On this page
- Departments (2)
-
Text (8)
-
Untitled Article
-
ffP* \ 'TTOfi o- $) t\j O <Hc<^i^ o^ Jfa ' «(% *^& ^y ^~ ?^ s ^ w J^ 1PV •'U* Jt*^ J& ? (~ * _J^r \ V } ^ ~ ft \ ^ y *
-
Untitled Article
-
Untitled Article
-
Untitled Article
-
Untitled Article
-
Untitled Article
-
- — 'Yl .11* (ul-8- * JpltUllT ^lUHtrS * ' ' .
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
-
-
Transcript
-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
Untitled Article
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS , Wo notice can be taken of anonymous communications . "Whatever is intended for insertion rnu 3 t be authenticated by the name and address of the -writer ; not necessarily for publication but as a guarantee of his good faith . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , Qjvtng to a press of matter ; and when omitted , it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . During the Session of Parliament it is often impossible to find room for correspondence , even the briefest . H .-We have forwarded " H . ' s" letter to Mr . Xiandor . He ivill have seen that M . ILossutb . declines the proposed subscription . Errata . —In our last number , in " The British Historians , " for "L , ady , " read " lavy ; " in " Civilisation in Bombay , " for Feimimore , " read " Trunnion , " and for " Scotretariah , " read " Secretariat . "
Ffp* \ 'Ttofi O- $) T\J O ≪Hc≪^I^ O^ Jfa ' «(% *^& ^Y ^~ ?^ S ^ W J^ 1pv •'U* Jt*^ J& ? (~ * _J^R \ V } ^ ~ Ft \ ^ Y *
>•— " ^ V J A n i
Untitled Article
PRUSSIA AND THE PRINCESS ROYAL . We do not see how the royal family of Englandcould have contracted a marriage for this engaging Princess more advantageously than with , the heir , in the second degree , to the powerful Protestant , and , in a certain degree , constitutional throne of Prussia . Without reckoning above its -value the political liberality imputed to the nephew of Fjiederiok . William , he and his House are beyond ' the reach of a Concordat , and it is more to the interest of England to be
related , through its royal family , with the only first-class Protestant monarchy , than to be compromised with any pervert of a Popish line , or to quarter on its pension list any of the miniature dukes and princes of Belgium or Germany . Leaving France and Austria out of the question , the one being governed by a Thunderstorm , the other by a Roman , Catholic despot recently married , what are the reigning families of Fairope 1 The heir presumptive to the Belgian throne is already married ;
Sardinia is a Catholic kingdom , governed by a widower , whose eldest son is scarcely fourteen years of age , Tho Tuscan Grand Duke i , s a slave of the Papacy , an absolutist on a potty scale . The King of Naples , Catholic and despotic , is n&turaily in league with the worst despotisms of Europe . If Spain wero not oxoludcd from an English alliance by hor religious institutions , the heir to her crowu is a princess four years old . Portugal , again ^ enjoys that constitutionalism which is consistent with the domination of tho Roman Church .
Great Britain liersolf has not a priuco to spare , nor is it the recognised practice of Courts to pass by the opportunity of a . royal in imago without going abroad for now relations . Tho Princess , then , must search the Baltic kingdoms or the kingdoms of Germany for a husband . The heir-apparent , to tho Lutheran
Untitled Article
the Conferences with instructions he was compelled to forego ; that an open clause in the conditions designed to cover the result of expected successes in the Crimea , was turned to the advantage of Russia , after the capture of Kara . Indeed , when the Treaty is promulgated , we have little doubt that , beyond extorting from the Government of Russia a
formal submission to the public law of Europe , it will be a rague and illusory document . The boundary question ~ will be left unsettled , beyond the mere admission that there is to be a new Danubian frontier ; the political settler ment of the Principalities will be deferred ; perhaps the sinister suggestion of our Turkish Ally will be adopted , and the rights conceded to the Christians of Turkey will not be placed under general guarantees . Practically Russia will be what she was before , except that her relations to Turkey will be altered , and , in a diplomatic sense , amended . If there be . a meaning in treaties , it is impossible that , she should soon again repeat her attack on the Ottoman territories . That is a point established ; and , strictly speaking , it fulfils the original objects of the war . It does not fulfil , of course , the hopes of enthusiasts , or the schemes of political philosophers ; but , in this instance , popular disappointment is the obvious result of immoderate expectation .
one conspicuous evil , illustrated at every crisis by the total . neglect of what are contemptuously and vulgarly styled abstract principles . The Corn Laws were repealed not because they were unjust , but because the poor were starving . Catholic Emancipation was conceded , not because it was the right of the Catholics , but because a rebellion blackened in the gaze of Parliament . The public never cared for Military Reform , until men , horses , and equipments , perished in the very midst of war , under
a system that had lasted , unreproached , during forty years . It is not to be expected that the populace should comprehend these things , or be awakened to their import without such a mechanical illustration as was supplied in the crisis of 18 o 4 , on the plateau before Sebastopol . But the professed politicians , the statesmen , the agitators , what did they say of Reform 1 It was only ia the penny almanacks that , before the outbreak of the war , the English nation was warned that its military institutions would be failures in the hour of need .
Practically , the war leads to few results that affect the external relations of Great Britain . But , collaterally , singular political developments have appeared — the ^ French , alliance , the Sardinian participation in the attack upon Russia , the revival of the Moldavian and Wallachian national claims , the internal reforms of Turkey , and other results which can only be imperfectly represented by the Treaty of Peace .
' The Treaty will be a deception ,, but to reasonable politicians , not a disappointment . If will be the expression of Erench Imperial policy . 'Great Britain made war at the instigation of France , makes peace at her bidding , and cannot expect to record , in a diplomatic convention , political successes which she has not gained , and which she has not deserved to gain .
AFTER THE "WAR . The dilemma of the Plenipotentiaries at Paris is not so serious as to admit of a doubt of peace . It is not a difference of policy that postpones the signature of the Treaty , but a diplomatic punctilio , arising from the claim of the King of Prussia to be recognised as one of -the High Contracting Powers . He has been invited to record his adhesion to the principles of the special settlement between Russia and the Western
Powers j he withholds his assent on the ground that he should sign as a negotiator , a participator in full , in the action of th ^ Council of Plenipotentiaries . This , at least , is the colouring given by public rumour , to the delay which has undoubtedly taken place . But it is not an insurmountable , or even a grave , difficulty . If , as is understood , the English Cabinet alone objected to the admission of
Prussia on her own terms , that is not an obstacle likely long to interrupt the progress of the pacification . The momentum of Continental Europe , of every government , and of nearly every nation , is against the continuance of the war . Whatever have been Lord Clarendon ' s instructions they will be set aside . England , which asserted no principle when it was at her option to lead France into the conflict , cannot now insist 011 a point of etiquette , to humiliate the Government of Prussia . She has too uniformly practised the attitude of subordination to overcome , at this juncture , the will of
her great military ally , in his own capital , with Austria and Russia assenting Besides , no intelligent politician would risk , for a moment , the issue of the negotiations , for the sake of wreaking a caprice on the Prussian King . We assume , consequently , that the Conferences will result in peace ; because all the powers represented , except , possibly , Great Britain , aro determined tipon the cessation of the war . Wo only regret that our statesmen have raised a protest to which they cannot and dare not give effect . It is a gratuitous humiliation of their diplomacy—a humiliation they could ill afford .
When , after this half-developed war , tho public opinion of Europe sums up tho consequences , it will assign some politioal disgrace to England , and many politioal tricks , successfully contrived , to Franco . It will gradually become known to tho world , as it is already known to statesmen , that Lord Clarendon was sent to
If we endeavour to estimate , precisely , the result to Great Britain of the Russian war , we are baffled by the uncertainties of the future . We have gained nothing ., ' But , from the lessons we have learned , we might , were we a wise and earnest nation , gain immeasurably . It was never desired that territorial advantages should follow the challenge we gave to the ambitious polic y of the Emperor
Nicholas . All that was possible was the achievement of pure glory- —not animal exultation after victories , but a heightening of our character , of our prestige , of all that constitutes moral power , which is the subtle , but unswerving basis of political power . Failing this , failng to exalt- our naval and military reputation , merging our political and diplomatic existence , for a time , into that of France , exposing a thousand vices in our administrative system , proving that our Constitution admits of the preference of incapacity to talent , of aristocracy to merit , what can we do to save a remnant of ad vantage from , the Russian war ? What , but to abolish the organisation that has broken down , discard the principles that have disgraced us , rely on the manliness and virtue of the nation , and be loyal to the spirit that has made us what we are . We have contracted unnatural ties . We have forsaken things we once cherished to adore a strange
phantom of lawless power ; but it was never by such recalcitrations that England became powerful by sea and land , and took a leading position in Europe . After the war , there comes the work of peace , the thorough reformation , not only of our military , marine , and civil establishments , but of the influences by which they exist ; of tho electoral system , which fills Parliament with factions , adventurers , and jobbers—of tho Cabinet system which renders political government tha exclusive estate of a few
families—of forty families , ' by tho average of tho last hundred years—of tho Army system , by which morit ia accidentally and rank systematically advanced—of tho Civil Servico system , by which tho ntupidity of one generation is made tho precedent of anotherof every public department which fosters incapacity for the snko of corruption at tho expense of the community . Finally , and most essentially , that body of national opinions must be quickenod and purified , which sanctions political immorality , which is selfish , lethargic , and sceptical . This ie the one needful reform—the
Untitled Article
March 29 , 1 ^ 6 . ]_ TgfrlEADE ^ 2 qq .
Untitled Article
SATURDAY , MARCH 29 , 1856 .
Untitled Article
here is nothing so revohationaxy , because tlxere is nothing ao unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world 13 by the very . taw of its creation in eternal progress . —Da . Ajinoi-d .
- — 'Yl .11* (Ul-8- * Jpltullt ^Luhtrs * ' ' .
^ nhllt Moot *
-
-
Citation
-
Leader (1850-1860), March 29, 1856, page 299, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2134/page/11/
-