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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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AFTER SEBASTOPOL—WHAT ? It is only justice to the armies of England , France , and Turkey , to assume that by this time Sebastopol is taken , and ttat the flags of the three nations wave over that redoubted fortress . It is a great blow ; and , no doubt , a permanent blow . We disbelieve the elaborate story that Marshal St . Arnaud's impetuosity
to get to the Crimea arose in . his expectation that , after the conquest , it would be created a duehy , he to be the duke , after the Crusades fashion . But we do not doubt that the Crimea is to be converted into a State independent of Kussiaj and we therefore anticipate some guarantee that , for the future , Constantinople will be safer than it has been during the last quarter of a century . ¦
The war might finish then . JN " o treaty would be Wanted . The allies might ignore Kussia : and , leaving a few war-ships here and there , gazette a peace . The Pruth will not soon be passed again by a Cossack—let Austrian policy be what it may . We may keep a fleet in the Baltic—say the Tagus fleetand shut up Cronstadt permanently . The Sebaatopol fortress and fleet destroyed , the
Black Sea will no longer be a mare clauswm English frigates can cruise about there , Russian prestige would be annihilated on all sides of Russia . Turkey , the most reforming nation on the face of the globe , grows apace , and will gradually become strong enough to do without her western protectors . ! For one campaign this would be a large result—a considerable stroke of business in defending civilisation .
A-t this ponit , therefore , the English public has to realise the objects for which it has gone to war . The leading journal , passing Sebastopol , has arrived at Cronstadt . The note " Cronstadt" is struck as boldly as the note " Sebastopol" was struck , previously , and ther , e may Tie the same official foresightedness in the reference . That would be an affair of next season ; and , of course , it is a mere matter of men . and money—tho taking St . Petersburg . But , having reached
tliat point , there comes the question—what are we to do with St . Petersburg ? Dictate a treaty ? Yes . But what do wo want with a treaty ? Th © independence of Turkey 7 ias been obtained , Tho opening and clearing of the Danube is a fact at our disposal . Tho [ Russian fleets are annihilated—or may be so shut iip as to constitute their fate a practical annihilation . Russian . prc&tige is gone . Sclmmyl is tho assailant .- and with a little encouragement and monoy Sclmmyl could do
our Indian business for us , and create a great empire between Russia and British Indiareplacing Persia . Considerations of this character suggest to us , an enlightened people , thut we have not tho slightest idea what wo aro about in thia war . If we merely mean a war against liuesin for Turkish integrity and independence , we have Jilrcady got what wo want : and further Vf nv would bo waste of time and capital . Wo h ave checked Itussia , us an encroaching power , for some yoara . Tho Austrian
statesmen detect that great fact , and are grateful to us ; consequently , wait quietly until , Sebastopol being taken , they are placed in a position to intimate to us that peace is now possible—for that they are satisfied . They are reproached for having said that they see no casus helli at present j what they meant was casus pads . The Erench and English Governments do
not want Cronstadt ; they accordingly order home D'Hilliers and Napier , and they will effect a peace , or what will amount to a peace —though there still technically may be war . Here , then , will begin a conflict between the Eng ; lish Grovernmeut and the English nation . And , therefore , arises the opportunity for the English nation becoming the English Government .
The ball—a cannon-ball—is rolling ; ought it not . to be kept up ? "We might lose the Austrian alliance . We would not lose the French alliance . Louis Napoleon dare not separate himself from England ; he consults his public opinion , and knows that Trance desires to become the chief military power in Europe—and , as a matter of sentiment , to re-create Poland . It is open to the English nation to decree the destruction of Uussia ; and the destruction of Russia means—freedom for nations in Europe . A war for any object but the destruction of "Russia is a sham war— -it ; is a
war for Austria , which is another Itussia . Affcer 'Sebastopol , then , by all means St . Petersburg—but with a purpose . We are in one of those periods of our peculiar history when public opinion , properly pronounced and organisedj is omnipotent . One reason why the public opinion anay now have power is , that our public men are fifthrate personages , not only withotit principles , but without opinions . We can point to no
One man now conspicuous in the councils of the Queen of whom we can say—he is our leader in this war . Neithea * individually nor unitedly has the Cabinet presented us with a conception of the objects of the . war . " Considerations for the public service '' excuse the mystery . We believe it may be explained by the profound unintellectuality of the men who are born our statesmen , and who are utterly ignorant of what now to do with the destinies of the State .
A public meeting is too often a "bathetical abortion in this country . Public meetings are , however , at this moment , a vital organisation through which the will of the country can be enforced . Public meetings would lead up to a November session , and Parliament would do as it has ever done—do the clearly ascertained will of the nation . A great opportunity for human freedom oilers ; will Englishmen be wanting ?
-Vrr™.^™ ^^ - *« R, R ^^N Conditions Of Russian Success
While Turkey was yet strong , Turkey beat the first great Russian Emperor in the field ; but , alas , did not know how to make the best use of her advantage . The mad warrior-ICing of Sweden , who did not know when to-% ht and when to abstain , gave the Russians , the first lessons in the art of war . Scotchmen taught them the rudiments of naval warfare ; and Frenchmen and Germans continued to improve upon the lessons which Charles XII . had so rudely initiated . Russia
stretched her arms in less than a century from the Baltic to the Black Sea , and robbed her neighbours in all directions of their frontier lands . In these latter years she has fought her way through the " Caucasus , and floated a steam navy on the waves of the Caspian . She has attained to the dignity of a great European power ; kings have humbly waited in . her aatichambers to take her orders ; and philosophers and literati have prophesied that she is the next state in succession to universal empire .
What are the sources of her success ? How is it that a , semi-barbarous nation , so much of whose power is fictitious , so nvueli of whose prosperity is hollow , enjoys so great a consideration ? Is all this prestige duly merited , or has it been hastily accorded , and ably upheld and increased ? Without decrying the deeds of arms which have made the name of [ Russian soldier
respected in Europe , we may venture to say that Eussia has never successfully , except in 1812 , engaged in wars with any power of the first magnitude , nor ¦ wi th any power in the prime of its vitality , Russia has succeeded in enlarging her boundaries in proportion to the weakness of her victim . At the close of last century , with the aid of Austria and Prussia , she partitioned Poland ; but at the close of last century the Porte , weakened as it was "by the bad organisation of its armies , was still able to withstand Austria and
. Russia- Poland was torn by internal faction when she fell ; the Porte had never recovered from the shock of her successive defeats on the Danube before Prince Eugene , So the Porte fell farther and farther to the rear , in the race of progress , while Russia came , or seemed to come , more rapidly to the front . At all events , she acquired ono great attribute of conquerors—an iron
executive possessed of absolute power" . As anarchy grew strong in Turkey , a firm despotism , grew up iu Itussia ; and although that despotism was based upon cruelty , oppression , corruption , and fraud , it proved , as a matter of course , a better weapon of offencethan the equally cruel and corrupt , but altogether impotent , Government of Turkey ,
To illustrate our meaning let us take the-European and Asian campaigns in 1828 and 1820 . Turkey had then fallen under tho hands of an energetic and clever sovereign , who , greatly to the alarm of Russia , saw the necessity of adopting European tactics and improvements . But Mahmoud had to cloar siway so many obstacles before ho could begin , that tho Greek war of independence , which enlisted sontimontal Europe against him , and tho destruction of the Janissarios , which snoilod his armv . iilaeod him at tho which spoiled las armyplaced him at tho
CONDITIONS OF RUSSIAN SUCCESS . Russia , has on tho whole been a decidedly successful empire . Up to the present time all has gone well with her ; and she has even the honour of having , in close alliance with tho rigours of her climate , beaten the great warrior of the century in a defonsive campaign . Ifortune has smiled upon , her , in giving her rulers with ambition and capacity , and foes of a second order ; a territory which no ono envies or would care to conquer , and a people as bravo as brandy and an instinct of obedience can xnako them . For long years her frontiers were touched by nations in whoso Governments tho principle of authority was weakened , and tho power of control Hourly de « troved—Governments cither
undergoing some transition , or tho prey of contending factions . For long years she had only to contend against Sweden , and Poland , and Turkey , tho Tartars , and the Cossacks Europo looking favourably on hor efforts .
, mercy of Russia , The Emperor Nicholas , knowing that the European Powers were too fearful of revolution to engage in a general war ; that the restored Bourbons had abandonod tho traditional policy of Franco iu tho " Question d'Orient , " and wore prcparotl to barter Turkey for tho llhino ; and that tho sentimentalists had overpowered tho politicians , and had rendered it impossible for thorn , to sustain the cause of tho oppress aora of thoso splendid Greeks , entered ait onco upon a war with Turkey , and seized tho supromo moment of hor weakness to attempt hor destruction . Turkey was much nioro a
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Phere is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . —Db . Arnold .
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& ^ £ j ! l $ &S 3 r , SEPTEMBER 23 , 1854 .
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898 THE LEADER . [ Saturday , ¦ ¦ ¦ " * ' iw ^ - ¦ - ¦ - - ¦ — .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 23, 1854, page 898, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2057/page/10/
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