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    in , its early stages , but may putgrowm its later , reasonable cause must always be shown for its continuance ; and the real treason is not to question it , but to forbid it to be questioned . The day may have come when the blind feelings of the patriarchal tent , of the Celtic clan , or of the feudal manor must give place , as the basis of authority and government , to political intelligence and political duty . If so , the lot of that

    gene-. ration on which the change , with all it 3 difficulties and perils , has fallen may be a hard one , but it cannot be refused . Let the advocates of the hereditary principle demonstrate its necessity or utility . Let them show that government by capacity , for which all are now calling , is compatible with the existence of a governing caste which all profess to respect . We will owe them , all the ' thanks due to those who convert contradiction into consistency and hypocrisy into faith .

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    THE SEBASTOPOL REPORT . The Select Committee , in its Report , has tenderly treated the character of public men . It has presented a strong summary of its opinions , based on the twenty-one thousand questions , asked and answered . But , upon the whole , it has fairly stated the incidents of the Crimean campaign , and even by its suppressions , has heightened the effect of the

    recital . Disengaging ourselves from the recollection of all that had previously been said or written , and adopting as inferences only such as are justified by the exact substance of this Report , we ask what is the result ? What would be the result in the mind of one who studied , in this record alone , the English method of making war upon a great and distant military power ?

    Some premises , however , are necessary . Forty years of peace had left Great Britain overflowing with affluence , free to draw for public services upon an unbounded fund of private "wealth , possessed of arts and appliances unknown to any former period of war , and stimulated by the enthusiasm of a pugnacious and excited population . It was not a naval power that had engaged us in hostilities ; the trade of our colonies , and of friendly

    states , was therefore uninterrupted . Trance was our ally ; our enemy was one who had created amongst us a deep sentiment of anger and aversion ; our fleet having blockaded the Baltic , left our army and a powerful squadron to concentrate themselves on one point of the ltussian , territory . Nothing was wanting , in the general condition of things , to support the expedition . The nation was rich . The war was popular . The seas were open . The factions were almost silent . The

    Government was left to prosecute its undertakings , and only a small section of politicians , little in favour with the country , desired to question its policy , or to restrict its means . It is true that the nation and the press were as improvident as the Ministers . They were blustering , exulting in powers not yot displayed , defying the enemy , and trimming

    their lamps in anticipation of bonfires and victories . Few gave their thoughts oi" their counsels to moderate this braggadocio , or to keep the Government alive to a sense of its responsibilities , and so England made warthe England of free institutions , chivalrous aristocracy , opulent middle classes , contented populace , patriotic statesmen . The first blow to be struck was in the Crimea .

    / The 3 ) uke of Newcastle , therefore , directed Lord Ra . gIiA . it , commanding the army intthe East , to collect information as to the militaryi resources of the Russians in the Crimea . Before : the siege of Sevastopol " . could le attempted / ' he said , such

    information must be obtained , for little or nothing was then known . Upon reports obtained— - not from Lord RaqIiAIT , who was required to obtain them—but elsewhere , Ministers founded an eager confidence in the success , of the attempt . Lord Aberdeen relied on a cvup de main ; the Duke of Newcastle talked of wintering the army in Sebastopol , of ordering it to the Bosphorus after that fortress had been dismantled ; Sir James Gbaham thought he had found " Crimean authority "—who must have been as ignorant as Sir James Gbaham was reckless—for all

    necessary information ; but what did Lord Raglan say ? That his own information as to the power of defence possessed by the enemy he was ordered to attack was not precise enough to justify such a resolution ; but that he decided upon an invasion of the Crimea " hi deference to the views of the ( ignorant ) British Government . " As to our ambassadors at St . Petersburg and Constantinople , who should have been the best instructed , they dismissed the subject by replying that they knew nothing about it . We want lights in the cabinet of diplomacy , at least .

    The desperate enterprise , undertaken by Lord Raglan , who confessed he was in the dark , was commenced , and ministers dispersed to their holiday recreations . Between six and seven months passed , involving important official changes , and no Cabinet deliberations in reference to them took place . But the Duke of Newcastle was at his p ^ , incessantly labouring , and suggesting

    improvementswith this difficulty , that he tried to repair a machine which he was forced to keep working , as though the engine-driver should at the same time handle the tools of the engineer . But , what with the delirium of the people , the delusion of the Ministers , and the hesitating acquiescence of the Commander-in-Chief , Sebastopol was attacked by an armj r which staked all on the event of one endeavour .

    For the success of that endeavour the excitement of the nation was well prepared . For its failure no one provided . No adequate military reserve was kept at home . The army of the East was created by a strain on our entire establishments . From June to November , though it had become apparent that the enemy was powerful , the hen

    necessary preparations were neglected . W ^ reinforcements reached the Crimea they were unorganised levies , as incapable of endurance as of action . No means beyond ordinary recruiting were adopted to restore the shattered regiments , or to render the militia available , until the crisis had arrived , and all had to be pushed forward with precipitationthe fruit of alarm . When a new Minister of

    War was created , the Minister had no ofhee , no instructions , no experienced subordinates ; ho guossed at his duties , and paid the most feverish attention to those of least importance . Meanwhile the expedition was unfortunate ; " the whole country was dismayed , " but " the Cabinet was in darkness . " Why ? Because officials in the East deceived it , and it disbelieved the press . The Duke of

    Newcastle " was not ( officially ) made acquainted until a lato period" with " the horrible mode in which the sick and wounded were conveyed from Balaklava to the Bosphorus . " An " indiscreet silonco" on the part of functionaries kept our ignorant Government inactive , though it sent out a commission to inquire , which was issued in October , 1854 , and reported in April , 1855 . In the interval an army perished .

    The Ordnance Department , to which ia committed one of the most important charges in tho service , was viciously constituted , and lemoralised by tho squabbles of its officers . Thoro was " no able hand to guide it , " and ' two officers were wanting , whoso functions

    the most economical administration had been unable to dispense with in times of peace . *' Hence , the series of errors and defaults is pursued by the Committee , from the bliitidermg Bysteni of transport to the Bosphorus , und across the Black Sea , to the still more wretched service of land-carriage from the harbour to the camp—in spite of two good roads left by the Russians , —the neglect to establish depots in the Crimea , the recklessness of depending for forage on supplies found on

    the invaded territory , the insufficient stores of food , the entire failure of the medical department , and the pestilential hospitals . At Scutari , the Committee say , the first real improvements were effected through private benevolence . No private undertaking connected with the war has failed ; scarcely one public operation has succeeded . The Government , ignorant of the countiy in which it made war , was deceived by the persons on whom it depended for information . In this double fact is contained the moral of the

    Report . As to the exoneration and blame , the Duke of Newcastle is treated favourably , in consideration of his efforts , though the Report does not exhibit him with the capacities of a statesman . The entire Cabinet is censured for omitting to concert its measures in Council at a time of public emergency . It is also implied that the Government acted with lamentable want of judgment in refusing to put faith in the unhappy narratives published by the press . On Mr . Sonet Herbert no opinion is passed . The Board of Ordnance suffers under the direct and severe

    reprobation of the Committee . Lord Aberdeen , personally , is accused of various omissions . . Admiral Boxer , not Tiaving been examined , is not judged , nor is Mr . Commissary Filder . Upon the whole , little blame is imputed to particular individuals ; but the essence of the Report is , that with nearly every circumstance in our favour , except our long inexperience in war and our ignorance of the Crimea , we carried on a mighty enterprise , with vast resources , in such a manner as to sacrifice thousands of

    British troops , to disgrace the nation , to throw a slur on constitutional government , and to risk a catastrophe which was only averted by the magnificent qualities of the army , to which the Committee refers ia language of the most exalted eulogy .

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    CHURCH EXTENSION—CHURCH DIFFUSION . Tiie Church of England is preparing a great effort of restoration . The movements of Lord Shaftesbury and of Archdeacon Sinclair are only parts , and not the most central parts , of a great whole . We do not mean that tho entire body of the Church is acting with unity of imrpose , but it is acting in the main from unity of motive . That moof its

    tive is tho restoration and extension own power—a power in which temporal influence and material guarantees subserve spiritual control . Its leading members are aiming to recover its unity of action through tho hierarchy which proaides over the discipline of the Church , for it is in this that 1 ho Church of England stands superior to t |» o other sects of tho country . It has an opiacopal staff that posaesscs in some cases nbsoluto power . Unlike the species of council tno

    which presides over tho action o ! Dissenters , oven the most orthodox , tho Bishops can agree upon certain proceedings , and carry them out ; and this power many sections of tho Church are labouring to restore . Lord Ulandfoiid moves for ^ a commission on Cathedrals and Oolloguj to Churches , for the purpose of using tho builuings and tho funds annexed to those bmla-

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• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 23, 1855, page 600, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2096/page/12/