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self to an issue of life or death . Besides ^ taking up arms for a British policy , Austria would reverse , her traditions . Along ^ the Danube her diplomacy has plaved a part all hut identical with that of Kussia , Her diplomatic action , her guarantees , her navjption privileges , hare given lessons to her great neighbour . Indeed , her present attitude , half-neutral , has heen of material advantage both to herself and to Russia . She has interposed a military line between the Turks and their invaders , who , thus relieved from Guarding the Danubian frontier , have been available for the defence of the Crimea . She has also gained a footing in the Principalities such a footing as her statesmen have
striven for during the better part ot a century . If , in this way , according to her mode of viewing it , she gains in peace all she could hope from war , is it not clear that her Gk > - vernment has reasonable grounds for avoiding , as long as practicable , the unknown dangers of a collision with Russia ? It is true that Austria may ¦« drift" into the war exactly as we drifted into it ; and this unforeseen compulsion may multiply the political dangers of her situation . Yet , if she be to blame for this , our Government and that of France are to blame equally , since both were hurried into action by influences which
they sought with desperate tenacity to control . Perhaps it is the destiny of the Russian war to involve all Europe , without ; preparing any government for the perils which await it . Of this , at least , we may be sure , that the first Austrian musket fired disperses every doubt . No one , fortunately , can be neutral in arms , and we shall then know thevalue of the alliance , if it be gained ; still more , perhaps , if it be lost . Probably , however , one of the German Powers , in the event of _ a universal war in Europe , would range with Great-Britain and France . The divisions of Germany—illustrated by the armaments of 1849—scarcely allow of an Austrian and Prussian alliance
for objects of war . It may be , as some suggest , that the Protestant element in Prussia has more natural affinity with us than the Catholicism of Austria ; but the dynastic ties betweenl-the houses , pf . Eomanoff and HonENXiNDEN are superior , in this instance , to national tendencies , and France , it must be remembered , is officially Catholic . Other things being settled , the subjects of Fbancis Joseph might fight , without a violent anomaly , by the side of those who are governed by the Pope ' s protector .
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THE NON-NATIONAL LOAN . We are astonished to hear that persons who might usually be expected to be informed on such subjects , " do not understand" the exact nature of the Government proposal on the subject of the loan . Tho confusion appears to be suggested by the use of tho name
" Terminable annuities , " applied to the peculiar kind of premium which tho CifAitr-OEiiiiOR of tho Exchequer offers to the subscribers . It is a proposal , we believe , without an exact precedent . In tho Budget of 1794 , Mr . Pitt " proposed to raiso a loan of 11 , 000 , 0007 ., in which for every 1007 . money tho londors wore to roceivo 1007 . stock in
Three per Cont . Consols , 257 , stock lour per Cents ., and 117 . Os . Long . Annuities : a complicated arrangomont intended to attract custom . Tho present plan is not quite so entangled . For every 100 / . paid down , tho lenders are to recoivo 100 / . stock in Three per Cent . Consols , and a terminable annuity , now determined , by tho bidding of those who contract for the loan to bo 14 s . Cd . per 1007 This annuity would last for thirty years . In other words , Government asked the lender
what amount of annuity . spread over thirtyyears would induce them tcradvance 100 ? . for 1007 . of Three per Cent , stock , instead of taking their gains out of the discount , which purchasers of stock . claim when they purchase in the usual Way . We cannot perceive any difficulties in understanding this plan . To understand it and to approve of it are totally different things . While we can understand the Government plan , it forces us to doubt whether the Government
understands the country with which it is dealing . It is proposing that which is not a Cityscheme , and not a popular scheme . It has neither thrown itself upon the Stock Exchange nor upon the country . From the opinions that have been expressed , even in the great building in Cornhill , it is apparent
that Government might have raised at least a portion of the money in Terminable Annuities— -that is , for a comparatively slight increase of the interests paid at present ; they would have contracted a debt , not to last for ever , but absolutely determined , say at the end of thirty , or forty , or fifty years . It has been calculated that if Mr . Pitt had
so arranged his debts , we might have been free at the present moment from the burdens that he bequeathed to us . Ministers , indeedj have endeavoured to avoid one of his faults . He did not hesitate to accept any terms which were offered in the market ; and the effect was , that while during the eight years of the first war terminating in 1801 he contracted a debt of 336 , 000 , 0007 ., besides that which he found in existence , he received for that debt only 223 , 000 , 0007 . in money . He has found a-well-informed apologist in Mr . Wilmatvi Newmahoh , who contends that Pitt could not have done
bet-ter ; and to prove it , he cites the difficulties of the time , the war , the dearness of broad b and the depressed quotations in the money market . But it is obvious that the quotations in the money market were influenced by two circumstances , originating with Mr . Pitt himself . One was a firm belief that the French were continually about to approach the end of their resources , and that to play
high was to terminate the game promptly . "So , " he said in December , 1794 , nearly five years before the termination of the first war , " I have even the authority of Tallien for saying that the French cannot maintain their assignats without contracting their expenses and diminishing their forces ; and it should be recollected that this is their only resource . Is it then too much to say , that their resources ax * e nearly at an end ?"
The other circumstance was , that when Pitt set going this lavish system of creating debt , he gave the first impulses to that tremendous depreciation that a fterwards hampered him in the course of his finance . This it was , even more than the ill-managed bargain of any particular year , which constituted Mr . Pitt a bad Finance Minister . He recklessly threw burdens upon posterity , but he also allowed the financial speculators to see that he was in a panic , and was bitten , with the mania for reckless gambling .
No wonder , then , that , like the heir of an entailed estate in a gaming house , with Jews at his back , ho ran \ ip a tremendous score of debt , and called upon us to be responsible for 133 , 000 , 0007 . without a penny evor received by tho country ; besides further burdens afterwards incurred in tho same manner . This fault the present Government has nvoidod .
But it has fullon short even of Mr . Pitt in tho confidence which it has displayed in tho public . If Pitt was reckless , at least ho triod . to find out what tho City were prepared to do . Now ifc is evident that the City woro prepared to advance money upon annuities
which , by terminating , would secure the extinction of the debt at a fixed period . Pitt , we venture to think , would have- seized upon that proposal . Lewis has passed it by in indifference , or did not fcaow its existence . To what are we to ascribe this financial blindness ? Is it that the accomplished gentleman who has been called from one avoca -
tion to edit the Budget is more familiar 'with books than with money matters ? Is it that he / can read Me ; Newmabch in the closetcan consult the precedent of the debt , and , perhaps , try to suck the brains of some stray financier , hut does not really know so much of the honest patriotism ana genuine frank liberality that really do reside in the great building on Cornhill ?
The Finance Minister of despotic Austria and the French usurper threw themselves on the body of the people , seeking the loan , not by contract , but by the subscriptions of the people ; and both succeeded beyond expectation — beyond all necessity . But as Ministers have failed to throw themselves on the people in regard to the defence of the country , — -as they prefer a kind of protracted
militia , raised from a very limited class to a national militia , —so they neglect to throw themselves on the country when they are in want Of means . They would rather screw it out of the people by compulsory taxes , and give the . benefit with the job of lending to great contractors , than deal direct with those from whom , after all , the money must come ! This is remarkable . Must " we ascribe it to
the arbitrary conduct , or the inveterate habife of jobbing ? Not at all . We impute it to ignorance . We Jbelieve that it is the result of the exclusive habits of our Ministers , who , whether they are dealing in a question of the franchise , or of national defence , or of national expenditure , mistrust the people , because they do not know them , and prefer to deal exclusively with the cliques who come nearest to them , and are prepared to approach them with cringing facilities . It is that aristocracy hauteur , that exclusive shyness , which is here paying its penalty in finance as well as in everything else .
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middle class statesmen and the ¦ ' "" army ; ¦ - ¦ --The leaders of the middle classes have hitherto assumed an attitude at once undignified and unwise towards the army . Mr . Cobden and Mr . Bright , by their conduct on military questions , have unhappily exposed themselves to a good deal of not unjust ridicule , which it is painful to us to see poured upon them by men incomparably inferior to them in character and capacity . They have
persuaded themselves that tho war spirit and the causes of war are really extinct among nations ; that wars are brought about only by the folly of statesmen and the bickerings of diplomatists ; and that the army is a simple social nuisance , kept up by the aristocracy as a maintenance for their younger sons . And therefore their ' only thought is , if possible , to get rid of the army altogether ; and it it is not possible to got rid of it , then to rewithout
duco its expenses as low as possible , the least regard to its efficiency or even its composition . They take no part m any attempt to correct its abuses , to purity its patronngo , to olovato its moral tone , to secure the respectability , and with it the civil character of tho soldier . All this , and tho credit of all tliia , they leave to other hands ; while they remain in a stato of impracticable isolation , preaching poaco wlion wo are actually ongagod in war , and iiflbrding only too much Imncllo to tho p leasantries of flippant and interested censors . Statesmen must look at facts ; no one can
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ATWCfc 21 , 1855 . 1 TfiE y 41 > m ; »?»
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), April 21, 1855, page 375, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2087/page/15/
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