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Leader (1850-1860), 22nd September 1855, Edition 1 of 2, Page 910, / 5^f tt It tl* ^ "flPlTt 1* JP? jpUlllll JililUrllfl

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      Untitled Article

      THMW 8 . XM ? SUBSCBIPTION TO « © & « . r . &e&toes . ?' Fqt ^ Half-Tear w ... —•• £ 0 1 S ° 2 V > fid remitted in advance . i « s » WnM « ir Orders should be drawn upon the Stbani > B ^ fc 7 Offlc e ? Lnd be made payable to Mr > , A ****** E . GAUiQWAX , at No- 154 , Strands

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      Untitled Article

      There is nothing so revolutionary , nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to iceep things fixed when all the world is by the very law o £ its creation in eternal progress . —Db . Arnoid

      Untitled Article

      at the setting-in of winter . Nevertheless , Sebastopol being the key of the peninsula , the Allies have made a great advance towards a decisive victory . In no circles of Europe , probably , is the opinion held that Russia can permanently sustain by force of arms her position in the Crimea . Signs of this conviction are apparent not in Vienna only . The report is—and particles of truth invariably float in the public rumour — that Aejdxandeb II . accepts the late event as a defeat ,

      THE PAUSE IN DIPLOMACY . The successes of the Allies in the Crimea are , as yet , incomplete . The positive orisis , therefore , is military , not political . Its issue may be decided by Prince Q-oBTSCHAKori at his next Council of "War , or it may depend on long battles of cannon between fort and fort , or on new collisions in the field . "While the results , in a military sense , are undetermined , diplomacy cannot move . Por beyond all question our chief interest , at present , is to know how the belligerent forces will stand

      In Sweden , which has cause to remember the vengeance of the Czars , no considerations have availed to forbid a parade of national joy . In Italy , perhaps , the p liancy of King JFebdinand has resulted , in some degree , from his knowledge that the guardian spirit of despotism had been exorcised from the Malakhoff Tower . From this point of view it is reasonable that liberals throughout Europe should regard with satisfaction the first real achievement of the war .

      " Unfortunately , in the discussions which take place on the subject of the Russian contest , a , spirit of absolutism is displayed on both sides . The extreme of the peace party would stifle , by violence , the advocates of war — -the advocates of war , by ungenerous sar-

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      SURVEY OF THE WAR . PBOSPE OTITE . There seems to be a veritable pauso this week in the progress of the war , but it is no doubt more apparent than real . No army can rapidly turn from carrying on , a siege , which terminated rather abruptly , to field operations , which require some little time for preparation . " We shall , therefore , bo doing our readers the best service we can in the iuterval by attempting to present a couipro-

      ^^ The Pause In Diplomacy

      casins , and by virulent inuendoes , disparage the friends of peace . If we were to read a lesson to these intolerant disputers , we would ask them not to ciairn that credit for sincerity which they will never concede to others ; ought they not to . refrain from insulting an honest opinion , lest it should be sounder than their own ? Among the exaggerations provoked by this irrational repartee , it has been said frequently , that to capture Sevastopol would not be to injure

      Russia . Fourteen divisions of the Russian army , however—or more than two-thirds of the Czab ' s regular forces— -have been sent to defend that fortress , and sent in vain . Three sanguinary engagements , and eleven months of unremitted losses ,, have reduced that host to a fragment which may be annihilated within a limited period of time . Undoubtedly , should it be dispersed or expelled from the Crimea , Russia will have suffered a diminution of military power , for

      it is a poor empire , and its treasures , now enormously reduced , have been painfully extorted , during forty years , from every source of contribution . The effect must be the more powerful , inasmuch as the Russian Government is encamped in the midst of a dangerous population . Travellers of high competence deny , indeed , that the fanaticism of the true serfs has been aroused against the Turks and their allies to the extent that

      has been represented ; at any rate , hating the French as they do , their feelings towards the English have been generally friendly . Still the Emperor JNichoias , when he addressed to the servile nation his inflammatory manifestoes , probably understood their temper . But , when all this is granted , it remains a fact that half the Russian army is absorbed in duties of police—not in original Russia , perhaps , but in the conquered realms not yet incorporated by civil relations with the mass of that iron dominion . "We have heard

      Poland—with its network of fortressesdescribed as a vast and complex Borodino , with a citadel menacing every centre of population . To garrison that volcanic territory , immense levies are required , as well as to maintain the presence of terror along every frontier . Thus , to draw out , at any point , a large proportion of the forces available to Russia for purposes of aggression , and to destroy them there , is to disable her for years to come , though to injure her vitally can only be effected by decomposing the foundations of her power .

      "We hear the English nation asking for right things in right places . " Will they now learn to insist on the right act , at the right time ? The proper time for assailing Russia was , when our aristocracy approved her usurpation , when oar middle classes were apathetic , and when to the majority it was proved that they were powerlessperhaps because they were unorganised . That opportunity arrived and passed when Hungary was invaded — when there was no fear of Austria , which stood on the defensive against a revolted viceroyalty , when the natural enemies of Russia were in

      the field , when the German courts were innocuous , when an alliance with the JYenoh nation was possible , when Denmark would have rejoiced to be set free from fatal treaties . The violated law of Europe would have vindicated such a protest , and to humanity the consequences would have been far more glorious—glorymeoning advantage—than any that can arise from a drifting war , in which the declared object of statesmen is to separate their policy from the genuine interests of nations . The irruption into Hungary was a piratical enterprise , which imbued Europe with an unprecedented fear of Russia . If civilisation or liberty had anything to do

      ^^ The Pause In Diplomacy

      with the policy of the governing class in England , that was the time to assert them . It was then that despotism presented an open front , and it was then that civilisation and liberty were in arms . Now , while military absolutism is abased in Russia , it is exalted in France , where it is more dangerous to liberal institutions throughout Europe , and where already it threatens the Italian nation From that source no aid ean be derived towards the establishment of a free

      Europethe only positive and durable safeguard against the expansive action of Russia . From Rome the influences of tyranny spread ; at Vienna , and at Paris , they are collected in the receptacles of physical power . But in no part of the world do the Allies encourage counteraction . They ask for none but mercenary allies—Italians , to expend on distant fields the blood that is sacred to Italy ; Poles to fight in aid of a speedy settlement , which would render immutable—if diplomacy could do it—the existing system of Europe .

      "We are in the condition of a nation that has stored up a certain amount of enthusiasm and must discharge it . "What will be the effect ? The active Liberals , who are few , sacrifice time and attention to crazy spouters incoherently bewailing the . nullity of the crown , and of the Privy Council ; the rest contemptuously stand aloof , disappointed , and without the courage of their opiis that of the

      nions . The only visible energy Cabinet , which urges on its generals , and that of the " public , " which , with an intoxicated indifference to responsibility , trusts that something may happen to put down Russia , and restore the rights of nations . But the policy of the war is left at the disposal of the Allied Governments , which disclaim all views of hostility to the rule of the sabre in Christendom .

      But a state of war existing between great powers in any part of Europe , is a practical contradiction of this idea . The artificial settlements of the Holy Alliance were framed with a reference to peace , and the safeguard of peace , during forty years , has lain in the fears of that pernicious conclave . The political shock in Denmark—about to result in the impeachment of a ministry—was caused , almost entirely , by the passage of the Baltic fleet , which was , prematureiy , welcomed as a signal of resistance to despotic power . In other countries the expectant populations await , with intense solicitude , the turn of fortune which shall bring their

      affairs to the surface . And it is to be noted that , at this juncture , the British Cabinet is supposed to be pressing hard on the governments of Germany , and throwing out allusions to the perils of the future . Those organs which profess to deal in popularity point to the contingency of a German war . In every direction the omens multiply of an extended conflict , unless the subjugation of the Crimea leads to a compromise . The question for serious politicians to consider is , whether a general war would not end by extinguishing weak despotisms , and replacing them by overwhelming military powers ; and whether the chances of liberty are worth tho risk of the conflagration .

      Untitled Article

      ¦ NOT ICES « O OOKKE&PQ 1 CDENT 8 . Wo notice can be taken of anonymous . communications Whateveris intendedforirisertionmust be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; , not necessarily farpublication . but as a guarantee of his goodfaitn . Communications should always be legibly written . and on © neside ^ ofth « paper only . If 16 ng . it inoreasesthe difficulty of flndini ; space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejeetedeommunications .

      Untitled Article

      side . The Leader has been " registered" at the General Postoffice , according to the provisions of the New Act relating to Newspapers , and an Unstamped copy has , therefore , the privilege of tran smission through the post beyond the United Kingdom on payment of the proper rate of postage .

      * * FiVbpence is now the price for an Unstamped copy of the Leader , and Sixpence if Stamped . A Stamped copy of this Journal can be transmitted through the Post-office to any part of Great Britain as frequently as may be required , during fifteen days from its date , free of charge ; but it is necessary that the paper should be folded in such a manner that the stamp be clearly visible on the out-

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      Untitled Article

      SATURDAY . SEPTEMBER 22 , 1855

      Untitled Article

      ^ , THE LEAPEB . . pgfc »; 28 fo Batstrpat ^

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 22, 1855, page 910, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2107/page/10/