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William Hamilton ' s division of tlie mental facilities is , that consciousness is not , as such previous metaphysicians as Locke and Reid had taught , a special faculty of the mind , but the universal condition and pre-requisite of all conceivable mental states . The following words , from Lecture XJ £ on ¦ " Consciousness- ^ -its special Conditions , contain a clear and forcible statement of the doctrine : — - "In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental phenomena ' these are all seen to comprise one essential element , or to be possible only under one nee ssary condition . This element or condition -is Consciousness , or the knowledge that I , —that the Ego existsin some determinate state . In tins
, knowladge they appear , or are realised as phenomena , anclAvith this knowledge they likewise disappear , or have no longer a phenomenal existence ; so that consciousness may be compared to an internal hglit , by means of which ; and . which alone , what passes in the mind is rendered visible . Consciousness is simple , —is not composed of parts , either similar or dissimilar . It always resembles itself , differing only in the degrees of its intensity ; thus , there are not various kinds of consciousness , although there are
various kinds of mental modes , or states , -of-winch we are conscious . Whatever division , therefore , _ the mental phenomena may be adopted , all its members must be , within consciousness ; thint . ,, we must not attempt to divide consciousness itself which must be viewed as comprehensive of the whole phenomena to be . devided ; far less should wo reduce it , as a special phenomenon , to a particular class . -Let consciousness , therefore , remain cine and indivisible , comprehending all the modifications , — all the phenomena , of the thinking subject . "
Consciousness having been viewed in its general relations , Sir \ V % goes on to analyse its more particular modifications ,- in other word : ! , the special faculties of knowledge . Tliey are these— : md in their- cliissifu .-at . iqn Sir W . Hamilton is original : : — I . The presentative faculty , comprising external perception and internal perception , or self-consciousness . II . The conservative faculty , or memory . III . The . reproductive faculty , comprising repi'oduction without will , or suggestion ; and reproduction Avith will , or reminiscence . IV .. The representative faculty , or imagination . V . The elaborative faculty , comparison , or the faculty of relations . VI , ' The regulative faculty ,
reason , or common scuesc . Anything more clear , exhaustive , and self-evident than this classification of the intellectual powers we cannot conceive . Translated into popular and unscientific language , it . simply means this . The processes which our minds can perform , as revealed to us by consciousness , are these : ^ -l . The mind can receive an impression , idea , or item of knowledge , either from without , through the senses , or by introspection upon itself , or reflection .. II . By memory it can preserve for itself and lay up in the store-house of remembrance such
items of knowledge . III . These are recalled to consciousness , either by accidental suggestion , or by the willed effort of recollection . IV , The kaleidoscope of imagination can reproduce these items of knowledge in new combinations and forms , and so enrich the mind with selfTCombined creaitions . V . J ? he faculty of reasoning can nlso repi'oduce for itself new creations , by elaboi'ating and marshalling . the items of its knowledge ! , into successions suggested by the relations of cause
and eJFect , means and end , premise an < l conclusion . VI . All these faculties of the mind arc exercised under the control , and in conformity with the suprpinaey of the reason , that is , "the power the mind lias of boing the native source of certain necessary or a priori cognitions ; which cognitions , as they are the conditions , the forms , under which our knowledge in general is possible , constitute SO' many fundamental laws of intellectual nature . " Such aro the nocossary idea of causality , the conditions of time and space , &o .
This is the skeleton of the Hamiltonian system of the psychology of tfhc cognitions . Each oiiu of the six divisions is most amply elaborated . And not only are tho aiitlior ' s own views stated with the fullest expatriation , but thoro is tho most wondvouBly fertile and prolific citation of authorities , authorities of every ago and oveiy school , authorities of ovorv shady of opinion , authorities known as masters of philosophy , and unknown except to those who approach very noar to the nuwiov ' g own recondite erudition . The wondrous kiurning displayed must strike tho most learned rivi'lor with tuo ( Iconost astonishment . That Sir W . JUinilton
was the most learned man that Europe has seen since Julius Scaliger , we believe cannot be denied . And there is the most thorough absence of all pedantry , Pegasus is kept in thorough control ; and you are strongly reminded of the graceful and well-moulded eruditeness of " Piiradise Lost , " when you see in these lectures , studded as they are with quotations and references , that so apposite are the citations , so appropriate the context of original commentary ' or correction , that were it not for the
inverted commas and foot notes , you wolild _ hardly know that more than one mind was contributing the ideas . The whole text runs with continuous and unbroken clearness . Apart altogether froin the high original merits of the lectures , their value as ai-f eclectic ' ¦ ¦ manual of tlia history ' of metaphysical speculation , is unequalled . As a fair specimen of the renorai . style of the lectures , and as illustrative of . our latter remarks , we extract the following on the definitions of philosophy , from one of the nine popular introductory lectures .
" The term philosophy , I may notice , which was originally assumed in modesty , soon lost its Socratic and etvniolqgical signification , and returned to the meaning of wisdom . Quhitiluin calls it ncvien insoleniissiinum ; Seneca , noi / ien invidiosum ; Epictetus counsels his scholars not to call themselves" Philosophers ; "' and proud'is one of the most ordinary epithets with , which philosophy is now associated . Thus Campbell ,-in his Address to the Rainbow , says :
" ' I ask not proud philosophy ' 'To tell me what thou art . ' " So much for the name signifying we proceed now to the thing signified . . Were I to detail to . you the various definitions of . ' philosophy which philosophers have promulgated—far more , were I to explain the grounds on which the author of each maintains the exclusive adequacy of his peculiar definition—I should , in the present stage of your progress , only perplex and confuse } -ou : Philosophy , for example , —and I . select only a few specimens of the -more illustrious definitions , —philosophy has been defined :
—The science of things divine and human , and of the causes in which they are contained ;—The science of effects by their ci ' uses ;—The science of sufficient reasons . ;—The science of things possible , inasmuch as they are possible : ;— Thescience of things , evidently deduced from first principles ;—The science of truths , sensible and abstract ;—The application of reason to its legitmate objects ;—The science of the relations of all knowledge to the necessary ends of human reason ;—The science of the orginal form of the ego or mental self ;~ The science of science ;—The science of the absolute ;—The science of the absolute indifference of the ideal and real—or , The identity of identity and non-identity , &e . &c . All
such definitions are ( if . not postively erroneous ) , either so vague that they afford uo rrecise knowledge of their object ; or they are so partial , that they exclude what they ought to comprehend ; or they are o f such a nature that they supply no preliminary information , and are only to be understood ( if ever ) after a , knowledge has been acquired of-that which they profess to explain . It is , indeed , perhaps impossible , adequately to define philosophy . For what is to bo defined -comprises what cannot be included in a single definition . For philosophy is not regarded from a single point of view , —it is . sometimes considered as theoretical , —that is , in relation to man as
a thinking and cognitivo intelligence ; sometimes as praotical , —that is in relation to man as a moral agent ;—and . sometimes , as . comprehending both theory and practice . Again , pliilosophy may either bo regarded objoctivoly , —that is , as a complement oJ truths known ; or subjectively , —that is , ag a habit or quality of the mind knowing . In tliQso circumstances , £ shall not attempt a definition of philosophy , but shall endeavour to accomplish the end which every definition proposes , —inalcq you understand , as preoisoly as the imprecise nature of tho objoct-matte * pormlts , what is meant by philosophy ,, and what are tho sciences' it properly comprohends within its sphere
"Asa matter of history I may hpro , however , parenthetically mention , that in Greek antiquity thoro wcro in all six definitions of philosophy which obtained colobrity . On thoso collectively t h oro aro extant various treatisos . Among the commontatora of Aristotle , that of Anunonius llcrmico is tho oldest j and the fullest is one by an annoyuious author , lately published by J ) r . Cramer , in tho fourth volumo of his Anopdota Qrasoa Porim ' cnuUi , Of the six , the fliyjt and second dulino philosophy from its objoct-mattor , -T-that which it is about ; tho third and fourth , from its ond , —that for tho sake of which it is ; tho -fifth , ( vom its relative pro-omlneneo i and tho sixth , from its etymology . The first of thoso definitions of philosophy is— " tho . knowlodgo of thhigs oxistont , as oxlstont . " The second is— " the knowledge of things dlvlno and human . " Thoso aro both from the
objectmatter ; and both were referred to Pythagoras / The third ^ and fourth , the two definitions of philosophy from its end , are , again , both taken from Plato . Of thesethe third is , — - " philosophy is a meditation of death ;" the fourth- —" ¦ philosophy is a resembling of the Deityill so far as that is competent to man . " The fifth s that from its preeminence , ' was borrowed from , Aristotle ,-anddefined philosophy " the art . of arts * and science of sciences . " Finally , the sixth , that from the etymology , was , like the first and second , carried up to Pythagoras—it defined philosophy " the love of wisdom . " > To these a seventh and even an
eighth were sometimes added , —but the seventh was that by the physicians , who defined medicine the philosophy of bodies ; and philosophy , the medicine of souls . This was derided by the philosophers ; as , to speak with Homer , being an exchange of brass for gold , and of gold for brass , and as defining the more known by the less known . The eighth is from an expression of Plato , who , jn the Theiutetus , calls philosophy " the greatest music , " meaning thereby the harmony of the rational , irascible , and appe tent , parts of the soul . "
Of the manner in which the editors of these volumes have discharged their task , no commendation can be too high . The one , as doubtless most of our readers know , is the accomplished Professor of Mental Philosophy at Oxford . The other is one of Sir William Hamilton ' s most distinguished students , and already known as _ a philosophical writer , by his excellent translation of ; and commentary on , the Port Royal Logic . As editors , they deserve this higli praise : they have done nothing more than was required of them , yet they luive done " more than the reader clear of
could fairly have expected . They keep the impertinence ( imd the temptation was strong to gentlemen wlio are themselves most accomplished inetaphrsicians ) . of commenting upon the lectures themselves , or adding explanatory notes . Oh the other hand , the margin is frequently enriched with additional extempore- elucidations , introduced by Sir William , in his delivery of the lectures , and obtained . from the note-books pf students , Avith notes extracted n-oin Sir AVilliam ' s common-place book and miscellaneous papers r and—Greatest wonder of all , and greatest service-to ieterence to tne
the reader—every citation made , or - opinions of others , by Sir William , is traced and verified by the editors ; iind the foot-note contains tho exact book and page where the passages are to be found . Thus , in the following sentences , _ every name cited there is a . note attached , informing the reader where he can at once peruse the whole statement of the reviews referred to . " Descartes distributed philosophy into theoretical and practical , with , various subdivisions ; but his followers adopted the division of Logic , Metaphysics , Physics , and Ethics . Gassendi recognised , like the ancients ,, these parts of Philosophy , Xogic , Avith
Physics , and Ethics ; and this , along many other of GassemVfs- doctrines , was adopted by Locke . Kant distinguished philosophy into theoretical and practical , with various subdivisions ; and the distribution into theoretical and practical , was also established by Fichtc . " To the first volume are appended excellent appendices , including fragments found "' iu the author ' s desk , written immediately before hi * death , on " -Ivaut and Jloid , " the Scottish . ScImu > 1-, " &c r - - ° the second volume is attached nn appendix to the whole , sufliciemly am ] Vle , and at once alphabetical and raisonnco . Who , with tho smallest capacity of montalintrosiuustion . that hns ever .- aniiroiichud at < an acolyte
the stops of'the noble temple of philosophy , especinlly if led to his first worshi p \ , y a high pr iest ot the rites , own forget the multitude of conflicting emotions , of wonder , awe , the eagerest curiosity , tjiG consciousness of sLrengih and dignity , the conviction of littleness and innignificnnce , thnt ntoncc ovorflQOilod his mind ? In ' your proyioiw education you liavo bucn carried away from yourself , into the external world of -lwturis nncl tho pant ages of history . You Imvu been led in tlio pant to contemplate tlio wuiuli \ ms lormn nml wlainatlons of material m-niion ; yom- ntiuniion has been oocupioiVby the -rout « Iou « 1 h tlmt othur men did--the rich words tliait of licr iikmi w > oko . Ji u bcot > tish student , you In . ™ up till Una moment been at school , unaiM-iiu . tn . cinw win . Lnitfhl you •}** " » £ tntivoly wh . it you nmHfucoq . t and boheve , bocauso they told it you . For , by the mid necessities of SotfttiBli odiientlnn , oven whon nt tho Urn verity you npiwmoliod fliontudy oi ' tho higherhumamties , you were Instnioiud , as a schoolboy in tlipolomonts of grainnuir and verbal criticism . Xho summer roooas olapuos , . and again you return to
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No . 46 &Mi * m 19 , 185 fili THE LEiBER . 365
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Leader (1850-1860), March 19, 1859, page 365, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2286/page/13/
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