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1134 THE.LEADEE . ¦ , [ .- Nip, 49&Oct. ...
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THE ITALIAN CAUSE: ITS HISTOHY AND ITS H...
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* " Tho vory day aftor tho Abovo sentenc...
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TBAVJEL.S IN GREECE ANT> RUSSIA, with an...
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front, who was entrenched boliiud ffroat...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
Mllere Is, This Week, As Great A Dearth ...
tribufcions from both sides of the Atlantic . The ^ British quota , however , was not sent in very long , and it has owed a very remarkable success almost entirely to native pens . No magazine of similar standing and pretensions has in this country ever obtained so large a circulation , and remained so long in a decidedly prosperous condition . The articles were rarely either so elaborate or so profound , or even ; so varied in their interest , as those of its English contemporaries , as that ripe and careful cultivation , of which good magazine literature is the fruitis by no means so general here as with you , but
, they were incomparably better than any similar recueil which has yet made its appearance on this side of the Atlantic , and has done a great deal both for American literary taste and reputation . It also , I am sorry to say , seems to be hi danger . The publishers , the well-known house of Phillips and Samson , of Boston ,, last week suspended payment , owing to the death of the two leading members of the firm , and the magazine , though , per se , a decided success even in a commercial part of view , can hardly separate its fate entirely from that of the rest ofthe concern . "
1134 The.Leadee . ¦ , [ .- Nip, 49&Oct. ...
1134 THE . LEADEE . ¦ , [ .- Nip , 49 & Oct . 8 > L 853
The Italian Cause: Its Histohy And Its H...
THE ITALIAN CAUSE : ITS HISTOHY AND ITS HOPES . Italy ' s Appeal to a Free Nation . —Chapman and Hall , This production , which is dedicated to Count Cavour , is among the best written works of the time on the important subject of which it treats . It proceeds upon the assumption that the Italian question was not , and could not be settled by the agreement between the Emperors at Villa Franca .-Neither will the writer believe that in the final settlement of Italian affairs the Emperor Napoleon could ever be a party to a state of things under wliir . h Austrian influence and Austrian
intervention might still coerce to despotism the Italian states . He takes , of course , altogether the side of Sardinia ; and contends that the recent war was commenced not for any purpose of territorial change , but for the express purpose of repelling an invasion of Sardinia , and that its great end would be incomplete if it left undisturbed that system by which Austria , in defiance of the spirit , if not the letter of the treaty of Vienna , had established a cruel and oppressive tyranny over threefourths of Italy .
. So rapid are the changes now taking place that books on the Italian question can scarcely be written fast enough to be right , up to the moment of publication . Much of the author ' s argument has been anticipated by recent events , and the solution dim to him is now becoming clear to us . The view he takes of the position of TSTapoleon IDE . is peculiar . Englishmen , he truly states , can make the greatness and happiness of England independent of the personal character of the sovereign , and establish her prosperity upon a national basis ; but Frenchmen , he further states , have seen reason to declare their free and uncoerced opinion , that the time for a dictatorship in France is not yet passed . The supreme power of Louis Napoleon , he adds , results from the choice of the people , who have as
much right to confer it { upon one individual as they have upon a Parliament . And while it is his opinion that no virtue in the administration of absolute power can or ought to reconcile us to its possession by one individual , still we should rer > member that there may be periods in a nation's history in which her destiny or even her will can only be carried out by one strong mind directing all her resources ; and he reminds us that one of our philosopher-poets indulged the dream , that in the progress of civilisation we might be able to discover a mode of Government , in which , unOer the influence of opinion , one enlightened individual wielding absolute power , might best represent in his acts the will of the community at large .
These considerations go deep into the question that now agitates so many countries ; the solution rests with eventualities beyond human control . The author thinks , what we may bo permitted in the present aspect of things to doubt , that the whole Italian question must nee , da bo submitted to the opinion of a European congress , or perhaps anew , or renewed war . Such gloomy forebodings are about to evanish . Joy cometh with the morning . Ho is able , however , to dispose with ease of the claims of Austria under the treaty of Vienna . Her voluntary cession of Loinbardy , for instance , deprives her of all title under any treatyright ) to toatprovince ; but supposing differences to interrupt the conclusion of peace upon tho
terms of the Villa Franca arrangement , it ought , he contends , to be distinctly understood that her claim to hold Venetia under that treaty is equally destroyed . No doubt Austria herself sees that dilemma , for lately she has shown a disposition to withdraw her cession of Lombardy , ¦ ' on the ground that the Duchies hare not been surrendered to their respective princes . What follows , we quote in extenso . " Those who cannot comprehend the motives which induced the French Emperor , in the moment of apparent victory , to stay his conquering hand , endeavour to find in the designs which they attribute to a personage whom they invest with more than the mystery of romance , reasons for a conduct which appears inexplicable . They solve that which they call the riddle of the sphinx , by assuming that Louis Napoleon assented to peace because it forwarded some secret plans of universal conquest .
" These were the considerations which influenced the French Emperor to accede to the compromise of Villa Franca . This yielding to them is but a proof of the firmness with which he adheres to the policv of peace and moderation , which he believes to be the destiny of his reign , as that oif his great predecessor was violent and universal war . " The reader will recognise the above reasoning as sound , as well as eloquently expressed ; and be induced probably to read the entire volume
' ? Those who have read the observations contained in the preceding pages upon the German confederation , and upon the character and objects of the French Emperor , will be able to assign very different and more probable motives for the course which he pursued . " When Xouis Napoleon , on his accession , announced to Europe that the empire was peace , he did not mean that France , under Imperial Government , would never go to war ; but he did mean that the third empire of a Napoleon was to avoid the mistakes of the first , and that his throne in France was not to be maintained by movements that would plunge Europe into a general revolution arv struggle .
" The policy of the first Napoleon , forced perhaps upon him by his position as the child and champion of the revolution , was one of war . The empire inherited the propagandism of the republic . The war of opinion soon became one of conquest and aggression . Ancient dynasties were destroyed , arid old landmarks disturbed , not to give freedom to oppressed nations , but to find thrones for the relatives of Napoleon , and to establish French influence by bringing reluctant nations under the yoke ... " That policy , if it could be called such , of universal war , of territorial conqiiest * of family aggrandisement , the present emperor believes it to be his destiny to avoid . His mission is a peaceful one—to assert the influence of Napoleon ' s throne without Napoleon ' s wars .
" Had his troops once passed the Mincio , he stood upon the threshold of a departure from the wise and enlightened policy he had thus laid down . Failing ( tO' our shame be it spoken ) in securing the co-operation of England , he had , before the war commenced , endeavoured to employ an understanding with Russia for the purpose of keeping the German States neutral in its progress . This was done , not in the belief that it would be necessary for Russia to strike a blow , but that the mere fact of the co-operation of Russia being secured would in itself compel the neutrality of Germany . the
" In accordance with this understanding , manifesto of the Russian cabinet was issued . It failed in its effect . It is impossible to know what communications passed between the French Emperor and the Russian court . It may be that Russia refused to coerce Germany to neutrality . It is far more probable that Louis Napoleon did not desire such an intervention . " From whatever cause it proceeded , it is quite plain that when Napoleon led his victorious army to the walls of Vienna , he had no assurance of the continuance of German neutrality . The moment he attacked the Quadrilateral he must have been prepared for some movement that might have brought him in collision with the whole of Germany . What would have been the result ? Exactly that which he has pledged himself to avoid—a general revolu ^
tionary war . Hungary in arms to shake off the Austrian yoke 1 Germany in arms against France . France would have been driven in self-defence to excite and stimulate the 'insurrectionary spirit in overy German State ; no one would . answer for or control the passions that would have been excited ; no one could tell what dynasties must fall , or what new ones be created . France would probably have marched on Prussia ' s Rhenish provinces . Tho enemies of the Emperor would have said that all they predicted of hia designs was fulfilled . Tho national feelings of Europe would have been stirred against him * and , in spite of himself , he would have been forced into that career of conquest and aggression in which the first Napoleon foil , and which ho had laid it down as the whole polioy of his life and his empire to avoid . * ,
* " Tho Vory Day Aftor Tho Abovo Sentenc...
* " Tho vory day aftor tho Abovo sentences were written by one who had watched from a far off distance tho Emperor ' a career , tho Emperor himself was thus stating to the French legislature the rooaona whioh . lnftuonood hia retirement from the war : ~ "' Arrived beneath tho walls of Verona , tho struggle was Inevitably about to change its nature , as well in a military an In a political aspect . Obllgod to attack tho enemy in
Tbavjel.S In Greece Ant> Russia, With An...
TBAVJEL . S IN GREECE ANT > RUSSIA , with an Excurcursion to Crete . By Bayard Taylor . —Sampson Low " Son and Co . ' We always take up a work of Mr . Bayard Taylor with delight , expectant of the pleasure we shall derive from its perusal . Wisely considering . that we may learn enough of the history of dreece elsewhere , Mr . Taylor confines himself to considering the physical aspects of the country . In relation to Russia his views are unfortunately
limited to external observation , from his want of acquaintance with the language . There are some pleasant reminiscences of Byron in one of the chapters on Greece , and . much that reflects credit on our traveller ' s taste , whose appreciation of the poetical is sensitively accurate . He is an enthusiast , however , in favour of Byron , and rather snubs Wordsworth and Pollok . Wherefure the two latter should be associated we hardly know . Here are some of -the reminiscences to which we liave referred : — . " Although fifty years have elapsed since Byron first visited Greece , his connexion with' the later struggle for independence lias kept alive some memories even of that earlier period . No foreign name is so well known to the Greeks as that of Veeron ( as they pronounce it ) ; his portrait always has a prominent place in the Pantheon of the Liberators . Mrs . Iila , ck , to whom he sang " Zoc mun , ' sns Agapo " still lives at Piraeus , and hus transmitted her charms to a lovely Greco-Scottish daughter ; ami Mavrocordato , his friend and ally , though blind and octogenary , was living at the time of my visit . I knew the physician who attended Mm at Missolonghi—the same in whose arms Ottfried Muller breathed his
last . Mr . Finlay , the historian of Media ? val Greece , knew him both at Cephalonia and at Missolonghi , and related to me the circumstances under which he contracted his fatal illness . Some of the particulars were new to me ; and as Mr . Finlay informed me that portions of his statement had already been published , I feel no hesitation In repeating them here . " It is well known that after Byron reached Missolonghi , he was greatly annoyed and perplexed by the turbulent horde of half-iobbers among whom he was thrown—a set of jealous , clamorous , undisciplined rogues , who were less zealous in the cause of Grecian freedom than in their endeavours to gefc a share of the poet ' s money . Ambitious to achieve some military distinction , and at the same time accomplish something for Greece , he enrolled a company of Suliotes under his own immediate command , and commenced a strict course of discipline . [ Byron ' s helmet , with his crest , and the motto
Front, Who Was Entrenched Boliiud Ffroat...
front , who was entrenched boliiud ffroatiortrc . H 8 oa and protected on hia finnkB by the neutrality pf the surrounding territory , and about , to boffin a Jong- and barren war , I found myself In face of Europe hi arms , ready either to dispute our successes or to agRT-ftViito our reverses . "Nevertheless the difficulty of the . enterprise would not have shaken my resolution if tlio means hud not been out of proportion to the r'bsujta to bo oxnoctod . It was necessary to crush boldly tho obstaolos opposed by " " ^ *? " ? : torfos , and then to aecopt a eonfflot on tho Uhhio w well as on the Adigo . It wns neoonnary to ^ rtify oursclvca openly with the concurrence or revolution , " w **" . ^ : aary to go on shedding precious blood , and at laHt risk tuat which a sovereign should only etake for the independence ° «' If Ih avo stopped it was neither «> ionfirh- woarinoB » j . ior exhaustion , nor through abandoning ; the noble cause which I desired td servo , buffor tho Interests of bVanoe . JWB groat reluctance to put reins upon , tho ardour ol oui HOiU'trs , ? o retrench from my prosTiinamo the territory fiom mo Minolo to tho Adriatfo . un < TtoB « e vanish from onoBthoarts noble aUualona and pairiotio hopes . In ordur to •«*« . " » $ Independence of Italy I made war "tf » i »» t *»« « mkrht Europe , and ns soon as tho destinies of my country miguc bo endangered I concluded poaoo , morolv _ « Our efforts and our sacrifices , have' Jhoy boon mowiy losses ? No 5 wo Have a right to bo proud o this ° ami > alffi . Wo have vanquished an ariny numerous , bravo , ami ^ vuu organised . Piedmont has boon delivered from tnw" > £ ' hor frontiers have boon extended to the Minolo . J ™ »»* of Italian nationality haa boon ntlmlttpdI by t ioho who com batted it moBt . All tho Sovereigns of the 1 ' onlnaulaoom prohond the Imporioua want of salutary ruloi'ins . * Thus , after our having given n now proof oftho mil nvry power of Franco , tho poaoo oomoluded will bo pmw' •{ nappy roaulte . 'tho future will ovory day rovonl "aditlonfti oauaofortho happiness of Ita y , the iuuuonoo oi I ranoo , and the tranquillity of Muropo . " » i , nf nrniinsti It may well bo amonffat his pjroudoat boasts , that nffiUMJ tharohulof Europe , lnyuuenoeft by an »» noBt insaiw uro « a of tho ambition Imputed to him , ho engaged In a war whlou , at all oyents , saved Sardinia from destruction mil _ « ••¦ Tho lnttuonco of Franco and the tranquillity of » uropo , are tho wfttoUworOfl of tho ompivo of fcho third Napoloou .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 8, 1859, page 18, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse2.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_08101859/page/18/
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