis Napoleon . At the very moment that Louis Napoleon is jgoing to war in Ibehalf of the independence of Turkey , he is himself an military possession of Central Italy ; and there
can be little doubt that , whatever zeal he may show in prosecuting , in alliance with'Great Britain , the war against' Russia , ' he does not expect that any disturbance will be offered to bia scheme of a French Empire in the Italian PeniflBtjla . SPcfl ^ seeing that the Diplomacy of'Great Brit&ln openly consented to his original tu 6 i of occupation in the PeBtnsula , when he got possession < 6 f Borne by crushing a nataonal * iftep&blie a * Kl restoring "the Pope , is it fety hkely thtffc tins same Diplomacy would th * 6 w % sttf obirta * cies iaa if he the %
m way , thought war gaifiBfc Russia a proper opportunity of demati&iig an increase of license sosth of the A % )» . One possibility still remains / A % present it Ifr the hope and exultation of many , that whatever efee may Woffle *© pass , Great Britain and Frarte ^ go into this war together . This alliance of tfe * two . g ^ reat OPowera of the West for a common Enterprise is regarded by toany as the most hopetfal political feature of tike tune . But , unless Mf * Bavid UTquhact Is a'false propnet , we oughtliiiot toHbe too sure that we shall long hawthis atliatuft to depend upon . Louis Uaptoleon , * rp to the preaettfc moment , has been apparently ia earnest
against Russia—more m earnest < £ » eoi than > th ® Btitish' Crover&inent ; and One can se < r many reason * why tire French Empefro * should find a war against Russia to be for his interest . -Still , the freaks and depths of Russian diplomacy are suet as no man can . caleialkte ; oti& ^ kv&i & LotM Napoleon personally sllotfld b ©* diarp £ sed to hold firm , It is not impossible that , as the last and crowning stroke of Russian int * i guev 4 ; bs > Bpring « £ the-present year may witness B © aie' cleVerlyarranged discord between France and England . To isolate Oreat Britain Would be so splendid a feat on the part of the < 3 iar , that we tniy be w&& he is > at this moment , whether through the Legitr * mists or the JFusibnists , or by mesre detect © vi *' - ttoesto Louis Napoleon himself ; ' tfyitaf-ltt pracch
ticability . Should he succeed in ^ ti an attemfj > V Great Britain would find herself alone , with the option of yielding to the Czar * or uhdertakibg single-handed the championship of liberty , and the command of a European Revolution . In such a dilemma , tf our dynastic politician ! are at the head of affairs , they will prefer the fortoecaltertiaiive . Such are some of the possibilities in the future development of what -is now beginning . One of them may be preferable to another ; but under each we have reason to fear what may occur if the war is conducted dynastieally and dinjetnati * cally . ** " ^
while the peoples wouT 3 go forward to the warln faith , and would evoke in its behalf all the strength that the accumulated wrong , the deep discontent , and the pent-up political speculation of Europe can give to it , the Powers and Diplomacies , upon whom the management of the war will ctegessarJl y at first devolve , go forward to it timidly an cHiesi- tatingly , conscious that they too , as well as Russia ^ walk over ground saturated with , hostile elements , ' and that the battle they are to fight must be fought over a mine . In other words , the Powers ' and Di plomacies have two incompatible things to , do—to fight Russia , on the one hand , and to conserve the dynasties and keep down the democracies on the other . This is what we call eenductinfirtne !
war dyriastically and diplomatically ; and , as sure as fate , the war so conducted wil l lead to nothing but disgrace and disaster . Let us glance at the possibilities as they successively present themselves . The most favourable supposition for the Diplomacies is , that the Four Powers co-operate energetically against Russia . The co- operation , or at least the sympathetic neutrality of Austria , is here the point of anxiety . Let this point be assured , let Austria be strictly neutral , and what follows' ?
Why , that in attacking one European despotism , the Diplomacies are pledged to the conservation of another equally bad , but more brittle 1 They purchase the co-operation of Austria , they purchase even her despicable neutrality , by a virtual pact to keep her as she is . To please and reward Austria , her brutal right < jf misgoverning a cluster of splendid populations will be guaranteed to her ; the services of Poles , Hungarians , and Italians in the war will be dispensed with ; and the Turks ¦ will be obliged to accept the irdnimum of assistance
from that quarter . And this is what the Diplomacies would like best . Possibly , in such a state of affairs , the Czar might find himself overawed and beaten ; but the defeat would" "be one leaving Europe open to him as before . He would be thanked for retreating across the Pruth ; Germany would still be a prey to Governments as bad as his own . Turkey would be protectorated in a manner not very unsatisfactory to Mm ; and uneasy Europe would continue to exist with all her Dvnasties and Di plomacies in tact—the alternative still being Russia or the Revolution .
Fortunately , the neutrality of Austria is all but an impossibility . Fortunately , we say ; for out of the contingency of an Austrian -secession to the side of Russia , good cannot but arise in spite of the Diplomacies . For , then , the other three Powers must break with Austria ; and it will not be necessary to make a bargain with one despotism while making war upon another . Hungary and the Austrian Slavonians will , by the consent of diplomacy itself , be placed at the disposal of the Turks ; Austria will cease to exist by the mere
continuance pf the war—some portions of her per * haps rushing towards Russia , and the others taking commission under the Di plomacies ; and when the war is ended , her place in the map will be vacant . If the Diplomacies in such a case were to be victorious , the reconstruction of Austria would be too great a folly even for their infatuation ; and more probably Prussia would be promoted to the Imperial place over Germany , while Hungary , Turkey , and a Slavonian power or two would rise as infant states under a Western
Protectorate . This would be a hard result for the Diplomatists , and they would do their best to settle the matter so as to outwit the Democracies . But what if Prussia also proves false ? In that case , the defence of the liberty and the civilisation of Europe devolves upon France and Great Britain acting in concert with Turkey . The war will certainly , then , be infinitely ennobled and simplified , and will move in a direction necessarily leading to finer issues . Involved in such a war , France and Great Britain -will be obliged to permit every element of hostility to Russia that exists in Eastern Europe to start forth in its own uniform , and
THE COMING WAR . Thb war into which we are driven may be conducted so well as to be the grandest course of activity in which Great Britain has been engaged ; or it may be conducted so wretchedly as to leave Great Britain permanently damaged , and dethroned from her place among the nations . In which of these two ways the war is to be conducted is the paramount thought of the present moment .
There is every reason to fear that , at least at the outset , the war will be conducted badly . It will be conducted on dynastic and diplomatic principles , and towards dynastic and diplomatic ends . For how stands the case , and how are the parties grouped ? A dispute having arisen between Russia and Turkey , four European Powers , fearing or pretending to fear Russian
preponderance , have sent their diplomacies into the field of the dispute , and after having reasoned with Russia , have been obliged , by the process of diplomatic etiquette , to signify that she is in such a position that , however reluctantly , they njust go to war with her . Supposing all the Powers to be in earnest , their sole motive to war is a desire to keep Russia within certain limits . So far their motive
is also that which animates the peoples of the West , and makes them long for a conflict with the Czar and his hordes . Thero is this immense difference , however , between the spirit in which the Four Powers , even supposing thorn all sincere , deairc to conduct the war , and the spirit in which the peoples would fain see it conducted , that
marshal itself according to its own national tendencies . And after such a war was over , supposing the victory to be on the right side , tho powers and nationalities thus called forth would necessarily have greater liberty to adjust themselves spontaneously and wider possibilities of new political arrangement . N " pled ge of tho Western Powors in favour of Prussian or Austrian dynasties being in the way , the nationalities of Eastern Europe might be permitted to group themselves anew after the war in more natural combinations . Still , even in such a case , the vice of dynastic or diplomatic management would make itself felt . Were
And what is the lesson ? The lesson is thisthat , from the -very first , Great Britain ought to accept this war pure and simple as a great war of interest and duty , and resolve to carry it on with * out reference to dynasties and diplomacies , but solely with a reference to its immediate and proper object , and to the collateral good it may bo made to yield . Great Britain ouglit to define this war to herself from the very first as a war undertaken primarily for the political incapacitation of Russia by the mutilation of her territories and the fracture of her dynastic system ;
and , secondarily , for the solution , by the way , of the great problem of how to shatter Austria , so as to make real nations out of her fragments . Great Britain ought from the first to rejoice at her good fortune in being placed in such a position that what is necessary as a war of self-defence maj ^ also be made a war of general contribution to freedom and civilisation . Great Britain ought from the first to see that her only and natural allies in this war arc tlie Turics , who are already making wa * against Russia , and the nationalities or the South and East waiting to be let loose upiojl her . So defining the war , and so entering Upoj * ** » " should not have to fear the result . "With Prussia and Austria wo should have nothing to do—they will be traitors , they must be encumbrances . If France went with us , well and good ; but we . should be under no obligations to share with her , on account of the alliance , the responsibility of her past or her future criminality . Nay , were we forsaken l > y
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January £ 1 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER , ^ " * ———M— in ^_^ , ^_
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SATUKDAT , XAJSTFART 21 , 1854 .
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Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 21, 1854, page 59, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2022/page/11/
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