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What that state was before the -war may be gathered from the folio-wing interesting passage : — , " Circassia is nearly all of tie same topographical character , and to its peculiar formation its inhabitants , in great measur e , owe their independence . It is known to be composed of an immense number of elevated plains , of a very productive character , separated from the low country , and from each other , by precipitous ravines , which regular troops , even without cannon , find it extremely difficult to traverse , while the inhabitants move about from place to place with a quickness and facility which wear out their pursuers , who are often obliged to act on the defensive , and have as yet never made any permanent impression on the country . The bravery , and capability of supporting privation , which these mountaineers possess is well known , and is admired by none more than by the Russian officers who have acted
against-them , many of whom I heard declare , that so long as the Circassians can obtain arms and ammunition , there is no prospect of their being subdued . One y « ar , the general who commanded only advanced a distance of twelve miles , and had afterwards to retreat and abandon the country . On this occasion several thousand Circassians , profiting by his absence from the neighbourhood of Stavropol , his usual head-quarters , threw themselves unexpectedly upon P-etigorsky , a district considered so far from the dangerous parts of the Caucasus , that the mineral springs there were the resort of many wealthy invalids . Tbe incursion is described as having been completely successful , and occasioned great alarm at Stavropol . Not 3 ong afterwards an equally bold attempt was made on the town of Georgrefski , where there is one of the forts of the line , and notwithstanding the resistance of a considerable garrison , the mountaineers succeeded in rendering themselves masters of the adjoining town , and kept it for several hours . "
A few pages further on General Macintosh adds some suggestions , probably as useful now as then .: — "A border clan , in a feud with more powerful neighbours , may , at times , have promised them allegiance as the price of intervention , but no more general submission to foreign supremacy has ever been recorded . " The resolution of the Circassians is indomitable , and I may observe , in conclusion , that a fe \ y light guns , if they could be brought to work them efficiently , would render them verv formidable . A single six .-pounder would , by report , make Gagra untenable . The Circassians are excellent marksmen , but are said to be slow in reloading their rifles with the forced ball ; hence arms , especially rifles of better make ^ are much in request , as well as ammunition . These , it is to be hoped , have now been abundantly supplied . "All parties in JRussia , though differing as to the means , agree that the entire subiu » ation
pt the Caucasians is a political necessity , both in reference to the security of the Russian provinces beyond the mountains ^ and for the development of her power in -Asia . The circumstance of an intervening region , inhabited by a warlike and independent people , through which communication is oftert impeded by their occupying a single defile , has ever been a subject of inquietude and mortification ; and this obstruction may now be raising a more intense feeling , with the expectation of its becoming an insuperable barrier . " At the present moment , however , the reader will naturally inquire what General Macintosh may lave to say about the Crimea . Oh this subject he has , indeed , a great deal to say , and as he says it better than we can , per-r haps it -will be as well if we permit him to speak in his own words—premising that a description of the well-known defences of Sebastopol preceded the pages we extract .
" Haying mentioned the state of the fortifications at Sebastopol , at the period of my visit , I may observe that it is , perhaps , unfortunate that between that time and the year 1853 , almost no attention should have been given in England to their condition and progress . I is true that it was visited soon after I : saw it , in consequence of my having reported what was then going on , by officers who more than corroborated my view ; tut when the war broke out , we had absolutely no positive information in England as to whether or not the plan for fortifying the land side of the great naval arsenal of Russia , on the Black Sea , had in the intervening , period , been carried to completion . So late as last year ( 1853 ) travellers , who , however , were not military men , reported that the town was still altogether open to the land side . Detached works may , however , have existed even then which escaped their observation ; and there is little doubt that , since flie occurrence of war , the Russians have been busied in extending the defences on that side . The landing-places near the monastery of St . George ! are too precipitous to be surmounted in the face of a defending force prepared for such an attempt , —and any force landing on the level shore between Cape Kherson and Sebastopol , would n-. ost probably find itself at once engaged in a general action , and would
Have to hght tor a space large enough to encamp upon . I am , therefore , certainly of opinion that a descent made in the immediate neighbourhood of Sebastopol , even with a strong and well-appointed force , especially after so much time has been allowed to Russia to erect fortifications ther-c—though these may be only field-works ;—and to collect forces for their defence , would be a very bold and hazardous undertaking , and that while a subsequent busty re-cmbarkation , should it occur , without any object having been attained , would , in itself , bo inglorious , a great loss in men and materiel would hardly fail to attend such a repulse . * ' When we consider the great scale on which arrangements must be made for attacking oven an imperfectly-fortified place , the heavy and cumbrous cannon and siege stores which it would be necessary to ltuid here , the great quantity of provisions requisite for the support of the besieging corps , to last possibly some months , and which must bo collected in a secure situation j and when we take into calculation what a largo force ought also to be kept in front to resist attempts to raise the siege : when we consider further that tho army must land on a level shore , commanded at no great distance by heights of very considerable strength , and that the area wliere it would have to make all its preparations , is too confined
ior tlio operations or so largo a lorcc asi would bo required for such an attack , I feel persuaded that my vi « w of tho subject will bo admitted to be just by all who have had experience in such matters , though it may not meet the wishes of many who arc too impatient that a blow shoukl bo struck at nny cost in that direction . If the object , however , were to inko permanent possession of tlio Crimea , us well « s to capture Sebastopol and tho ileet , it appears to mo to involve u inero question of tho adequate magnitude of the attacking force , and the proportionate aculo of tlio operations engaged in , with due pursovenuicg . in currying on tho struggle . " In attacking an insular or peninsular territory by disembarking an expeditionary force from a ileor , one gireafc difficulty which attends it consists in establishing a tirm and permanent base on whoro from whence to commence subsequent operations . For us ' thia ought to bo effected in animation affording a good harbour lor men-of-wnr und transports , anil tho local configuration , ( should lo ijuoli that tho troopB disembarking miglit bo able at ouce to , tnko up a position covering thoir lodgment— . if I may use tho oxprossioir , — -which would give ' them a secure buhis for future proceedings , and shelter when malting arrangements preparatory to their advance .
" ICozlof , or Jitojmtoria , on tlio Odessa side of the Crimea , has a harbour and good roads , leading towards Sjmplieropol , tho seat of government , ua well sis to Subaatopol . hat thia Innihng-plttoo is ¦ too-liable to risk , from its proximity to tho mainland , and the roads rasa over open steppes , whore im enemy tlio strongest in cavalry would have greatly tho advantage I think , th e refore , that Knil'u , sometimes called Thoodosia , is preferable for n disembarkation . It 5 b an excellent and cupncioua harbour , and stands at the entry of a minor peninsulu , « in which a body of troops of duo utrongtli might , alter a Bliort struggle , establish Hwolr ,. particularly if a uimuluincoua doscont tfero to bu made at Kortcli . They miglit then ? . n « Hi i i , J l > mu 8 » l ire P ' ftl 0 » 'y tl > pushing forward : for U will bo understood , that I rmnin ltj would lo by no hurried coup de mom , but only by a period of steady and continued warfare , tliat wo oouiii effect tho subjugation of tho Oilmen . of the o ?™ u , J » * . . ! nnl ln " . P' "PP * " " 8 tomo tliat Anapa on tho nearer part t . iiosnrSl ' ^ ' , ^ ^ UKkm iw [ K « n > bonod , aud in order tWly to Ut . owto tho should JTfortS l > wt ? Hy £ orlB <) a tUo couat wIlieh ln ' V i "' 11 bo in ltusaiun potion , nl o hertribesS aT Wdl T ' Circassians , who uro vorv ellicie . it insular Lore * and ml is ihfi t orJ tl % ° RUCIlHU ? '"> « WW co-operate , ahouldU invited tu tiiuton to Apnpn , ana aa Hie atrait leading into the Sea of As « f is there narrow and shallow , tho mon and chair
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IDA MAY . Ida May . By Mnry Langdon . Edited by an EuglidhClorgyman . Sampson Low , Sou « nd 0 i » Ay no small cost to ourselves wo have never hesitated to condemn the unthinking philanthropist , who periodically insists on n crusade for tho abohtiou of slavery in America . It excited aomo astonishment —we should rather write , indignation—thut this Journal , professing as it docs to bo in advance of other public organs , should never have joined the abolitionists : but our reasons are logical ; and wo uro temperate in tho perusal ol abolitionist Utoratura- ~ from Mrs . Stowo ' a books to Mr . George Ihompaons flpeeches . Wo havoaaSd than much by vny oCintroduction t <> Ida May , which is an Americarratory , intended to philosophise on » tovdry . Mass Langdon tolls us that there may be brighter , and thut ilioro cerUuily are darker aconos than
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horses could be passed over by means of rafts or lighters , of which there are many at Yeni-Kalleh and other adjacent places , and the native horses could even be swum across a distance of several miles astern of the boats , so as to pour into the Crimea a countervailing force to the Cossack and other cavalry of the Russians . Much the same course might be adopted for the introduction of supplies of cattle and sheep from the Caucasian shores for the use of the army . ' " As to a plan of campaign , although such suggestions as are matter of study at a distance are too often liable to objection , yet from what I have seen of these countries , I think I may , without risking the imputation of very great presumption , venture to point out the advantages of commencing and completing operations in the strongest part of the country , before risking a final advance . The district , called the ' south shore' of the Crimea , consists of what is evidently a low and navrow continuation of the Caucasian range , rising above the sea to an occasional altitude of 5000 feet . Its southern slope is divided from the Euxine by a narrow and often rocky plain , indented by the harbours of Soudag , Oursouf , Yalta , and Bala-Klava , all of which are good . To the north the ridge rises in steep hills and oftea in
rocky walls , wooded at the summit , and occasionally pierced with valleys , having roads leading through them into the interior . The x-oads to the westward of Aloushta are much the l ) est , and are now excellent highways . : " I shall suppose that a strong force of the allied armies has effected a disembarkation , and having cleared the peninsula of Kerteh of the Russian troops , raised such defences towards the mainland , and so effectually secured the sandy ledge of Arabat , as to be able , with perfect prudence , to leave the peninsula in its rear . I consider it might be possible for a column of light troops , accompanied by sappers and artificers , and supported by steamers * to pass along this shore , seeming each strong point in the passes through the mountain , while the main column of the army would advance along the sloping northern face of the range , where it dips tewards the steppes of the Crimea . As both columns , advancing parallel to each other , reached in succession the small passes leading across the heights , they would seize and fortify them sufficiently to secure the means of future retreat through them , if retreat should unfortunately be necessary , as well as to prevent any attempts on- their rear ; and for these reasons the improvement of the roads through the passes would be very
desirable , ihese measures would , in case of necessity , afford means of re-embarking at whatevermight . be the nearest harbour on tlie coast , wlien a retrograde movement was called for , leaving only a sufficient r « ar-guard to cover the retreat in the strongest part of the pass , which , as we have supposed , would have been previously strengthened toy fieldworks ,, so situated that the enemy could not make them available against the covering corp ? , when it abandoned them , or against the army should it again advance . ¦ ¦¦ .. ., . , " The routes along the shore near the sea , below the modntain range between EafFa and Aloushta , were , unlike those to the west of the latter place , very rugged and unconnected at the time of my visit to the peninsula ; and should they still be found too difficult for a column of light troops , descents might probabl y be made from the steamers at the landing-places opposite the small passes , so as to co-operate with the main column above , as it reached thia debouching points , which would possibly answer as well as the continued advance of a light column along the shore . . .. .
"'I imagine that the whole mountain tract of tlie south shore rriightthusbe taken possession offroin Kerteh to Sebastopol ; but it is , of course , to be expected that some hara fighting / would occur before this result could be attained' . ; and even afterwards the flat country of the Crimea might become the theatre of" a very severe struggle . But while the allies would have in their rear a strong country bordering on the sea , from whence they : could draw their supplies , the Russians would have a flat country without a single position to retire upon ; and in the event of being beaten , they would te forced back upon the isthmus ofPericop , and driven over it beyond the limits of the peninsula . Their supplies , too , in the Crimea , must all pass over this istlimus , as our supremacy afloat would enable tts to stop all water transit , not only over the sea on the Odessa side , but also on that of Azof , as small steamers , gun-boats , and the very launches of our sliips of war mi g ht , I have been told by good naval authority , enter that shallow inland sea , and sweep it clear of every description of vessel . ' " The capture of the town of Sebastopol , from the land side , would not be a serious undertaking to a victorious army , supported b y a powerful fleet , and its s « a batteries arid the ships in its harbour would then fall easily under their combined fire , For this purpose siege-guns might be required on shores but Bala-Klava and its excellent harbour would
then have , fallen , and would afford facilities for landing , if no nearer place should be available . Numerous ships and many troops would be requisite for these operations ; but without such a force , all thoughts of disturbing the Crimea to a serious extent must be abandoned . While advancingalong the south shore , the allied column on tlie north Bide of the heights , as well as . tq the south , would have tlie advantage of manoeuvring in a country where a large proportion of cavalry would not be indispensable ; but on advancing across the steppes towards Pericop , a field eminently calculated for the employment of that arm would begin : and it is to be hoped that by that time we might assemble a strong force oi cavalry for the purpose . . ¦ •' " The foregoing seems an approximation to the best plan of operations which could now be adopted in an attack oil the Crimea from the sea ; and as a large Russian force , if not already on the spot , would certainly be hurried into the peninsula when it * yas known to be threatened , there is no denying that it is . an undertaking of great magnitude , and of no little difficulty , especially if the passes through the mountains of the south shore should have been lately strengthened ; which , as the possibility of such an attack , in the event of a rupture with the Western Powers , has long lieen quite obvious to the Russians , is by no means improbable . "
It by no means follows , however , that because General Macintosh has sketched this plan of a campaign , based on the supposition that the Crimea is to be conquered as well as Sebastopol taken , such plan will be followed . Indeed , no one can say what plan the allies will adopt . At present , the idea that finds most favour among the correspondents of the journals is that of a landing to the north of Sebastopol , somewhere near the mouth of the Katcha . Should , this prove a good gu « ss , it is clear that the generals look to < . > arryin » tlie place at onco , and trust ulterior operations against the pen- insula until next SDriner . By landing so near the fortress thev would at
once find themselves in lace of a llussian force , equally on the north as on , the south side ; and they would act under tho disadvantage of being .. coin . r pelled to deal with the northern defences before attempting to talce the town which lies nearly open on the southern side . At the same time , a landing on the north , while it would present some difficulties to the troops , would , these difficulties overcome , rapidly enable them to destroy the Russian neat , lying at anchor in tho inner harbour , or force that fleet to soa . Tho descent on the Crimea is one of tho greatest enterprises over undertaken in the face of an sictivo enemy ; but not until it is over will the public bo able to appreciate ita hazards and its difficulties .
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" Tho peuinaulu of the Kerteh ,
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September 16 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 881
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 16, 1854, page 881, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2056/page/17/
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