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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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December 15 , 1855 . ] ' T H E I , E A D E R . MQ 9 .
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thing is thus secured , for humanity ' s sake but enough is not done for English ; credit , or for justice , until Colonel Turk is plaeed at liberty beyond the Austrian frontier . The incident , However , illustrates th < disposition of the Government at Vienna which takes the initiative in the movement for peace . Some mutual understanding exists between that government and the Cabinet o , Berlin . Though Austria has , from the beginning , assumed a more contemptible , because a more wavering and less frankly-avowed position than Prussia , the English public feels itself so insulted by the stolidity of King Frederick William , that it prefers the hypocritical expectancy of the Emperor Fuancis Joseph . The question , then , is reduced to one oi terms and conditions . Peace is possible , if it be possible for Russia to make adequate concessions . That is the difficulty . The offer must come from her , and must be an avowal of coercion . Whether wise or not , whether just or not , we represent , we believe , the opinion of nine-tenths of Eng lishmen when we say that the public opinion of this country would stigmatise as dishonourable a peace eonckided on any other basis . Further , the war has a tangible object—that of giving a check to Rtissian power . The object is not high , nor has it been sought by worthy methods ; but , once announced , it must practically be accomplished : —of that there is no doubt . Any negotiations , therefore , to have a palpable result , must proceed upon the assumption that Russia is to submit , and that the Allies are to retire , as acknowledged victors in a jiist cause . The most moderate supporters of the war must admit this . If the Russian Government concedes so much in principle , and ratifies its moral assent by acts of practical submission , the question is settled ; if not , it must be settled by a new campaign . Of course , there will be a subtle contention among diplomatists , and a violent public debate as to what are , and what are not , suitable terms . Too many crotchets have been intruded into the discussion to render it easy of solution . What is to be done with the Crimea ?—is a question put by those who ignore tlie possibility of its restoration to the architects of Sebastopol . Guarantees arc demanded ^ for Circassia—concessions for Sweden , as if Sweden , up to this point , had established any claim , or as if the Allies could require the surrender of Finland without having previously conquered it . Were Great Britain and France to insist on the evacuation of Finland , what more natural reply for Russia than " Come and take it , " and a prolonged and desperate war ? Our claims must be in proportion to our successes ; they will represent the amount of the superiority we have established , of our own power over that of Russia . We have gained nothing in the Baltic , except a temporary . suppression of the enemy ' s naval ascendance , and the capture of nn unimportant and isolated fortress . Consequently , in that quarter we have nothing to urge in corroboration of our claims—except , possibly , that the Aland Isles should not be re-fortified . But , the Government , ignoring in public the underplot of passing negotiations , presents its account of military and naval preparations . Tt promises for next year campaigns of gigantic proportions , with decisive results—the mo « t gigantic , and the most , decisive ever witnessed . Wo shall then make war with a hundred thousand men in the field , combined with the hundred thousand of our allies . We shall not leave the Russians to choose their own field , but shall drag them , perhaps , over a vast surface , to defend the northern point of their empire . Or , it may be , that while tlwy arc ¦
THE DIPLOMATIC SEASON . The idea of Peace has received hitherto n o official sanction . Nevertheless , a negotiation of a vague , suggestive character has commenced . It originated , to all appearance , with Austria , which fears the next campaign ; and it seems to have had this effect in London : that the Government , which lately treated the struggle of 1856 as inevitable , is now Aveighing terms and conditions . We do not go so far as to say that any formal reply has been given to the " sounding" despatches from Vienna ; it is only for young Toryism to amaze the town by hebdomadal disclosures . But it is next to certain that a general scheme of peace has been transmitted from Vienna , to part of which , at least , the Russian Government is disposed to adhere . That which may be considered positive is , that no propositions will be made by Great Britain . The Austrian Government has many reasons for desiring the discontinuance of the present conflict . It has gained , on the Damibe , substantial advantages which it fears to lose . Moreover , the war is dangerous to despotism , chiefly because it unsettles . Far as is the policy of the Allies from any project of the emancipation of Europe , the contest , as it widens , disturbs the complex and delicate system constructed by diplomacy . It approaches more closely the territories of the disaffected ; it gives prominence to the constitutional State of Piedmont ; it compels the German Governments to keep their military establishments , at least , on a modified war footing ; . and , though it increases French absolutism , and feeds with fresh blood the Papal power , it is perpetually on the verge of an incline , down which at any moment it may roll , carrying with it rulers and nations beyond tho control of Cabinets—even beyond the arbitration of standing armies . This is the fear of despotism ; this is still , in some quarters , the hopo of Liberalism ; it is only this chance ; that renders tolerable , to the democracy of Europe , the prospect of a new campaig n . Official Austria estimates these contingencies , and redoubles her efforts to obtain peace . We may say with confidence that , among other influences exerted by her to conciliate the British Government , will be an act of dramatic magnanimity towards Colonel Tuuit . He will not , in all probability , be executed , or tortured , or flogged , or immured for life ; and , though he may be kept within reach of the Imperial police , Europe will be spared at ; present tho scandal of his sacrifice . Some- <
; I gathering in the north , they will be attacked i across the Danube . Two hundred and forty 3 vessels , including forty line of battle ships , twenty corvettes , and a hundred and eighty ; gun-boats , besides the French navy will range , the Baltic to assail its coasts and fortresses . b The utmost might of England will be put 3 forth , the enemy must reel under her blows , f Such—results included—is the official pro-- gramme . Perhaps it is designed , with its i , style of reverberating menace , to give the - Emperor of Russia , a new reason for peace . j We trust that it indicates something more ; ; that it is a plain statement of the works in - progress , in anticipation of a new campaign . 5 To relax the activity of our naval and military ' departments would be the worst policy for the ? friends of peace . We have not made that ; figure in the war which would justify us in .. relying upon the prestige of our feats in the Crimea , or of our indecisive demonstrations in the Baltic . We want great and well-appointed fleets , a sufficing number of gun-boats , an army in the field , and an army of reserve , a spirited attitude in the people , proofs of a better system in the public service , signs of patriotic feeling in the ruling classes , candour and fidelity in the Government , and a display of courage and honour before the world , before our allies , rivals , and foes , to enforce the stipulations on which our diplomatists may in sist . Then we have to meet the result of aai unsuccessful negotiation—an extended war , Avith new Russian armies in the field , new generals in command , and a broader scope of operations . All this Avill bring us to dishonour if we continue paltering with our purpose , dividing ourselves between aristocratic interests and public duties , neutralising activity in one quarter by neglect in another , disgusting our soldiers of all . ranks , while requiring their most loyal exertions . Wo must not only prepare new forces for the campaign of 1856 , but a new system .
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There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so iannatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed -when all the world is by the vcry law of its creation in eternal progress . —Dr . Arnold .
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THE POISONER IN THE HOUSE . If you feel a deadly sensation within , and grow gradually weaker , how do you know that yon are not poisoned ? If your hands tingle , do you not fancy that it is arsenic ? How can you be sure that it is not V Your household , perhaps , is a " well-regulated family ; " your friends and relations all smile kindly upon you ; the meal at each period of the day i « punctual , and looks correct ; but how can you possibly tell that there is not arsenic in the curry ; something more deliberate and malignant than the poison in the anchovies , or the p ickles-, or tho preserved fruits ? It literally without exaggeration , is impossible to tell . It is quite evident that persona die of poison , the cause being unsuspected . It has been proved by the records of our criminal courts withiM tho last few claya , that poison may be detected and challenged , and yet that tho , poisoner shall escape detection . May we not have reason tw doubt whether sometimes innocent persons have not been sacrificed—the real poisoner being undetected . The Borgia has not , in our . days , courage to brave accusation , but he Jtnis a greater cunning for concealment . How can we possibly affirm at tho prevent day that Madame Laitakgk was really guilty of her husband ' s death ? Mr . Joskpii Snaith Woor . icu i » acquitted , m . < I wo think justly acquitted . When thu evidence was imperfectly stated , his guilt looked almost crt * - blished ; but wl . « n tl . « comp lement of «« evidence i . s broug ht , forward—when it , ifl shown how c . oriHp icMioiiNly anectwnateho vnjW tohis wift ; hmv l . « broug ht ; her friends tt , h < -r ' how he pressed the medical mon to state | , or Hyiriiiloni « , and Ktrove to throw light upon hov illness ; how h « made no concealment of
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NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . No notice can be taken of anonymous communications . "Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his ffood faith . Communications should always be leg'bly written , and _ on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted , it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . A . J J . ( Nicholas-lane ) . —An accepfable hint . " Late a Middy , " " B ., " "An Old Indian . " and " H . E . W \ , " next week .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 15, 1855, page 1199, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2119/page/11/
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