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THE NATIONAL DEFENCE QUESTION.
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RATIONAL measures for the defence of England must be founded upon a survey of the whole of the circumstances likely to affect our possible enemies , and ourselves . On either side there might , at the beginning of a war , be ^ a naval defeat , or a successful attempt to outmanoeuvre the opposing force ; and we should probably be exposed to more peril of this sort than our foe , on account of the incorrigible imbecility of the sort of Cabinets that are tolerated by an unreformed Parliament , and that flagitious jobbing with appointments , which is a far greater sin than any of the " vices" against which her Majesty has just
issued her royal proclamation , and woidd have formed a better subject for rebuke , especially if the powerful offenders about the Court had been compelled to surrender the offices ; nu \ pay which they cannot honestly hold . In this matter of possible defeat , or outmanoeuvring , the chances would be more against us than during the last French war , as the fleet most likf-ly to be opposed to us is much nearer on a par with our own thau . was -then- the case , and if such an accident should occur , the consequences
would be more serious from the increased rapidity of such operations as disembarking troops . We have not the elements of an exact comparison , but we should not be far out in intimating that twice the number of men might be landed in a given number of hours . On our side , such a possibility ought not to excite alarm , for our means of meeting an assailing force have multiplied in a far greater proportion ; and by means of railways we could throw upon any important point more men in twelve hours , than could have been concentrated in a week under the old system .
With a male population capable of bearing armsestimated at five millions , and of whom one half , or two millions and a half maybe fairly taken as really able to assist in their country ' s defence , a Government that was not always impelled by some sinister motive would "have no difficulty in organizing so powerful a . defensive system as to make a successful invasion of England as chimerical as a capture of the moon . The problem would be how to establish a good line of defence by a powerful fleet , and behind this lo have ^ al ways in readiness a force for concentration-on any point to prevent a landing , and other forces to occupy positions commanding all practicable roads to great arsenals or large towns . Such arrangements would be very easy , and comparatively inexpensive , as Colonel Kennedy has distinctly shown in his able pamphlet which treats of the
organization of volunteers . , The natural and rational plan of defence is disliked by the Court and aristocracy for political reasons : and they fear any extension of popular power , not from the belief that the people would misuse it , but from a conviction that it would be incompatible with arrangements by which a select few profit a great deal at the expense of the general interests of the community . With this determination to do wrong , the Fortification Commission was set going , aritPits members had neither the moral courage nor the integrity to speak out the whole truth . They commence by assuming that the Government will be permitted
to thwart the development of the Volunteer movement into a great national institution , and instead of boldly denouncing such conduct , as would have been instantly done by the lute Sir Chakles Napier , they present us with the following process of ratiocination / "We cannot admit , " say the fortifiers , " that moveablc batteries of field guns , and the few thousand riflemen who might be available on any given point , would prevent the landing of a hostile force . " What business have they to assume that only " a few thousand " riflemen would be " available at any given point ? " or what right have they to he thus in Ihnitie accomplices in the base design of limiting our means of defence , and of imperilling the nation for the convenience of worn out political factions ? Tlwt they have done so casts a doubt upon
all their plans , and the House of Commons will not do its duty if it votes one farthing : without , better nuthority than can be furnished by such men . It would be easy to throw a . considerable force in n { c \ v hours on any important landing-place , that is , any landing-place near a primary object of defence ; mid with reference to less important landing-places , their value could be neutralised by the occupation of nil the chief roads accessible from them . With the means ot our disposal , if any Government permitted an enemy to land and march twenty miles in any direction , its members would deserve to be impeached ; and the aristocracy ; who nowmonopolize nil the niilitniy " power , liinyroly upon it that they would have to pay for "any serious disaster occasioned by their own plans ,
tary enlistment is necessarily much greater than that of one raised by conscription . " If this statement referred only to regular armies it might be admitted , but even then . not . without some reservation , as a system of conscription cannot be worked except the country subjected to , it is oppressed with an army to act as a military police , as Avell as with a fighting army , an arrangement that involves a large outlay , and makes every fighting soldier cost much more than appears . The fact is , that the expense of armies depends chiefly on the rate of wages and the rate of living in various countries ; and when the conscription armies of continental despotisms are compared with our
own , we must not forget to compare also the development of industry , the ordinary food of the people , and the average earnings of the nations from which the troops are raised . ' Our Commissioners , however , do not make tiny reservation , and would have us believe that -the 120 , 000 volunteer riflemen said to be enrolled , cost the country as much as the same number of regular troops . These riflemen are indeed spoken of in another paragraph in a slightly different way ; but after a left-handed
compliment , we are told they " must necessarily be unable to meet the regularly-disciplined soldiers of continental armies on anything like equal terms . " We have no doubt these Commissioners could prove that the newly-raised and unpractised . soldiers who fought under Wellington at Waterloo , were unable to meet the enemy on " anything like equal terms ; " and they might , for all we know , deny the victories of Garibaldi's' volunteers over the trained soldiers of Austria ; but leaving them to make what absurd statements they choose , every one knows that , under
good leaders , troops hastily raised have , after a very moderate allowance of drilling , constantly beaten more . practised'soldiers ; and , in the case of an invasion , our . Volunteers' would have the immense advantage ; of fighting in their own country , where every inhabitant would assist their plans . We are Hot reckoning upon the performance . of men who had learnt nothing , and hastily shouldered a musket when the enemy came ; but . we . 'should rely on the conduct of Volunteers who had been in training for weeks or months under judicious teachers , and who haveTjeen proved to acquire the business of soldiercraft very much faster than the lowest section of the working-classes , of whom the regii ^ lar annv is chiefly . composed . _
If we will not be strongs througluour Volunteers , we must be weak ; and this last alternative being a « eepted ~ b y theFortification Commisioners , they propose to spend twelve million on works of various kinds . ' These may be divided into two sorts—the one rational , and the other irrational , or dishonest . The first arc directed to obstruct the approach of the hostile fleet near enough to bum our arsenals , , and to these we have no objection provided they arc likely to answer their purpose . The second , and very expensive portion of the scheme , is to erect costly defences against land
attacks . The Commissioners , acting upon the iniquitous notions ^ fllie governing ^ probalTtfity that a larger army would be landed on our shores than we could meet in the field- and to trust our safety to huge forts , by which we might gain time to do what ought to be done at once , namely , provide forces'sufficient for our need . Instead of defending Loudon by a couple of hundred thousand riflemen and a good supply of artillery , we arc asked to fool away £ 700 , 000 on the top of Shooter ' s ' Hill , and each principal arsenal is to be surrounded by outworks and entrenchments with a view to a siege . Sir John
BiJKOOYNE , alluding to the schemes of defending Portsmouth , observed , — "If I had 30 , 000 men , and were a general in command , I would occupy Portsdown Hill and throw up field works , and hold it as long as I possibly could , and very likely toith ' wine . vliewhs ; but icliat I should (>< ' afraid ofwould ln < jtlachiy parmajimtworks there , and not being ^ ( Ma to ocrtipy tku jxmtlon I think it would'be of such . consequence to put all your good troops constantly in the field , that there would be none to spare for the purpose . " ' Of course not ; mid the first thing a prudent general would do would be to blow up the preposterous land fortifications of the Commissioners , in order to set the soldiers at liberty to do the real work of the war .
With reference to defending dockyards against . bombardment , Sir J . BuuooYNE makes the remark— " It is one of tho contingencies of the new rifle-gun , that the extent of fortifications to secure you from bombardment would be so great , that it would be almost impracticable ever to reach it . " This shows tho folly or ^ elyin ^ : iipo ' n" - 1 brtittMtiDns :: for lho--protectioiv" : of "' nr 8 ( Jiinl 8 i"OKcept lit those cases in whicii they can prevent an approach by sea . On the subject of landing in face of mi enemy , Sir J . Buitooynk affords ec | iui 11 y valuable information ; he observes— " I have a very strong opinion about landing in the face o !' an rnemy . 1 think it the most desperate undertaking possible , unless the landin » sphice is of considerable extent . I believe that it . never was done with smewws except in Egypt , and that was under very peculiar circumstances . Tho enemy ' s butteries were lew and tar
, O ] Lir 'Fortification Commissioners , after laying down the obvious truism , that a nation's means of resisting invasion depend upon the forces it can bring into play , proceed to tell us that our regular army must bo small- —a fortunate circumstance , we are glad to admit . After this , they nuvko tho astounding assertion that "the expense of a force brought together by vohm-
Untitled Article
June 23 , I 860 . ] The Leader andSaturday ' Analyst . 583
The National Defence Question.
THE NATIONAL DEFENCE QUESTION .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), June 23, 1860, page 583, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2353/page/3/
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